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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation develops a framework to assess digital forensic readiness (DFR) in 
organizations. DFR is the state of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present digital evidence when 
needed. This research collects indicators of digital forensic readiness from a systematic literature review. 
More than one thousand indicators were found and semantically analyzed to identify the dimensions to 
where they belong. These dimensions were subjected to a Q-sort test and validated using association 
rules, producing a preliminary framework of DFR for practitioners. By classifying these indicators into 
dimensions, it was possible to distill them into 71 variables further classified into either extant or 
perceptual variables. Factor analysis was used to identify latent factors within the two groups of variables. 
A statistically-based framework to assess DFR is presented, wherein the extant indicators are used as a 
proxy of the real DFR status and the perceptual factors as the perception of this status. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of information systems generates traces of all kinds due to activities exerted by humans 
as well as by computers. The art of discovering, collecting, managing and reporting this digital evidence is 
called digital forensics and has become a discipline of increasing importance for governments and 
organizations alike. John Tan (2001) described the different measures that can be taken in order to 
prepare systems to reduce the digital forensic work required to recover from an incident, and collect 
information to detect the source of the attack and reduce the system’s vulnerabilities. Tan’s paper is 
called “forensic readiness” and he is commonly credited with the coining and definition of this term. The 
present dissertation builds over Tan’s and many other authors’ works on digital forensic readiness to offer 
a quantitative assessment of the ability of organizations to provide digital evidence when needed. 
Tan’s seminal paper recounts that during the Honeynet Project, 13 subjects participated in a contest in 
which they reported findings of their forensic analysis on disk images of a compromised honeynet system. 
The head of the project, Dave Dittrich noticed that on average, two hours of intruder time turned out to 
mean 40 billable hours of forensic identification. This did not include: intrusion detection (human element), 
forensic acquisition of disk images, restoration of the compromised system, hardening of the 
compromised system, network scanning for other vulnerable systems, and communications with 
stakeholders (Tan 2001). 
Forensic readiness measures have emerged as a response to the situation described by Tan, 
and as a complement to the traditionally reactive approach used in digital forensics. “Digital Forensics is a 
discipline that primarily focuses on the post-incident side of an investigation. However, during the last 
decade, there is a considerable amount of research that considers proactive measures taken by 
organizations. Such measures comprise a digital forensic readiness plan” (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 
2011). Today forensic readiness is an indispensable part of the digital forensics discipline. 
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The development of digital forensics has not been free of challenges. On one hand, there has 
been a slow and complex process in adapting the legal framework to the admissibility of evidence stored 
and processed by computers and networks. On the other hand, companies are reluctant to disclose 
information that may cast doubts on their ability to control the security of their assets. A small percentage 
of hacker attacks are reported; 26% on non-reporters fear bad publicity, 22% believed law enforcement 
couldn’t help, and 14% think competitors would use it in their favor (Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010). 
Still, being able to assess and improve the forensic readiness status of organizations is a highly desired 
goal with clear benefits. Better preparedness reduces the occurrence of incidents and the associated 
excessive costs of corrective actions. Moreover, measures taken within an adequate program for forensic 
readiness enhance the weight of the digital evidence before courts of law. Additionally, organizations 
seeking forensic readiness are in better control of the situation when digital incidents occur. They would 
be able to manage many situations without the help of official security forces; hence, reducing the need to 
disclose their vulnerabilities before law enforcement and the public. 
Despite these benefits, organizations do not have standard mechanisms to assess this readiness. 
“Digital forensic readiness is often ad hoc and no consistent application or framework exists globally. As a 
result, there is no standard way to specify computer system's forensic capabilities or to formally compare 
systems” (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 2011), and rather, a lack of maturity in the discourse that is 
rooted in the reliance on informal definitions of key terms and concepts (Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 
2015). In consequence, Pangalos & Katos (2010) ask for security policies to be assessed for their 
forensic readiness status, and suggest the need of a metric of forensic readiness to achieve this. 
The present paper seeks to produce such a framework and develop a mechanism to assess the 
digital forensic readiness in organizations. This endeavor is undertaken through a process divided in two 
phases. In phase one, the extant literature in digital forensic readiness (DFR) is systematically reviewed 
to understand the concept of DFR and extract its potential indicators and dimensions. A preliminary 
framework, tested through Q-Sorting among independent qualified reviewers and validated using 
association rules, is revealed. This can be considered a practitioners’ framework of DFR, not yet the 
theoretical framework seeked for by this research. Phase two uses the discovered dimensions to further 
synthesize the indicators into measurable variables. These variables are tested in a pilot study among a 
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small sample of organizations. The pilot study assesses the feasibility of the survey in terms of length, 
clarity of the questions, and adequacy of the results to be analyzed via exploratory factor analysis. Once 
the survey is refined and adjusted, a bigger sample of organizations is surveyed and factor analysis is run 
again in order to discover the latent factors that explain DFR. 
The systematic review of the extant literature on DFR is deemed the most comprehensive 
mechanism to extract potential indicators of a specific status of DFR in organizations. This process 
includes the discovery of: 1) the different terms associated to digital forensic readiness, 2) the purposes 
for which this readiness is sought, 3) the steps and requirements for achieving certain status of forensic 
readiness and 4) the previous attempts to define a framework of factors that determine the digital forensic 
readiness capability of organizations. This information is aggregated, refined and sorted using structured 
techniques such as the Q-Sort test. 
The application of quantitative techniques as a means to elaborate the digital forensic readiness 
framework distinguishes this work from previous proposals, which have implemented qualitative 
approaches to build the framework. Furthermore, the present research proposes a framework that can be 
used both as an instrument for the implementation of DFR measures and as an instrument to measure 
DFR levels at specific moments. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first time this 
subject is addressed with a quantitative approach. 
The general hypothesis of this research is that the framework to assess DFR can be developed 
using quantitative techniques such that a number of identifiable factors might suggest the level of DFR of 
an organization; it is, to be able to present valid digital evidence whenever it is required to do so. 
Furthermore, other factors, representing the perception about this readiness, and their correlation with the 
former, can also be discovered. The definition of these factors and their relationships constitute the DFR 
framework looked for by this research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Digital Forensic Readiness is a term in the making. Different terms in the literature have been 
used to describe similar concepts and different descriptions are found to refer to equivalent terms. In 
addition, the domain of the concept has extended to different disciplines, objectives and stakeholders, 
making it, heretofore, an unstandardized, yet vital, measure for organizations. The following sections are 
used to explain this and other associated terms as they show up in the literature. Given that digital 
forensic readiness is considered part of the wider discipline of digital forensics, this term is explained first. 
Digital Forensics 
“Digital Forensics can be defined as the efficient use of analytical and investigative techniques for 
the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, analysis, and interpretation of computer media 
which is digitally stored or encoded for evidentiary and/or root-cause analysis and presentation of digital 
evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the reconstruction of 
events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to 
planned operations” (Grobler & Louwrens 2007). “Digital evidence is present in disputes and crimes 
where (i) computers and the information they store have been targeted, (ii) computers have been used as 
tools, and (iii) computers have been used as repositories for information used or generated in the 
commission of crimes or disputed events” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004). 
The concept of digital forensics has experienced evolution in regards to the appropriate term and 
the corresponding definition. Law, on one hand, and informatics, on the other, are the two disciplines that 
converge in the initial development of this discipline. Digital forensics is closely associated to the 
management and legal treatment of “electronically stored information (ESI),” which is also known as 
digital evidence (e.g. Richard 1999). 
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On the legal side, the U.S. “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended in 1970 to 
acknowledge the widespread use of computers by allowing for discovery of electronic media in addition to 
traditional forms of printed media” (Youst & Koh 1997). On the technology side, works such as “Secure 
Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics” (Schneier & Kelsey 1991), “Forensic Readiness” Tan (2001), 
“Investigating Sophisticated - Security Breaches” (Casey 2006), among others have been developed in 
order to guide the collection and production of electronic evidence. Garfinkel (2010) says that 1999 to 
2007 is kind of the “Golden Age” for digital forensics due to the realization of our ability to see the past 
through the recovery of residual data. 
One of the first terms used instead of digital forensics was “forensic computing” (e.g. McKemmish 
1999; Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003) referred to as “the methodologies used to capture and authenticate 
data at its source, analyse that captured data for evidence relevant to the case at hand, produce an 
understandable report that can be introduced into evidence in a court of law, and testify as to the 
authenticity of evidence presented” (Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003). Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang (2006) 
notice that digital forensics is also known as computer and network forensics, and has many definitions. 
“Generally, it is considered the application of science to the identification, collection, examination, and 
analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict chain of custody 
for the data. It comprises four basic phases: collection, examination, analysis, and report” (Kent, 
Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006). 
This definition includes the application of science in response to courts’ requirements for the 
admissibility of evidence, which is a major challenge for presenting digital data before courts of law. For 
example, the Daubert test asks for the recognitions, testability, error rate, and acceptance of the 
technique producing the evidence for its admissibility. “We might extend the common definition of forensic 
science, in the case of digital forensic science, as the application of computer science and mathematics 
to matters of law” (Stephenson 2003).  
Some practitioners might consider the limitation of digital forensics to evidence that has the 
potential to be used in courts of law as inconvenient compared to the practical use of digital forensics. 
Broader definitions may be preferred. For example, when used to detect nosey people accessing data 
they are not supposed to access. “Determining what is an act of curiosity and what is a genuine access of 
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confidential records is a subjective issue” (Hoolachan & Glisson 2010). Hoolachan & Rowlingson (2001) 
contend that forensic readiness “is that an organisation can pre-empt the occurrence of a crime by 
preparing the environment in advance and in doing this, organisations will benefit not only in instances 
where prosecution becomes an issue, but also in limiting their own business risks” (Pooe & Labuschagne 
2012). 
Two more definitions support this broader view of digital forensics. The first one says that “digital 
forensics comprises analytical and investigative techniques used for the preservation, identification, 
extraction, documentation, analysis and interpretation of computer media, which are digitally stored or 
encoded for evidentiary and/or root cause analysis” (VonSolms, Louwrens, Reekie & Grobler 2006). In 
the second, Whitcombe (2002) says that digital forensics refers to digital evidence, understood to be any 
information of probative value that is either stored or transmitted in a digital form (Bem, Feld, Huebner & 
Bem 2008). 
Some authors also coincide in that digital forensics can also include evidence not stored in 
computers: “many of the issues facing digital security exist in a non-digital medium (Hoolachan & Glisson 
2010). Bem et al. (2008) explain that digital forensics “refers not only to computers, but also to digital 
audio and video, digital fax machines, and similar.” They also propose seven components of incident 
response of which the Pre-incident preparation stage has been matched to forensic readiness. 
No agreement in the models used to approach digital forensic investigations, perhaps due to the lack of 
technology neutrality of some proponents of such frameworks (Beebe & Clark 2005). In the next section 
different approaches for the decomposition of the digital forensic investigation process are presented as a 
starting point in defining the concept of digital forensic readiness. 
Digital Forensics Investigation Process 
At a very high level every digital forensic investigation must go through the following phases: 
1. Define the scope and goals of the investigation 
2. Determine the work and materials 
3. Acquire the images of the devices to be examined 
4. Perform the digital forensic analysis 
5. Prepare the report (Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010) 
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An evidence-centered view of the digital forensic investigation (DFI) process includes 5 phases: 
1. Identification 
2. Collection 
3. Transportation 
4. Storage 
5. Examination and presentation (Trenwith & Venter 2013) 
For the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRW) - a large-scale consortiums lead by 
academia rather than law enforcement - that process includes 7 stages:  
1. Identification 
2. Preservation 
3. Collection 
4. Examination 
5. Analysis 
6. Presentation 
7. Decision (Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002) 
Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee (2005), combine the high level and evidence-centered approaches in a 
cycle of 7 stages:  
1. Officially accept a fact or an object to be examined 
2. Plan a forensics procedure for producing a legally admissible report 
3. Carry out the forensics process 
3.1 Evidence 
3.2 Identification 
3.3 Analysis 
3.4 Verification 
3.5 Individualization 
3.6 Crime scene reconstruction 
4. Collect forensics results 
5. Analyze the forensics results 
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6. Present the forensics results and compile a forensics report 
7. Determine the evidential effect 
Bem et al. (2008) also say that there are “seven components of incident response, but they 
moved the planning to the initial stage: 
1. Pre-incident preparation 
2. Detection of incident 
3. Initial response 
4. Formulate response strategy 
5. Investigate the incident: data collection followed by analysis 
6. Reporting 
7. Resolution (lessons learned, long-term solutions) 
Other stages of the digital forensic investigation process different to those described by Bem et 
al. (2008) are proposed by different authors. For example, Kruse & Heiser (2002) summarize the phases 
of the digital forensic process in: 
1. Securing the evidence without contaminating it  
2. Acquiring the evidence without altering or damaging the original 
3. Authenticating that the recovered evidence is the same as the original seized data 
4. Analyzing the data without modifying it 
However, VonSolms, Louwrence, Reekie & Grobler (2006) point out the reactive nature of this 
approach lacking planning and preparation. Thus, they propose a sequence of: 
1. Planning and preparation 
2. Incident response 
3. Investigation and juridical/evidentiary 
What we can infer form these different approaches is that literature supports that DFR is a first 
stage in the DFI process. DFR is defined as the preincident plan within the DF lifecycle that deals with 
digital evidence identification, preservation, and storage whilst minimizing the costs of a forensic 
investigation” (Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012). 
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Carrier & Spafford (2003) make a parallel between the physical and the digital investigations and 
mention different approaches of these processes in order to offer a summarized view. For example, 
Prosise & Mandia (2001) propose an investigation sequence comprised by: 
1. Detection of the Incident 
2. Initial Response 
3. Response Strategy Formulation 
4. Duplication 
5. Investigation 
6. Secure Measure Implementation 
7. Network Monitoring 
8. Recovery 
9. Reporting 
10. Follow-up (Carrier & Spafford 2003) 
Whereas the Department of Justice (DoJ) proposes a process following: 
1. Preparation 
2. Collection 
3. Examination 
4. Analysis 
5. Reporting (Carrier & Spafford 2003) 
And the US Air Force considers a sequence of stages involving: 
1. Identification 
2. Preparation 
3. Approach Strategy 
4. Preservation 
5. Collection 
6. Examination 
7. Analysis 
8. Presentation 
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9. Return Evidence (Carrier & Spafford 2003) 
After considering these approaches, Carrier & Spafford proposed a comprehensive set of 17 
phases into 5 groups: 
1. Readiness Phases 
Operations Readiness 
Infrastructure Readiness 
2. Deployment Phases 
Detection and Notification 
Confirmation and Authorization 
3. Physical Crime Scene Investigation Phases  
Preservation 
Survey 
Documentation 
Search and Collection 
Reconstruction 
Presentation 
4. Digital Crime Scene Investigation Phases   
Preservation 
Survey 
Documentation 
Search and Collection 
Reconstruction 
Presentation 
5. Review Phase 
Review 
This model of the digital investigation process has been adopted by later authors (e.g. 
Rowlingson 2004; Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis 2013; Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012) with zero or few 
modifications. In fact, Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis (2013) and Mouhtaropoulos & Li (2012) use the 
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model to define DFR as “the preincident plan within the digital forensics lifecycle that deals with digital 
evidence identification, preservation, and storage whilst minimizing the costs of a forensic investigation” 
(Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis 2013). A subtle variation of Carrier & Spafford’s model can be seen in 
forensiccontrol.com, where the digital forensic process is divided into 6 stages: 
1. Readiness 
2. Evaluation 
3. Collection 
4. Analysis 
5. Presentation 
6. Review 
Pollitt (2007) does a review of some of these and other process models of digital forensics and 
reminds us that there are different knowledge management contexts involved in them. They are the 
physical, the logical and the legal contexts. Likewise, Pollitt shows that Mocas (2003) also identifies other 
contexts for the analysis of digital forensics. They are law enforcement context, a military context and a 
business system security context. 
Regardless of the conceptual model of digital forensics used, we can see digital forensic 
readiness as an initial state of this general digital forensic process that is becoming more relevant due to 
its implications in later stages and the costs associated to a complete investigation. “Proactive digital 
forensics is a phase within the digital forensics lifecycle that deals with pre-incident preparation. 
(Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012). In the next section, the concept of digital forensic readiness is 
explored. 
Conceptual Approaches to Forensic Readiness 
The oldest antecedent of the term forensic readiness is found in John Tan’s paper “Forensic 
Readiness” of 2001. He defines the concept by stating its 2 objectives: 
1. Maximizing the environment’s ability to collect credible digital evidence, and  
2. Minimizing the cost of forensic during an incident response. 
In this seminal paper the elements of forensic readiness are listed as:  
1. How Logging is done 
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2. What is logged 
3. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
4. Forensic acquisition 
5. Evidence handling 
The paper also describes 4 potential sources of incident data, which are: 
1. The victim’s RAM 
2. The attacker’s RAM 
3. The intermediary system’s logs 
4. The physical security (For example, cameras) 
In consequence, Tan gives recommendations to incident management in Windows and Unix 
operating systems and explains that the digital data from an intrusion can be used with diverse purposes, 
such as a leverage in an internal incident or evidence in court, as a base for formulating response plans 
during an incident response or to look for additional vulnerability and compromise, and even as an auto 
incriminating evidence (Tan 2001). 
Robert Rowlingson (2004) developed a commonly cited definition of forensic readiness (i.e., 
Grobler & Louwrens 2007; Reddy & Venter 2009) that says that it “is the ability of an organisation to 
maximise its potential to use digital evidence whilst minimising the costs of an investigation;” and adds 
“forensic readiness is a security process which is more procedural and staff-intensive than technological”. 
Garcia (2005) modified Rowlingson’s definition to describe forensic readiness as the “art of 
maximizing the environment's ability to collect credible evidence” (Pooe & Labuschagne 2012). Spike 
Quinn (2005) is even more concise and defines forensic readiness as being prepared to deal effectively 
with events that may require forensic investigation. While appropriate, Quinn’s definition allows 
interpretations outside the context of digital systems. In contrast, Rowlingson’s definition fits the context of 
computerized systems. 
Other terms such as “proactive computer system forensics” and “network forensic readiness” are 
also used in agreement with the context of DFR as defined by Tan (2001) and Rowlingson (2003). In the 
present paper the term Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) is considered a more appropriate term to 
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denote the concept expressed by Tan and Rowlingson. However, the similarities among these terms are 
evident and it can be expected that authors refer to digital forensic readiness with other names. 
For instance, instead of forensic readiness, some authors use the concept of proactive forensics: 
“proactive computer system forensics is the design, construction and configuring of systems to make 
them most amenable to digital forensics analyses in the future” (Bradford, Brown, Perdue & Self 2004). 
Mouhtaropoulos & Dimotikalis (2013) highlight the equivalence of the concepts “proactive forensic 
capability” and “digital forensic readiness” by saying that “little academic research has been conducted on 
an organization's proactive forensic capability. This capability is referred to as digital forensic readiness 
and aims to maximize the forensic credibility of digital evidence, while minimizing its post-incident forensic 
investigation.” 
Another term, network forensic readiness (NFR), is defined as "maximizing the ability of an 
environment to collect credible digital evidence while minimizing the cost of an incident response” 
(Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor 2007). Although constrained to the specific context of networks, this 
definition is very similar to the general concept of forensic readiness given the hyper connectivity of 
current systems. Yet, later papers (e.g. Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 2007; Forte 2010; Pangalos, 
Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010) use the term forensic readiness. 
One way to synthesize what is common to this diversity of terms used to denote the same 
concept is to define its scope. For example, the word “digital” seems to have a more comprehensive 
scope than the words “computer” and “network”.The following section addresses these issues of the 
scope of forensic readiness. 
Forensic Readiness’ Scope 
The posterior development of the concept of forensic readiness has turned it into an 
organizational matter more than a matter of the technology used. Unlike information technologies, which 
include data, hardware and software, information systems include also people and procedures, and the 
management of this information systems must be aligned to the corporate strategy (Kroenke 2013). 
Forensic readiness is, then, understood as a state or capability of the organization’s information systems 
with special recognition of the role played by people and procedures, as shown in more recent definitions 
(e.g. Rowlingson 2004).  
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Forte describes the complexity of the forensic readiness implementation by adding that “planning 
and preparation involve the drafting of guidelines, procedures and standards, the development and 
preparation of training programs tailored to the various figures involved, and the selection and validation 
of technologies to use in incident response and digital investigation processes. It is also quite clear that 
these responsibilities entail keeping abreast of the state of the art in terms of both tools and skills, and 
keeping all documents hardware and software up to date” (Forte 2010).  
Also, different authors stress the importance of legal (e.g. Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010a 
and b; Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 2011) and financial (e.g. Tan 2001; Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012) 
aspects in forensic readiness. (Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 2007) describe forensic readiness as 
“the capability of the system to efficiently collect credible digital evidence that can then be used in legal 
proceedings”. They explain that “efficiency for digital forensics has been described in terms of cost since 
costs tend to be significant, especially for systems that are not forensics ready”, and that “credible digital 
evidence refers to data that have been collected and preserved through a process that does not 
invalidate the legitimacy of the data”. 
The use of the term digital forensic readiness (DFR) is more recent than the use of the term 
forensic readiness. However, the connotation remains the same, as shown by the research of 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li (2011), who explore different understandings of DFR in governments and 
the academia. Some of the illustrative assertions in their work are: “digital forensic readiness involves the 
identification, preservation and storage of digital evidence (DE)”, “Forensic readiness is cited as proactive 
digital forensics, a term introduced by Bradford, Brown, Purdue and Self to include all preventative 
security measures taken by a system”, and “Forensic readiness for a computer system, as defined by the 
US, is the capability of the system to efficiently collect credible digital evidence that can be used in legal 
proceedings”. 
Two peculiarities of these statements must be noted. On one hand, there is a reference to 
“credible digital evidence”. On the other hand, it includes specific jurisdictions as a relevant characteristic 
of DFR. This is important because the word “forensics” implies “the use of science and technology to 
investigate and establish facts in criminal and civil courts of law”, which means that “the goal of any 
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forensic investigation will be to prosecute the criminal or offender successfully, determine the root cause 
of an event and determine who was responsible” (Grobler & Louwrens 2007). 
In consequence, the domain of DFR has been limited to only evidence that can be accepted in 
courts of law of specific jurisdictions. Because DFR is a stage of the digital forensic investigation (DFI) 
process, it is limited by the same legal boundaries for digital forensics made clear by authors such as 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke (2007) and Trenwith & Hein S Venter [2013], who state “only 
evidence deemed to be legal and useful in building a case should be collected for analysis. This is 
referred to as the proportionality rule”. 
Although this view fits the semantics of the term, it is hardly appropriate to represent the cases 
that researchers have elaborated to denote forensic readiness. For example, Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie (2015) found that “some experts were of the opinion that where investigations were not expected to 
go to court then there was no need to meet an unnecessary high burden of proof”. Clearly, not all tasks 
considered within the forensic readiness scope are meant to satisfy legal requirements. Non-legal uses of 
forensic readiness tasks are also ackowledged when they are referred to as “the implementation of 
preparatory measures that can immediately be put into effect in the event of an incident having 
implications regarding either for internal processes or legal compliance” (Forte 2010). Not all evidence to 
solve an internal disagreement would be strong enough for a court of law and not all evidence that is 
useful to detect additional vulnerabilities in the organization, as suggested by Tan (2001), would be of use 
in a trial. 
Still, in an adaptation of Rowlingson’s definition, digital forensic readiness is said to be “the ability 
of an organization to maximize its potential to use comprehensive digital evidence (CDE) whilst 
minimizing the costs of an investigation” (Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010), where authors propose 
the new term “Comprehensive Digital Evidence (CDE)” as “digital evidence that is complete, relevant, 
admissible, and have an evidentiary weight in a court of law to determine the root-cause of an incident 
and link the attacker to the perpetrator” (Grobler et al. 2010). 
The extent to which either the definition or the term are to be adapted in order to facilitate the 
development of a standard measure of digital forensic readiness must be a primary endeavor for 
researchers. On one hand, limiting DFR to only evidence usable in courts dismisses the potential benefits 
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of DFR measures in non-legal organizational affairs. On the other hand, including non-legal evidence 
increases the complexity of the concept and our ability to assess it. 
This research considers that the scope of forensic readiness goes beyond the IT department’s 
responsibility to become an organizational concern. It also includes more than software, hardware and 
data; procedures and people are perhaps more important subjects of forensic readiness measures than 
the technology itself. Forensic readiness actions are not limited to preparation of the system. They have 
effect in the post-event activities of digital forensic investigations. In addition, these measures are 
becoming more relevant in assessing the security and risks of the organization and the standing of its 
stakeholders, not only from a legal perspective, but also from an economic and internal affairs 
perspective. 
Despite this complexity, forensic readiness must be measurable at any point in time in order to be 
of any use for organizations. Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos (2010) suggest the need for a forensic 
readiness metric of the security policies. This is why they describe forensic readiness as “the state of an 
organisation where certain controls are in place in order to facilitate the digital forensic processes and to 
assist in the anticipation of unauthorised actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations”. It is 
important to opt for a definitive term for which to develop such a measure. 
After realizing the large scope of forensic readiness, as well as the different meanings of similar concepts 
and the context of the overarching discipline of digital forensics, we can proceed to define the nature of 
the modern term digital forensic readiness, which is deemed the most appropriate to name the construct 
of interest in this research. 
Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) 
Recent papers tend to use the term digital forensic readiness instead of the other terms 
previously described. DFR is considered a program that “consists of a number of activities that should be 
chosen and managed with respect to cost constraints and risk” (Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012), and also 
“the preparedness of organizations for conducting digital forensics” (Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 
2014). These recent papers confirm that DFR is an initial stage of the more complex process of digital 
forensics. DFR has become so important that the preincident plan for the identification, preservation, and 
storage of digital evidence is mandatory for UK government offices (Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012). 
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Maybe the first practical implementation of DFR policy happened after the HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) incident on October 18, 2007, when two CDs containing personal information of 25 
million individuals and 7.25 million UK families claiming child benefits were missing. The UK government 
then published the HMG Security Policy Framework (SPF) in May 2010, mandating a Forensic Readiness 
Policy (FRP) in departments and agencies (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler, & Li 2011). 
Mouhtaropoulos et al. (2011) also say that digital forensics can be proactive or reactive. The 
proactive digital forensics is the discipline concerned with the achievement of digital forensic readiness. 
Specifically, there is a clear distinction between digital forensic readiness (DFR) and digital forensics 
(DF). Digital forensics is a discipline. Digital forensic readiness is a state of preparedness of an 
organization to obtain, understand, and present digital evidence when needed. DF is to be known and 
practiced. DFR is to be measured and achieved. 
This said, we may be aware that, in both cases, authors use the terms to refer to processes and 
disciplines. For instance, Farmer & Venema (2005) define computer forensics as the process of gathering 
and analysing data in a manner as free from distortion or bias as possible to reconstruct data or what has 
happened in the past on a system (Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 2008). Likewise, Fergusson-Boucher & 
Endicott-Popovski said that network forensic readiness (NFR) has emerged as a method for supporting 
collection of digital evidence from networks using suggested checklists, procedures, and tools 
(Fergusson-Boucher & Endicott-Popovski 2012). On the other hand, we found statements such as “digital 
forensic readiness is a discipline within the field of digital forensics” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004). 
Both DF and DFR are associated to other terms, such as risk assessment (e.g. Rowlingson 
2004), information assurance (IA) (e.g. Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor 2007), IT governance (e.g. 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 a and b), and information security (IS) (Hamidovic 2012). This role 
of DFR in the context of these concepts is not completely clear, although some illustrative contributions 
are found in the literature. For example, “forensic readiness is complementary to, and an enhancement 
of, many existing information security activities. It should be part of an information security risk 
assessment” (Rowlingson 2004); “a forensically ready network incorporates the full spectrum of 
information assurance (IA) elements: security policies, procedures, practices, mechanisms, and security 
awareness training programs” (Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor 2007); “The accepted literature on 
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digital forensic readiness concentrates mainly on evidence identification, handling and storage, first line 
incident response and training requirements. It does not consider the proactive application of digital 
forensic tools to enhance the corporate governance structures (specifically information technology 
governance)” (Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010a); and “Digital forensic readiness is a natural 
progression for organizations with a mature information security posture” (Hamidovic 2012). Given the 
importance of these concepts in the organizational sciences, the following section elaborates on the role 
of DFR in the framework of these information security elements. 
Role of DFR in the Organization 
Information security (IS) is, as DFR, a state; in this case, the state of security of an organization 
or a system. Substantial development on the actions leading to better levels of information security has 
allowed us to see IS as a process, as well. “Information security can be defined as the process of 
protecting information and information assets from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business 
continuity, minimize business damage, maximize return on investments and business opportunities by 
preserving confidentiality, integrity and availability of information” (Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2007). 
IS is also considered a discipline, due to not only the vastness of academic production on the 
topic, but also due to its increasing importance in the organizations’ corporate governance. “Information 
security governance is an integral part of corporate governance, and consists of the management and 
leadership commitment of the board and top management towards good information security, the proper 
organizational structures for enforcing good information security, full user awareness and commitment 
towards good information security, and the necessary policies, procedures, processes, technologies and 
compliance enforcement mechanisms all working together to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, hardware, people etc.) 
are maintained at all times“ (VonSolms 2006). 
Corporate governance, within which IS governance is embedded, is defined by Elachgar, 
Boulafdour, Makoudi & Regragui (2012) as all taken responsibilities and practices implemented by a 
general direction in order to provide a strategic direction and ensure objectives are met, risks are 
managed appropriately, and organizational resources used responsibly. 
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Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms (2010a) see governance as one of the dimensions of digital forensics 
along with people, policies, laws, processes and technology. Other authors propose DFR as a step 
beyond IS: “digital forensic readiness is a natural progression for organizations with a mature information 
security posture, enabling them to pursue perpetrators in the legal domain when other security measures 
have failed” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004; Hamidovic 2012). Likewise, a focus group of experts 
suggested that “DFR supports the information security program by enhancing the security posture and 
deterring potential attackers” (Elyas et al. 2015). Valjarevic & Venter (2011) “believe that DFR should be a 
built-in security feature and not merely an add-on”. 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch (2001) contend that information systems security 
(INFOSEC) has evolved into information assurance (IA) and that IA encompasses IS. Hamidovic also 
shows a strong connection between information assurance and DFR. He contends that the organization's 
forensic readiness ca be assessed based on criteria suggested by the UK Information Assurance 
Advisory Council (IAAC): 1) the main likely threats it faces; 2) what sorts of evidence it is likely to need in 
a civil litigation or criminal proceeding and how it will secure that data; 3) the amount and quality of 
evidence it has collected; 4) knowledge of the potential legal problems such as admissibility, data 
protection, human rights, limits to surveillance, obligations to staff members and disclosure in legal 
proceedings; and 5) the management, skill, resource implications and action plan (Hamidovic 2012). 
Despite the above suggested connections among DF, DFR, information security and other 
concepts, there is not a widely accepted framework to assess DFR. “Digital forensic readiness is often ad 
hoc and no consistent application or framework exists globally” (Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011). In 
part, this is due to the lack of clarity on the nature of these concepts when put together in a conceptual 
model. Some of them are processes, some are states or stages, others are disciplines, and some are 
several of them simultaneously. Therefore, the proposed frameworks might be seen differently according 
to the reader’s perspective. 
One way to start visualizing the framework of DFR is by using a common unit among the 
elements in the model. For that reason, the present paper proposes a comparison of the previously 
explored concepts in terms of the tasks associated to them. 
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Giiven that the tasks necessary to achieve DFR are the initial step in the complete DF 
investigation process they must be a subset of the DF tasks. On the other hand, all the tasks of the IS 
program are part of the global corporate governance activities. Likewise, the tasks in DF investigations 
and DFR programs are part of the corporate governance. “DFR allows organizations demonstrate due 
diligence for good corporate governance” [Grobler & Louwrens 2007]. Von Solms & Louwrens (2007) 
show how IS and DF overlap (Table 1, p. 16) and how IS and DFR overlap (p. 20). “Whilst information 
security and DF are considered as two different disciplines, there is a definite overlap between the two” 
(Von Solms & Louwrens as cited by Grobler & Louwrens 2007). 
However, despite the considerable overlap between IS and DRF, not all DFR-related tasks 
belong to the IS strategy. “Information security programmes often focus on prevention and detection 
measures. From a preventative information security perspective, there is little need for digital evidence” 
Rowlingson (2004). Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad (2003) say that “in any computer security incident there will 
be a tendency to focus on containment and recovery, as these are the foremost business critical issues. 
However, in stressing these, any evidence that might be required may be damaged, discarded or simply 
ignored” (Tan et al. 2003 as cited by Rowlingson 2004). Moreover, high levels of DFR provide benefits 
beyond being the source of evidence for IS-related events. DFR allows organizations demonstrate due 
diligence for good corporate governance (Grobler & Louwrens 2007).  
In fact, the objective of achieving high levels of IS and DFR can be contradictory endeavors. IS 
concentrates on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), but not on the preservation of evidence, as 
DFR does (Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010). This means that some tasks, such as disconnecting a 
hacked device from a network may be recommended by the organization’s IS protocol while contrary to 
the DFR program. This is similar to the work of the police officer versus the work of the journalist. While 
the officer wants to stop the crime as soon as possible, the journalist tries to find the right angle to capture 
the complete video of it. Likewise, while Information security aims to eliminate vulnerabilities to eventual 
attacks, DFR takes advantage of these vulnerabilities to collect as much evidence as possible from the 
attacks. Forrester & Irwin (2007) assert that unlike the police, businesses use the approach of the military, 
which requires identification of the incident, and propose mechanisms to deal with both the military and 
the police approaches in parallel by using forensic readiness. 
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Privacy, an important asset of IS, also goes in contradiction with DFR. “privacy concerns are a 
“showstopper” for the deployment of digital forensic readiness” (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004). Only 
corporate governance may be able to reconcile these differences in some organizations. These set of 
relationships among the activities of DFR, DF, IS and corporate governance can be represented by the 
following model in figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Venn Diagram - The context of DFR tasks 
 
Since the purpose of this research is to advance in finding a unified framework allowing the 
measurement of DFR, we require understanding of the role of DFR in the organization, but also of the 
goals, dimensions, activities and factors associated to DFR. The following section explores the literature 
in relation to these aspects. 
Digital Forensic Readiness Goals 
Forensic readiness was from the very beginning defined in terms of its goals: 
1. Maximizing the environment’s ability to collect credible digital evidence, and  
2. Minimizing the cost of forensic during an incident response (Tan 2001) 
Mouton & Venter (2011), interpreting Tan, assert that DFR is put in place to: 
1. Decrease the time period required to perform a digital forensic investigation 
2. Reduce the cost involved in performing a digital forensic investigation 
3. Maximize the ability to collect the evidence without disrupting the environment 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie (2014) recognize that the goals of DFR can be diverse. They 
express them in the form of three capabilities that a forensically ready organization must have: 
1. To produce evidence that facilitates the demonstration of regulatory compliance 
Corporate Governance 
Information Security 
DF 
DFR 
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2. To produce evidence to facilitate internal investigations 
3. To produce evidence that can be used in legal proceedings (legal evidence management)  
In addition, Rowlingson (2004) says that this preparation can also be a deterrent for internal 
crimes. Likewise, Danielsson & Tjøstheim (2004) say that the management of digital evidence is a means 
to limit business risk, and compare the DFR measures with those that “organizations take in the physical 
world to monitor their buildings with, for example, video surveillance (i.e. CCTV), guards, and by logging 
information about all persons that enter and leave their office buildings”. The collection and preservation 
of digital evidence would limit business risk by providing support for:  
1. Legal defense 
2. Civil litigation 
3. Criminal prosecution 
4. Internal disciplinary actions 
5. Claim to intellectual property 
6. The documentation of due care 
7. The documentation of the impact of a crime or disputed action in order to support an insurance claim or 
a claim for damages (Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004) 
They say that these measures serve 3 interdependent purposes: 
1. Provide a deterrent effect 
2. Support the detection of suspicious events 
3, Provide support in answering the questions post mortem of who, when, how and what 
Although, they acknowledge DFR support of the recovery process, its focus, according to them, is 
on the third purpose of providing information about transpired events. 
According to this diversity of purposes one question that researchers and practitioners should answer 
before assessing the forensic readiness of organizations is: ready for what? A review of the literature 
leads us to different approaches. 
Carrier & Spafford (2003) say that this is an ongoing phase whose goal “is to ensure that the 
operations and infrastructure are able to fully support an investigation. Both digital and physical evidence 
can be lost if it is not maintained and collected properly” (Carrier & Spafford 2003). This statement 
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highlights the infrastructure and operations dimensions and opens the domain of DFR not only to the 
digital, but also to the physical evidence. 
Other factors and dimensions can be identified from other authors. Factors such as cost, 
business continuity, and benefit/cost proportionality can be inferred from Rowlingson’s (2004) proposed 
goals of DFR, which are adopted in posterior research (e.g. Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010): 
1. To gather admissible evidence legally and without interfering with business processes 
2. To gather evidence targeting the potential crimes and disputes that may adversely impact an 
organization 
3. To allow an investigation to proceed at a cost in proportion to the incident 
4. To minimise interruption to the business from any investigation 
5. To ensure that evidence makes a positive impact on the outcome of any legal action (Rowlingson, 
2004) 
For Rowlingson, DFR is itself a corporate goal that involves technical and non-technical actions 
that maximize the ability of an enterprise to use digital evidence (Reddy & Venter 2009).  
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms (2010 a and b) use the term Proactive Digital Forensics (ProDF) for 
which they propose the following goals: 
1. Become DF ready 
2. Enhance the Governance programs (IT and IS of the organization by proving (assessing) the 
effectiveness of controls, measured against IT and IS objectives related to business objectives) 
3. Improve IS / IT performance with the responsible use of DF tools to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency in organization (Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 a and b). 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos (2010) say that forensic practices are “departing fast from the niche 
of law enforcement and becoming a business function and infrastructural component.” One example of 
this happened to Target in 2014. According to the expert Steve Durbin, Target attack was done through 
exploiting a web service application used by a HVAC vendor to supply invoices (Olavsrud 2015). “From 
Target to Sony the number of breaches continues to increase affecting also employees and customers” 
(Starkman 2014). This leads us to propose that another objective of DFR would be to demonstrate good 
practices to suppliers and customers. 
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An observation from this analysis is that the objectives of DFR might be identifiable according to 
the interested party involved, which may also give an idea of the DFR status of the firm. A radial chart can 
be used to show this coverage of stakeholders according to the DFR objectives. In general, companies 
must be able to demonstrate regulatory compliance through the formalization of procedures and the 
commitment of managers and members of the board. One step further includes control its own 
environment, including employees’ behavior and daily interactions with customers. This will prepare the 
organization to conduct internal investigations. Commercial disputes will require this internal control, as 
well as control over the interactions with other companies, such as suppliers and partners. Finally, these 
internal and external controls might not be enough for the firm to deal with unknown interested third 
parties, such as anonymous cyber-criminals or digital bunglers. Dealing with this requires more than 
having good policies and procedures, internal and external controls in place, and complying with 
regulations. It requires up to date knowledge of threats, vulnerabilities and safeguards and sophisticated 
methods and personnel to perform intelligence. At this level, interested parties easily include judiciary and 
executive authorities, and foreign companies and governments. In general, the farther a stakeholder is 
from the center of the circle the more challenging it is for the organization to deal with DFR goals 
associated to that stakeholder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Goals Coverage of DFR 
 
The radial scope of this chart does not necessarily imply that organizations achieve higher levels 
of DFR from the center outward. Casey (2005) gives an example of an intrusion difficult to track because 
the organization only had monitoring systems on the internet border, but not on its internal subnets. 
Which are the activities of DFR aiming to achieve its goals is the subject of the next section. 
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Digital Forensic Readiness Activities 
There are different approaches in understanding the several activities involved in the process of 
gaining DFR. Carrier & Spafford divide them in operational and infrastructure. “The operations readiness 
phase provides training and equipment for the personnel that will be involved with the incident and its 
investigation. This includes training the responders, the lab analysts, and staff that will be receiving the 
initial reports of the incident. The infrastructure readiness phase ensures that the needed data exists for a 
full investigation to occur. After all, it is difficult to analyze data if it does not exist. This phase only applies 
to those who maintain the environment that could be the target of a crime (Carrier and Spafford 2003). 
In addition, they explain that infrastructure can be physical or digital. Cameras and card readers are 
examples of the physical phase. Examples of the digital phase include sending server logs to a secured 
log host, synchronizing the internal clocks on servers with network time protocol (NTP), creating a 
baseline of MD5 hashes, and maintaining a change management database. 
The key activities in implementing a forensic readiness programme for Rowlingson (2004) are: 
1. Define the business scenarios that require digital evidence 
2. Identify available sources and different types of potential evidence 
3. Determine the evidence collection requirement 
4. Establish a capability for securely gathering legally admissible evidence to meet the requirement 
5. Establish a policy for secure storage and handling of potential evidence 
6. Ensure monitoring is targeted to detect and deter major incidents 
7. Specify circumstances when escalation to a full formal investigation (which may use the digital 
evidence) should be launched 
8. Train staff in incident awareness, so that all those involved understand their role in the digital evidence 
process and the legal sensitivities of evidence 
9. Document an evidence-based case describing the incident and its impact 
10. Ensure legal review to facilitate action in response to the incident 
Although policies are seen as a specific dimension of DFR, Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
(2007) offer steps to define the forensics policy addressing forensic readiness for a given system: 
1. Identify digital assets that have value 
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2. Perform a risk assessment for potential loss and threat to those assets 
3. Remove assets that do not warrant the effort of prosecution 
4. Identify associated data needed for these assets along with collection and storage needs 
5. Write the forensic policy in terms of digital assets, forensic events, data collection and storage 
6. Ensure adequate forensics policy enforcement is in place. 
A structured approach in digital forensic readiness, according to Danielsson & Tjøstheim (2004), 
should at least include: 
1. An analysis of legal requirements and constraints on collection and preservation of potential digital 
evidence in the applicable legal context 
2. A method for analyzing the organizations’ need for digital evidence 
3. An identification and classification of potential digital evidence sources, and enumeration of 
technologies and processes for utilizing these sources 
4. Guidelines for preserving digital evidence, including processes, procedures, and suggestions as to how 
technology solutions can be used 
5. Guidance on when and how to report incidents to the law enforcement, including content and formats 
of reports, criteria for reporting, and standardization of the interaction between affected parties and law 
enforcement 
Grobler et al. (2010a) decompose the process of becoming forensic ready into steps as follows:   
1. Provide and prepare the infrastructure to support DF investigations 
2. Develop an evidence management plan (EMP) including an evidence map and evidence management 
policies and procedures to manage CDE 
3. Augment organizational risk mitigation plans to include evidence and process requirements. Apply an 
algorithm to calculate the completeness and admissibility of the evidence. Implement an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS). Define trigger events for investigations. Prepare for containments of incidents to 
include containment on live systems  
4. Develop a DF training and awareness strategy with training and awareness programmes for the 
organization 
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5. Develop a management capability to outline the internal and external DF investigators and the role and 
responsibilities of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
6. Document and validate a DF investigation (DFI) protocol (Active and Reactive) against best practice 
7. Establish procedures and policies to ensure that an investigation proceed at a cost in proportion to the 
incident 
8. Minimize interruption to the business from any investigation 
Factors Affecting Digital Forensic Readiness 
One of the earliest approaches to determine the status of DFR in organizations can be extracted 
from Yasinsac & Manzano (2001). They propose a set of computer and network policies to deter 
computer crime and enhance computer forensics, which are some of the cited goals of DFR. Given that 
the factors of interest are conditions that might determine the state of DFR in an organization we can turn 
Yasinsac & Manzano’s policies into questions in order to assess their impact. For example: 
A. Retaining Information 
A1. Does the organization copy and retain application and local user files?  
A2. Does the organization copy and retain computer and network activity logs?  
B. Planning the response 
B1. Does the organization have a forensic team?  
B2. Does the organization have an intrusion response procedure?  
B3. Is there a formal investigative procedure?  
C. Training 
C1. Is there training for the response team?  
C2. Is there training for the investigative team?  
C3. Is there training on DF for all personnel that use computers?  
D. Accelerating the investigation 
D1. Is personal file encryption prohibited?  
D2. Is disk scrubbing tools and file shredding software prohibited?  
D3. Are data indexes utilized?  
D4. Is information fusion utilized?  
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E. Prevent anonymous activities 
E1. Is onion routing prevented or used?  
E2. Are date, time and user stamps in file required? 
E3. Is strong user authentication used?  
E4. Are strong access control mechanisms used?  
F. Protect the evidence 
F1. Is there rigid control over administrative access for systems housing potential evidence?  
F2. Are evidence files and connections encrypted?  
F3. Is there strong integrity checking technology? (Adapted from Yasinsac & Manzano 2001). 
Yasinsac & Manzano’s six categories of policies have been retaken by later authors (e.g., 
Rowlingson 2004; Pooe & Labuschagne 2012), and is a starting point to identify how different factors can 
be grouped into different dimensions. However, because DFR is part of DF, the dimensions of DF must 
also be considered in order to propose the dimensions of DFR. Grobler et al. (2010a) propose a model in 
which the dimensions of digital forensics are: 
1. Legal (which deals with compliance). The legal and judiciary dimension is the backdrop for the digital 
forensic management framework (DFMF) as it will influence all the activities of the organization 
2. Governance (Management of facilities, partners, and risk) 
3. Policies (answers to the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘who’ questions) 
4. Process (answers to the ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’, ‘where’ and ‘who’ questions) 
5. People (answers to the ‘who’ question) 
6. Technology (addresses applications and technologies to use) 
Although there is a clear advantage in the categorization of factors and the identification of 
dimensions, several challenges can be seen from these frameworks. On one hand, it is important to 
identify the relationships among the different dimensions, which not always are comprehensive and 
independent as to be put in a statistical analysis of principal components. This is evident based on the 
statement “the governance dimension is a subset of the legal and judiciary dimension. The other 
dimensions people, policy, process and technology are subsets of the Governance dimension” (Grobler, 
Louwrens & Von Solms 2010). 
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On the other hand, the dimensional approach can have several layers with relationships among 
factors and dimensions crossing through those different levels. For example, from the two previous 
categorizations we can see that Yasinsac & Manzano’s categories of policies are set in the form of 
processes, which puts them into the process dimension of Grobler et al.’s (2010a) framework. However, 
training is a process directed to people. Therefore, the training policies of Yasinsac & Manzano are also 
closely related to the people dimension of Grobler et al., and both, then, are related to the governance 
and legal dimensions, which are one and two levels above respectively, according to Grobler et al. 
(2010a). 
To top it off, one single category in Yasinsac & Manzano’s framework can demand several 
indicators in order to be assessed appropriately. Let us take the category “retaining information” for 
example. Basic questions about possible source of evidence to be retained are given by Rowlingson 
(2004): 
1. Where is data generated? 
2. What format is it in? 
3. For how long is it stored? 
4. How is it currently controlled, secured and managed?  
5. Who has access to the data?  
6. How much is produced? 
7. Is it archived? If so where and for how long? 
8. How much is reviewed? 
9. What additional evidence sources could be enabled? 
10. Who is responsible for this data? 
11. Who is the formal owner of the data? 
12. How could it be made available to an investigation? 
13. To what business processes does it relate?  
14. Does it contain personal information? 
Stephenson (2003) uses a similar set of questions to summarize what he considers factors 
affecting the digital investigation, but in this case his focus is in the incident: 
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1. What is the nature of the incident? 
2. How can we be sure that there even was an incident? 
3. What was the entry point into the target system? Was there only one? 
4. What would evidence of an attack look like? What are we looking for? 
5. What legal issues need to be addressed (policies, privacy, subpoenas, warrants, etc.)? 
6. Who was in a position to cause/allow the incident to occur? 
7. What security measures were in place at the time of the incident? 
8. What non-technical (business) issues may have impacted the success or failure of the attack? 
9. Who knew what about the attack and when did they know it? (Stephenson 2003). 
In fact, the closest substitute for a DFR framework can be found in proposed frameworks for the 
digital investigation process. Stephenson used the DFRWS Digital Investigation Framework to elaborate 
his End-to-End Digital Investigation (EEDI) technique. This framework as cited by Reith, Carr & Gunch 
(2002) comprises 7 stages, whereas Stephenson talks about 6 classes. Although, the framework is 
essentially the same, the present research pays special attention to the terminology used in the literature 
in order to propose a standard framework of DFR. Therefore, the elements of the DFRWS framework are 
included as candidate factors or dimensions of DFR and submitted to later classification following the 
methodology adopted here. These elements are: 
A. Identification  
A1. Event/Crime Detection  
A2. Resolve Signature 
A3. Profile Detection  
A4. Anomalous Detection  
A5. Complaints  
A6. System  
A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis  
B. Preservation 
B1. Case Management  
B2. Imaging Technologies  
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B3. Chain of Custody  
B4. Time Synchronization 
C. Collection 
C1. Preservation  
C2. Approved Methods 
C3. Approved Software  
C4.Approved Hardware  
C5. Legal Authority  
C6. Lossless Compression 
C7. Sampling  
C8. Data Reduction Recovery 
C9. Recovery Techniques 
D. Examination 
D1. Preservation  
D2. Traceability  
D3. Validation Techniques 
D4. Filtering Techniques  
D5. Pattern Matching  
D6. Hidden Data Discovery 
D7. Hidden Data Extraction 
E. Analysis 
E1. Preservation  
E2. Traceability  
E3. Statistical  
E4. Protocols  
E5. Data Mining  
E6. Timeline  
E7. Link 
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E8. Spatial 
F. Presentation   
F1. Documentation 
F2. Expert Testimony 
F3. Clarification 
F4. Mission Impact Statement 
F5. Recommended Countermeasure 
F6. Statistical Interpretation (DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003) 
Carrier & Spafford (2003) noted ambiguity in the distinction of the preservation and collection 
phases, and the analysis and examination phases. Thus, they propose their own framework consisting of 
five groups of phases: 
1. Readiness 
2. Deployment 
3. Physical crime scene investigation 
4. Digital crime scene investigation 
5. Presentation 
Other models of the digital investigation process can be found in Casey (2000) (1. Recognition, 2. 
Preservation, collection, and documentation, 3. Classification, comparison, and individualization, and 4. 
Reconstruction) and Lee ’s (2001) Model of Scientific Crime Scene Investigation (1. Recognition, 2. 
Identification, 3. Individualization, 4. Reconstruction) (Ciardhuáin 2004). For the purpose of this research, 
items such as preservation, which in Stephenson (2003) framework is present in several classes, or 
spatial, which looks like a dimension itself rather than a factor, represent a challenge of classification 
(These issues are addressed in the section of methodology). A more manageable set of factors come in 
the form of questions. 
From Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang (2006) Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into 
Incident Response, which they developed for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
we can extract a different set of key questions: 
1. What are the potential sources of data?  
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2. Of the potential sources of data, which are the most likely to contain helpful information and why?  
3. Which data source would be checked first and why?  
4. Which forensic tools and techniques would most likely be used?  Which other tools and techniques 
might also be used?  
5. Which groups and individuals within the organization would probably be involved in the forensic 
activities?  
6. What communications with external parties might occur, if any?  
7. From a forensic standpoint, what would be done differently if the scenario had occurred on a different 
day or at a different time (regular hours versus off-hours)?  
8. From a forensic standpoint, what would be done differently if the scenario had occurred at a different 
physical location (onsite versus offsite)? 
Kent et al.. (2006) also highlight the importance of the existence of a toolkit and team response, 
of clear weighed criteria on whether turning off a hacked device or not, and of clear weighed criteria on 
volatility orders to collect evidence in each case.  
It is not surprising then that, given this plurality of potential factors of DFR with such complex 
relationships among them, there is not an accepted framework to assess DFR. Instead of a measurement 
model many authors hence propose policies, requirements, strategies and protocols in order to help 
organizations to be forensically ready. For example, Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & Taylor (2007) use four 
strategies (called the 4R model for resistance, recognition, recovery and redress) to categorize the 
abilities and tools necessary for network forensic readiness (NFR). These tools and abilities can be 
considered factors that determine the DFR state. They are: 
Resistance 
1. Ability to repel attacks using tools such as firewalls, user authentication, and diversification 
Recognition 
2. Ability to detect an attack or a probe using ids and internal integrity checks 
Recovery 
3. Ability to provide essential services during attack and restore services following the attack using 
incident response, replication, backup systems, and fault tolerant design 
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Redress 
4. Ability to hold intruders accountable in a court of law and to retaliate using forensics (the who), legal 
remedies and active defense 
Additionally, two more candidates of factors can be extracted from Endicott-Popovsky et al.’s work: 
5. The identification of relevant target assets 
6. The test and calibration of the collection devices and their frequency of calibration 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li (2011) say that a forensic readiness policy (FRP) should consider: 
1. Digital evidence (DE) identification 
2. Risk Assessment by classifying DE exposure and correlating with threats 
3. Control to DE access and maintenance of a digital chain of custody (DCOC) 
4. Statistical representation of the DE by establishing a Bayesian network; it will calculate the relationship 
between cost and benefit factors of each measure 
5. The events that will escalate an event into a full forensic investigation; the policy should specifically 
correlate events with the established Bayesian network 
6. Evidence Management Plan development 
7. Single point of contact (SPOC) establishment with legal authorities 
8. Digital forensic investigation (DFI) model choice - the procedure to be followed after an incident occurs 
9. Technical infrastructure standards 
10. Staff training procedures on the policy’s contents 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan (2010) contend that “numerous varying factors such as the perceived 
high cost, as well as the current lack of forensic skills, make the implementation of digital forensic 
readiness appear difficult if not infeasible for smaller organisations”. They summarize the Components of 
DFR as: 
1. Strategy 
2. Compliance & Monitoring 
3. Policy & Procedures 
4. Technology and Digital Forensic Response 
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They also identified the following factors that may play a role in the decision of adopting a 
forensic readiness plan and the level of its implementation: 
1. The industry sector (financial institutions may be more likely to adopt a higher level of forensic 
readiness as they handle financial transactions) 
2. The funding available. 
3. More employees increase the risk of internal criminal incidents and the need for forensic readiness 
4. More staff with access to financial instruments increases the chances of incidents of fraud and the 
need for forensic readiness 
5. Staff with more advanced IT skills in the organization increases the chances of being able to multi-skill 
some of them to handle forensic cases, which reduces costs of adoption 
6. Organizations with public profiles are more likely to adopt forensic readiness to maintain their 
reputation 
Legal requirements, as well, give indications of what factors must be considered in order to be 
forensic ready. According to Leigh (2012), English courts have an electronic disclosure protocol 
requesting organizations providing digital evidence (including computer files, mobile phone records, 
smartphone data, tablet data, electronic booking system records, photographs, voicemail, data back-up 
tapes) to inform about: 
1. IT systems in use 
2. Where data is stored 
3. Back-up procedures 
4. Electronic document retention and archiving policies 
5. The number of documents likely to be located (Leigh 2012) 
Therefore, these five aspects plus the legal requirement itself can be considered among potential 
DFR factors. In addition, Leigh underlines the importance of some considerations that could be 
considered determinants in DFR. For example: 
1. Tracing custody of individual PCs, laptops and PDAs for upgrades people's change of office or role 
2. Asset registry for items of electronic equipment that could record information 
3. Employment law or privacy issues 
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4. Training in awareness 
5. Centralization of data 
6. Storage in personal devices (Leigh 2012) 
Reddy, Venter & Olivier (2012) explain that the challenge for managers is to coordinate the 
organisational resources to attain an acceptable level of DFR. Reddy & Venter (2013) developed an 
architecture for a DFR Management System DFRMS based on basic requirements that the proposed 
system should accomplish according to the extant literature (Details about the source of Reddy & 
Venter’s requirements can be found in Table 1, p. 76 of their paper). Given that these requirements are 
proposed as necessary conditions for achieving a good level of DFR, we can treat them as factors in a 
preliminary exploration. These requirements are: 
1. Monitor or log network and host activity 
2. Secure storage of logs 
3. Intrusion detection system 
4. Distinguish whether hardware or software elements are being monitored 
5. Automated alarm upon detection of potential or actual incident 
6. Configuration procedures for monitoring and logging 
7. Investigative teams (DF teams) and incident response teams’ descriptions 
8. Training requirements and training 
9. Business process descriptions 
10. Organizational DF policies and policies related to DFR 
11. Suspicion policy 
12. Law enforcement contact policy 
13. Escalation procedure 
14. Incident response procedure 
15. Law enforcement contact procedure 
16. Organizational structure and staff involved in DFR and incident response 
They also make a contribution worth considering among potential factors, which is the existence 
of three types of software related to the management of DFR: 
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1. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitoring events on computers and networks 
2. Security event management software (SEM), which filter real threats from false alarms 
3. Incident management software, controlling the workflow involved in the incident management process 
through incident records, escalation rules, information about end users, and about configuration items 
(Reddy & Venter 2013) 
Similarly, an approach based on functionalities contends that a system for DFR in the cloud was 
deemed to require: 
1. Communication Channel 
2. Encryption 
3. Compression 
4. Authentication of log data and proof of integrity 
5. Authenticating the client and server 
6. Timestamping (Trenwith & Venter 2013) 
Finally, Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie (2014) propose eleven factors: 
1. Forensic strategy 
2. Non-technical stakeholders 
3. Technical stakeholders 
4. Technology 
5. Monitoring 
6. Architecture 
7. Policy 
8. Training 
9. Forensic culture 
10. Top management support 
11. Governance 
These same authors later changed the denomination of “factors” by the term “capabilities” in a 
follow up of their framework performed with focus groups of DF experts (Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 
2015). In their new study, they introduced different perspectives from which DFR has been studied: 
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1. Resourcing (e.g. Reyes & Wiles, 2007) 
2. Technology use and selection (e.g. Carrier & Spafford, 2003) 
3. Training (e.g. Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Rowlingson, 2004) 
4. Legal investigations (e.g. Casey, 2005) 
5. Incident response (e.g. Ahmad et al.., 2012; Shedden et al.., 2010a; Tan et al.., 2003) 
6. Policy (e.g. Yasinsac & Manzano, 2001) 
All these factors must be considered in the analysis of the DFR framework. However, in this 
paper, a factor will be treated as a condition, something that is present to a specific extent and can be the 
cause of something else: “a phenomenon presumed to affect an experiment” (Wikipedia 2015). For this 
reason, some of the factors previously listed are better seen as dimensions in the way this term is used in 
the social sciences. A dimension is something that is characteristic of the subject or a perspective from 
which that subject can be seen. “A dimension is a structure that categorizes facts and measures in order 
to enable users to answer business questions … Perhaps the most basic way the word dimension is used 
in literature is as a hyperbolic synonym for feature, attribute, aspect or magnitude” (Wikipedia 2015). 
According to this, we cannot, for example, use governance as a factor. Governance could be a 
dimension. The factor would be to what extent there is governance or to what extent governance includes 
IT policies. This paper’s objective is to find factors that are measurable with scales that vary from low to 
high. These factors, nevertheless, can be grouped in dimensions in order to facilitate the comprehension 
and analysis of the problem. For this reason, the previous literature review on factors, dimensions, 
activities, and goals related to DFR are of paramount importance in the final definition of the usable 
factors for this paper. The work of these researchers, regardless of the terminology used, unveils many 
relevant measurable indicators of the extent to what DFR is achieved in an organization. 
A partial view of the preliminary list of potential factors and dimensions found in the literature is 
presented below. This list considers not only what has been explicitly mentioned by the authors, but also 
what could be inferred from their contentions. Therefore, some items in the list are presented as in the 
original, while some others have been reworded or redacted for the first time. The complete list of 1115 
items is too large to include in the body of this paper, but it is provided as Appendix A. 
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Figure 3. Preliminary Factors and Dimensions of DFR (Partial View) 
 
Clearly, some of these factors and dimensions show up repeatedly in different works, some are 
mentioned by other authors not presented in the list, and others may not be in the list. This list does not 
pretend to present the factors in a specific order or imply that a factor listed was proposed originally by 
the article from where it was extracted. The list’s main purpose is to be as inclusive as possible from the 
literature reviewed. Many of the factors included are indeed recurrent throughout the literature of digital 
forensics. 
This is only a preliminary step in the search for the final factors that might be affecting how an 
organization moves towards a specific status of DFR. The next section explains the structured process 
used to find the factors affecting DFR. 
  
Predictor Classification Paper Year
Management Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Access control Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Systems development and maintenance Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Business Continuity management Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Compliance Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Having International Information Security Certification Factor VonSolms 2000 2000
Cultivating an Information Security Culture Right Factor VonSolms 2000 2000Implementing Metrics t  Continuously and 
Dynamically Measure IS aspects Factor VonSolms 2000 2000
Management of People Leaving the Company Factor VonSolms 2000 2000
Electronic Device type Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Tools & Equipment Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Securing and Evaluating the Scene Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Documenting the Scene Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Evidence Collection Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Packaging, Transportation, and Storage Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Crime Category Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Ability to collect evidence Factor Tan 2001 2001
Cost of forensics Factor Tan 2001 2001
Multitiered logging Element Tan 2001 2001
How Logging is Done Element Tan 2001 2001
What is Logged Element Tan 2001 2001
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Element Tan 2001 2001
Forensic Acquisition Element Tan 2001 2001
Evidence Handling Element Tan 2001 2001
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Although DFR is being practiced and studied more every day, the literature and practitioners have 
not yet reached an agreement on a common framework to assess DFR and implement measures to 
improve it. A diversity of methodologies exists for the implementation of DFR and several distinct factors 
can affect its status according to different objectives. 
This dissertation proposes a strategy that combines the review of the extant literature, the views 
of other qualified reviewers and the answers from professionals working on IT security in order to obtain a 
comprehensive framework of the factors that determine DFR. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
are applied in the process of extracting the knowledge from primary and secondary sources of data. 
This research shows that there is great diversity and amount of potential factors of DFR. The 
challenge lies in identifying and classifying a complete and succinct set of those factors which can explain 
the DFR status in organizations. Complete means that the DFR framework should include as many 
factors as possible that explain variation in DFR status. Succinct means that only those factors which 
capture variance of the DFR not explained by other factors should remain in the framework. 
In order to be as complete as possible, this research extracts all potential indicators identifiable in 
the DFR literature available. These indicators can be factors in their own right or be a lower level of a 
factor in conjunction with other indicators. These factors and the relationship among them is what 
constitute the resulting model of DFR. In addition, dimensions should be identified such that professional 
practitioners, who may not be familiar with concepts such as latent variables and conceptual models, can, 
nevertheless identify the aspects of the organization that the factors represent.  
The terms factor and indicator are use indistinctly in parts of this work because they both are 
indications or predictors of the level of certain condition, DFR in this case. They both can be variables in a 
statistical model. When the factor can be subdivided in more specific lower level factors we talk about 
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indicators. It is important to understand also that factors affecting a construct cannot be assessed 
unless there is a measure of the construct to which to compare the impact of the variation of the factors. 
Because that measure of DFR does not exist, this research proposes it and identifies the factors affecting 
it. The way this is done is by distinguishing between extant and perceptual factors and then comparing 
their relationship. 
As academics, we should expect that researchers proposing frameworks, methodologies and 
assessments of DFR are accounting for all what they consider affects its status. Therefore, a literature 
review should provide a comprehensive set of indicators of DFR. Of those indicators, some refer to 
elements that the organization has, knowledge that it possesses, and actions that it does, and by having 
them, knowing them, and performing them it enhances its digital forensics preparation. These can be 
understood as extant DFR indicators because they represent the reality of the DFR status of the firm. On 
the other hand, there are elements for which no direct verification is available; thus, we search for 
perceptions, opinions, and attitudes in order to obtain some measure of their presence. These are called 
perceptual indicators in this research. It is hypothesized here that perceptual factors reflect the DFR 
status assessed by the extant ones. 
This research follows a process divided in two phases in order to develop and test a framework 
for the assessment of DFR in organizations: 
Phase 1: Elaboration of a practical framework through quantitative literature analysis 
1. Definition of the research question and identification of the dependent variable 
2. Systematic revision of the extant literature in DFR 
3. Collection and classification of the DFR indicators extracted from the literature 
4. Testing of the dimensional classification through a Q-Sort test 
5. Adjustment of the validity of the dimensional classification using association rules 
Phase 2: Elaboration and testing of an instrument to assess DFR 
6. Refinement of indicators to be used to survey organizations 
7. Distinction between extant and perceptual indicators of DFR 
8. Assessment of reliability and validity 
9. Final survey and exploratory factor analysis  
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10. Drawing of conclusions, assumptions, limitations and contributions of the study 
A detailed description of these stages is elaborated below: 
Phase 1: Elaboration of a Practical Framework through Quantitative Literature Analysis 
1. Definition of the research question and identification of the dependent variable 
The research question of this study is whether a framework for the assessment of DFR can be 
found and what the factors affecting DFR in organizations would be. Therefore, the dependent variable of 
interest is DFR. 
As any other variable, DFR can assume different values representing the DFR status of an 
organization at different moments in time. There is, currently, not a standard measure of DFR against 
which to develop tests to see how it changes when other variables change. On the contrary, DFR is yet to 
be comprehensively understood. In fact, it seems like determining the DFR level of an organization will be 
an unachievable task. How prepared is the organization to respond to a situation requiring digital 
evidence cannot be known with certainty until such situation happens, which is not a moment firms are 
longing for. If the situation, though, arises, it can come in many different fashions, and it is unlikely that it 
will be the same or similar to any other event in the same or a different company. Comparisons, then, are 
impossible. 
Regardless of these difficulties, the need to assess this digital forensic preparedness is real and 
growing. It is required that researchers minimize uncertainty on the assessment of DFR as much as 
possible. Given that the DFR indicator does not exist and that no variables can be tested against it (and 
because of this), this paper is in the quest for finding the factors comprised by the DFR construct. 
After reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that many and varied factors complement each 
other to create the idea of a specific status in terms of DFR in an organization. It is also clear that some 
factors contribute to the DFR status in a way that is out of the domain of other factors. This indicates that 
many factors in question are formative rather than reflective. Therefore, finding these factors is, at the 
same time, understanding the composition of the construct and developing a measure for it that has not 
been proposed heretofore. 
Because many distinct and overlapping factors have been proposed to affect DFR, it is difficult to 
understand what their prorated unique contributions are. For this reason, this paper proposes a 
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preliminary framework for the classification of the factors found and exposes the indicators of this 
framework to statistical tests of exploratory factor analysis. 
2. Systematic revision of the extant literature in DFR 
In the process of developing measures, which is the purpose of this paper, Churchill (1989) 
recommends to start with specifying the domain of the construct. Likewise, the present paper has begun 
with a detailed review of the extant literature on DFR in order to recognize the domain and scope of the 
construct. 
The amount of literature on DFR until Decemeber, 2015, is still moderate, especially considering 
papers published in indexed academic journals. For this reason, this research attempts to review all 
extant literature whose main topic is DFR frameworks, components, factors or similar aiming to describe 
how is DFR composed and what factors determine its status. This includes similar terms such as pre-
incident preparation (Mandia, Prosise & Pepe cited by Valjarevic & Venter 2011), operation readiness 
phase and infrastructure readiness phase, (Carrier and Spafford cited by Valjarevic & Venter 2011), 
proactive digital forensics (Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & Traore  2011; Mouhtaropoulos Li & Grobler 2012), 
network forensic readiness, and forensic readiness in the cloud (Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-Popovsky 
2012; Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013; and Trenwith & Venter 2013). Other papers are included as 
deemed relevant by citations of the most directly related papers from indexed academic journals. 
In the process of this research, 77 DFR-related documents have been examined. Two main sources have 
been used to limit the scope of the search. One is the library system of a southern university in the United 
States classified as a highest research institution by the Carnegie classification of institutions of higher 
education. This includes those volumes available through interlibrary loan service. The second source is 
the Google Scholar web search engine. The university’s library provides access to over 140 databases 
and 27.000 electronic journals, while Google Scholar database allows access to an estimated of more 
than 160 million documents including such recognized sources as Elsevier journals.  
3. Collection and classification of the DFR indicators extracted from the literature 
During this process, the complete selection of papers is reviewed to extract explicit nomination of 
factors by the authors. Other factors that are inferred from the explanations of the authors are also 
considered. Each item is initially classified as a factor, dimension, requirement, step, etc., as proposed by 
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the paper’s author(s), and later reclassified as only a factor or a dimension according to the definitions 
proposed in this research. As explained above, there is no clear and broadly accepted distinction 
between factors and dimensions throughout the DFR literature. Authors talk about factors, elements, 
categories, phases, requirements, etc. in ways that are coherent within their own discourse, but difficult to 
reconcile with each other and to quantify in a comprehensive model. This is also an obstacle in the quest 
to establish a structured general framework of DFR. 
Despite the diversity of proposals, the raw list includes all factors, elements, categories, 
requirements, etc. as originally mentioned by the authors. From this point on, they will be called items or 
indicators, and can be part of factors or dimensions or remain as simple indicators. This inclusion of 
explicit and implicit items helps recognizing different dimensions of the DFR construct according to the 
literature. Furthermore, by putting all the items on the table, this research minimizes the possibility that 
any relevant indicator of DFR is left out of consideration, and that any factor or dimension, that surges 
with the support of that indicator, is dismissed. 
One first obstacle is that this comprehensive approach leaves too many potential indicators with 
no inferable structure. Therefore, some preliminary organization must be done on this list in order to distill 
a unique categorized set of relevant indicators. Two preliminary operations are conducted on the raw list: 
reclassification of items as factors or dimensions and elimination of redundant items. 
First, all the items are reclassified as potential dimensions or potential factors, which may change 
the initial denomination by authors as factors, elements, categories, requirements, etc. It was explained 
before that all those items that can be expressed and seen as potential generators of a specific DFR 
status are considered factors, whereas those items referring to a perspective or category, within which 
more granular indicators can be grouped, are considered dimensions. 
Factors are more specific than dimensions. They indicate conditions or choices or actions. 
Although a single factor can be measured through two or more indicators, when several of those 
conditions, choices or actions are needed to define the item, it may be better deemed as a dimension. For 
the purpose of this research the factor has to be measurable through variables assuming values on a 
continuum (e.g. time of experience of the CIO) or at levels/categories (e.g. industry, number of employees 
by ranges) or, at least, as a binary variable (e.g. have/have not security policy). The description of the 
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factor may also include a verb, such as “support from management”, which indicates that such action, the 
support, takes place or is performed to some level. 
Many items included are questions that authors suggest to ask in order to assess preparedness. 
An observation from the review is that, in general, questions such as “how much”, “for how long”, “is 
there”, “what type”, “who”, and “where” are indicative of factors because they tend to have single values 
as responses, whereas a question such as “how to” might indicate a dimension because it, likely, requires 
identifying several aspects and their relations to explain the way something occurs. In some cases, 
wording the item as a question helps in applying this discriminant technique. 
A dimension can surge when different indicators refer to the same subject. For example “cost of 
technology” and “technology currency” might indicate that the subject “technology” is a dimension that 
includes those two indicators. However, including another indicator such as “cost of training” might 
indicate that “cost” is also a dimension including the first and third indicator. This is because dimensions 
are also understood as perspectives from which to observe the subject in question, DFR in this case. 
Spyridopoulos & Katos (2011), for example, talk about three dimensions of cloud forensics: technical, 
legal and organizational. 
Because there is not one single perspective that can be considered correct while excluding 
others, this research offers a less subjective interpretation of dimensions, and instead defines them by 
quantifying the recurrence of the words included in the items reclassified as dimensions. A caveat here is 
that in the first round of reclassification the same item may appear as both dimensions and factors or in 
two or more dimensions. Despite the previous explanation, distinguishing factors from dimensions is not a 
straightforward task. Thus, allowing items to be in different groups helps quantifying their recurrence and 
forces the analysis of those items in the context of other items in the extracted dimensions. The 
classification of dimensions is contrasted with the judgment of external reviewers via a structured 
methodology called Q-sort test, explained below. 
4. Testing of the dimensional classification through a Q-Sort test 
The content validity tests the completeness and correct classification of the words as real 
representations of the dimensions of DFR. This is done through a Q-Sort test. Q-Sort tests have been 
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previously used in the literature by Davis 1989; Segars & Grover 1998; and Guo 2014, among many 
others. 
The implementation in this study is slightly different. Those words and groups of words finally 
selected as potential dimensions are separated from their sets and individually presented to a group of 
academics and professionals of information systems for them to regroup them as they think will represent 
independent dimensions.  
5. Adjustment of the validity of the dimensional classification using association rules 
The groups selected by the exterbal reviewers are assessed in terms of the cohesion of words in 
a specific group and its distinction from other groups by using a data mining technique known as 
association rules. This is equivalent to measures of convergent and discriminant validity, as shown in the 
results section. 
Phase 2: Elaboration and Testing of an Instrument to Assess DFR 
6. Refinement of indicators to be used to survey organizations 
Once the framework of dimensions is defined, all items are assigned to the dimension in which 
they better fit. In order to perform this classification two tasks are implemented. First, all 1115 items are 
checked via a lookup function in Excel for their containment of a word belonging to a dimension and 
marked accordingly. Second, all 1115 items were semantically interpreted and assigned to all dimensions 
where they could belong. Obviously, many items fall into several dimensions because words used to 
describe the item appear in several categorical dimensions or because they semantically seem to belong 
to several dimensions at the same time. 
After separating items in dimensions, each dimension is reviewed individually to check on 
repeated items that could be eliminated. Once all categories are cleaned, Items are organized by unique 
item ID in order to detect ID duplication and decide in which of the several dimensions they will remain. 
Finally, those items which are semantically equivalent are merged into a single one or clustered to be 
redacted as measurable indicators. 
The extra care and work that this stage entails is justified by the unique opportunity of conducting 
a structured research with qualified professionals whose available time is in shortage. Given the 
quantitative characteristics of this research, each qualified respondent is of paramount importance in 
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order to assure the power of the test. Therefore, the construction of a parsimonious and optimized test is 
useful to avoid attrition of respondents and minimize other threats of internal validity when conducting the 
study. 
The indicators must be tested through surveys using scales, such as the Likert scale, that allow 
the statistical assessment of potential predictors. Alternatively, semantic differential scales are used when 
considered more appropriate. The instrument also asks a pre and post survey question testing the effect 
of the awareness on the perceived DFR status: What is the level of forensic readiness of your 
organization? 
After the elimination of duplicated items and grouping items based on semantic equivalence, 
each category comprises a reduced set of items. They are not redacted in a way that can be used in a 
survey. Therefore, they are reshaped into single questions that capture what they pretend to measure in 
terms of DFR. Some groups are summarized in a single question whereas some items need two or more 
questions in order to capture what they aim to assess. 
7. Distinction between extant and perceptual indicators of DFR 
The result is the list of measurable indicators of a survey instrument. Among them, there are 
questions that describe the current status of the organization. For example, if a specific training has been 
provided or a specific system is in place. These are called extant indicators. Demographic characteristics 
such as the size of the company are considered a special case of extant indicators. Other questions 
evaluate the opinion of the respondent regarding a condition hold by the organization. For example, 
whether there is management support for the DFR program. These are considered perceptual indicators.  
The distinction among extant and perceptual indicators is used to contrast the real and the 
perceived situation of the organization regarding DFR. Extant indicators give an assessment of the level 
of DFR in the organization according to what has been proposed by the literature, whereas the perceptual 
indicators account for the perceived reflection of that reality. Those perceptual items found to be 
correlated with the level of DFR as measured by the extant indicators make the proposed starting point of 
a measurement model of DFR for social scientists. 
8. Assessment of reliability and validity 
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A sample of randomly selected companies completes a survey with the extant and perceptual 
indicators. These are analized independently via exploratory factor analysis. The extant indicators are 
considered formative of the DFR concept; therefore, they are processed using principal components 
analysis. The perceptual indicators are considered reflective of the DFR concept; therefore, they are 
processed using maximum likelihood.  
The results of the pilot study are used to assess the feasibility of these factor analyses and to 
have a preliminary approach of the nomological validity of the latent factors discovered in the final study. 
Cronbach’s alpha measures are performed for the assessment of reliabilty of the indicators of the final 
factors.  
9. Final survey and exploratory factor analysis  
Statistical exploratory factor analysis is used in order to detect the latent factors behind the tested 
indicators. Although Churchill’s general framework proposes a procedure to develop measures for 
marketing constructs using multi-item measures, this methodology is frequently used in other business 
and social disciplines. An important consideration must be done regarding the adoption of Churchill’s 
methodology. Even though multi-item measures are utilized in the present research, Churchill’s procedure 
is designed for reflective items and not for some of the formative items resulting here. DFR is a complex 
construct defined by interrelated yet independent aspects in the organization. For this reason, some of 
the factors of interest of this study are mostly formative rather than reflective factors. Therefore, the 
evaluations of reliability through tests such as Cronbach’s Alpha have limitations in assessing the items of 
the final scale. Formative indicators may not respond as expected to the reliability tests even though they 
indeed belong to the factor of interest. This issue requires the following short clarification. 
Formative vs. Reflective Factors 
Formative factors are conceived as the pillars of a composite variable hence this variable owes its 
existence to the presence of each of those factors in an additive way. In other words, we understand that 
the composite variable exists because the factors exist simultaneously. On the other hand, reflective 
factors are indications that a latent variable is present. Therefore, when the latent variable changes all 
their indicators change to reflect that change. In the case of formative factors, not all indicators need to 
change in order to see a change in the latent variable, i.e., they are not expected to correlate. Because 
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the causal flow is different from formative to reflective factors, the indicators are exchangeable in the 
reflective case and definitional in the formative case (Rash.org 2015 retrieved on 150622 from 
http://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt221d.htm). 
The definition of indicators as formative or reflective must then be justified by the researcher 
based on sound theory more than statistics. Notwithstanding, statistical analysis can open the door to 
reevaluate the theory. As an example, let us use Elyas et al. (2014) summary of DFR in three goals and 
turn them into measurable indicators: 
1. My organization is ready to collect and present valid digital evidence in the event of digital crime. 
2. My organization is ready to collect and present valid digital evidence in the event of litigation. 
3. My organization is ready to collect and present valid digital evidence in the event of internal 
dispute. 
An assessment of DFR under this perspective seems to be formative because the organization’s 
status on DFR depends on the combined status of three different indicators. They are: readiness to 
provide evidence in a digital crime, readiness to do it in case of litigation, and readiness to do it in case of 
internal dispute. However, a high correlation among the items associated to all of them might indicate that 
these factors are indeed reflective rather than formative. This is, perhaps, because although DFR is 
achieved through several independent ways, once a certain level of DFR is gained it will simultaneously 
improve the ability to collect and present digital evidence regardless of the reason why this collection is 
done. 
This said, measures of reliability are implemented in this research regardless of the classification 
of indicators. According to Davis (1989) who uses this methodology in the development of the technology 
acceptance model (TAM), the appropriate selection of the initial scale items helps to assure the content 
validity of the scales. Far from avoiding the theoretical discussion on the issues explained above, this 
study aims to encourage it.  
10. Conclusions, assumptions, limitations and contributions of the study 
This process is as real a measure of DFR as it can be, considering the unattainable conditions of 
a definitive assessment. Yet, the proposed tasks have their own challenges as well. Some assumptions 
and limitations hold and are explained after the concluding remarks of the study. 
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This methodology not only values the theoretical and practical knowledge on DFR, but also 
combines qualitative and quantitative techniques whenever they are more convenient in order to 
guarantee that the research follows a structured process that is testable and repeatable. In particular, this 
study uses Q-Sort tests as a structured way to extract information from experts and statistical techniques 
on all quantifiable data. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
1115 potential indicators of DFR where extracted from the literature. This list is found as 
Appendix A. Of those 1115 potential indicators of DFR, 381 items were considered to be representative of 
dimensions. A snapshot showing a partial section of a table of items reclassified as dimensions is in 
Figure 4. The complete table of 381 items is too large to be included in the body of this paper; hence, it is 
provided as Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 4. Items re-classified as potential dimensions of DFR (Partial View) 
  
The number of items discovered is too big, which makes it difficult to make sense of the potential 
dimensions by identifying groups of similar indicators that are at the same time different to indicators in 
other groups. Thus, a semantic approach is used to discover the underlying dimensions to which these 
Predictor Classification Re-Classification Paper Year
Security policy Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Security organization Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Personnel security Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Physical and environmental security Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Communications and operations Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Management Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Systems development and maintenance Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Compliance Dimension Dimension VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000
Tools & Equipment Factor Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Evidence Collection Factor Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001
Training. Dimension Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001
Protect the evidence. Dimension Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001
Information States Dimension Dimension Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001 2001
Security Services Dimension Dimension Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001 2001
Security Countermeasures Dimension Dimension Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001 2001
Time Dimension Dimension Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001 2001
Education Factor Dimension Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001 2001
Training. Factor Dimension Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 2001 2001
Storage technology Factor Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 2002
Infrastructure digital and physical Dimension Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003
Operations Dimension Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003
Training Factor Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003
Equipment Factor Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003
A. Identification Class Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 2003
A6. System Sub clas Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 2003
A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis Sub clas Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 2003
B. Preservation Class Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 2003
C. Collection Class Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 2003
D. Examination Class Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 2003
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items belong. It consists of finding the recurrent terms used by authors when describing indicators, 
grouping those words that are semantically equivalent, and counting their recurrence throughout the set 
of items. The process so far explained can be summarized as follows: 
1. Identify each item as a factor or dimension 
2. Extract those items classified as dimensions 
3. Select recurrent words that appear within the selected items indicative of dimensions 
4. Group those words which are semantically equivalent 
5. Create a matrix of word sets (in columns) versus items (in rows) 
6. Compare each item against each word set and give it a point if the item contains the word or a 
synonym of it 
7. Add the total points for each word to show its weight according to the recurrence in the list (higher 
counts are considered more indicative of a dimension) 
The list of 128 word sets initially selected as potential dimensions of DFR comprises: Accelerate, 
Access, Accreditation/Compliance/Certify, Action/Activity, Admissible/Credible, Advise, Alert, 
Analysis/Intelligence, Anonymous, Apply/Conduct/Establish/Execute/Implement/Perform, Approve, 
Architecture, Archive/Custody/Preserve/Protect/Storage, Assessment/Measure/Indicator/Statistics/Test, 
Asset, Assurance, Attack/Risk/Threat, Audit, Authenticate/Authorize/Identity/Log (people), Available, 
Awareness, Best Practice, Business, Capability/Ability, Case/Event/Incident, Chain/Flow, Cloud, 
Code/Guideline/Law/Requirement/Rule, Collaborate/Interact, Collect/Acquire/Extract/Retain, Commitment, 
Communicate/Disseminate/Notify/Present/Report, Computer/Hardware/Server, Contact, 
Containment/Defense/Resilience, Context/Environment/External, Control, Coordinate, Cost, Create, 
Culture, Customer, Data/Information/Record, Delete, Demonstration/Evidence/Proof, 
Detection/Monitoring/Surveillance, Deter/Disrupt/Interrupt/Limit, Develop, Digital, Document, 
Education/Training, Electronic, Emergency, Enforcement, Escalate, Forensic, Formal, Functionality, 
Governance, Hierarchy/Structure, Hypothesis, Identify/Classify, Impact, Industry, Infrastructure, Integrity, 
Inter/Multi-disciplinary, Internal, Intrusion, Investigate, Expertise/Knowledge/Literacy/Skill, Lab, Lead, Live, 
Maintenance, Manage/Adm/Handling, Mature, Media, Mitigate/Minimize, Mobile, Model, Need, Network, 
Objective, Obligation, Organization/Corporate, People/Personnel/Stakeholder/User, Physical, Plan, Policy, 
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Prepare/Prevent, Privilege, Procedure/Process/Operation/Method, Professional, Program, Prosecute, 
Quality/Effectiveness, Readiness, Recover, Reliable, Reputation/Status, Resource, Response, 
Responsibility/Role, Review, Search, Security, Select, Service, Social, Software, Source, Space/Location, 
Standard, Strategy, Support, System, Target, Task, Team, Technique/Technology, Time, 
Tools/Equipment, Traceability, Transport, Use, Wireless. 
The repetition of nominations indicates consensus, throughout the literature, on the existence of a 
relevant dimension denoted by the word(s), while allowing reduction of the number of potential 
dimensions. Indicator items that do not contain any of the words of the selected dimensions, are then 
assigned to a created dimension, grouped together to make other eventual dimensions, left alone as an 
independent dimension or reconsidered as a factor. 
It became clear, from this selection, that indicators of DFR classified under this framework of 
dimensions would belong to many of them at the same time. In addition, 128 dimensions are too many to 
be useful for a practical framework. Further analysis revealed that each one of the 128 terms belongs to 
one of three categories of words, those which refer to entities, those referring to actions, and those 
referring to conditions. The impact list of Table 1 below shows the number of items associated to each 
word from the most to the least frequent, and their classification into these three types of words. 
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Table 1. Frequency impact of word sets indicating dimensions  
Terms Impact List 
Index Term Count Type 
1 Procedure/Process/Operation/Method 56 Entity 
2 Archive/Custody/Preserve/Protect/Storage 47 Action 
3 Demonstration/Evidence/Proof 47 Entity 
4 Data/Information/Record 46 Entity 
5 Code/Guideline/Law/Requirement/Rule 45 Entity 
6 Forensic 42 Condition 
7 Security 39 Condition 
8 Policy 37 Entity 
9 Digital 33 Condition 
10 People/Personnel/Stakeholder/User 31 Entity 
11 Technique/Technology 30 Entity 
12 Manage/Adm/Handling 27 Action 
13 Case/Event/Incident 26 Entity 
14 Collect/Acquire/Extract/Retain 23 Action 
15 Education/Training 20 Condition 
16 Expertise/Knowledge/Literacy/Skill 20 Condition 
17 Investigate 20 Action 
18 Analysis/Intelligence 19 Action 
19 Organization/Corporate 17 Entity 
20 Response 17 Action 
21 System 17 Entity 
22 Accreditation/Compliance/Certify 16 Condition 
23 Computer/Hardware/Server 15 Entity 
24 Tools/Equipment 15 Entity 
25 Plan 14 Entity 
26 Chain/Flow 13 Entity 
27 Deter/Disrupt/Interrupt/Limit 13 Action 
28 Communicate/Disseminate/Notify/Present/Report 12 Action 
29 Detection/Monitoring/Surveillance 12 Condition 
30 Attack/Risk/Threat 11 Entity 
31 Capability/Ability 11 Condition 
32 Develop 11 Action 
33 Premises/Site/Space/Workspace 10 Entity 
34 Apply/Conduct/Establish/Execute/Implement/Perform 9 Action 
35 Authenticate/Authorize/Identity/Log (people) 9 Action 
36 Awareness 9 Condition 
37 Business 9 Entity 
38 Context/Environment/External 9 Entity 
39 Infrastructure 9 Entity 
40 Maintenance 9 Condition 
41 Prepare/Prevent 9 Action 
42 Team 9 Entity 
43 Document 8 Entity 
44 Network 8 Entity 
45 Responsibility/Role 7 Condition 
46 Admissible/Credible 6 Condition 
47 Architecture 6 Entity 
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48 Assessment/Measure/Indicator/Statistics/Test 6 Action 
49 Cloud 6 Entity 
50 Governance 6 Condition 
51 Identify/Classify 6 Action 
52 Integrity 6 Condition 
53 Readiness 6 Condition 
54 Anonymous 5 Condition 
55 Collaborate/Interact 5 Action 
56 Control 5 Action 
57 Cost 5 Condition 
58 Culture 5 Condition 
59 Enforcement 5 Condition 
60 Jurisdiction 5 Condition 
61 Physical 5 Condition 
62 Resource 5 Entity 
63 Software 5 Entity 
64 Accelerate 4 Action 
65 Action/Activity 4 Action 
66 Hierarchy/Structure 4 Condition 
67 Inter/Multi-disciplinary 4 Condition 
68 Internal 4 Condition 
69 Program 4 Entity 
70 Quality/Effectiveness 4 Condition 
71 Transport 4 Action 
72 Use 4 Condition 
73 Approve 3 Action 
74 Assurance 3 Condition 
75 Audit 3 Action 
76 Available 3 Condition 
77 Containment/Defense/Resilience 3 Condition 
78 Coordinate 3 Action 
79 Hypothesis 3 Entity 
80 Lead 3 Action 
81 Strategy 3 Entity 
82 Asset 2 Entity 
83 Commitment 2 Condition 
84 Electronic 2 Condition 
85 Formal 2 Condition 
86 Intrusion 2 Entity 
87 Lab 2 Entity 
88 Live 2 Condition 
89 Mitigate/Minimize 2 Action 
90 Reliable 2 Condition 
91 Review 2 Action 
92 Standard 2 Condition 
93 Time 2 Entity 
94 Traceability 2 Condition 
95 Access 1 Condition 
96 Advise 1 Action 
97 Alert 1 Action 
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98 Best Practice 1 Condition 
99 Contact 1 Action 
100 Create 1 Action 
101 Customer 1 Entity 
102 Delete 1 Action 
103 Emergency 1 Condition 
104 Escalate 1 Action 
105 Functionality 1 Condition 
106 Impact 1 Condition 
107 Industry 1 Condition 
108 Mature 1 Condition 
109 Media 1 Entity 
110 Mobile 1 Condition 
111 Model 1 Condition 
112 Need 1 Condition 
113 Objective 1 Entity 
114 Obligation 1 Condition 
115 Privilege 1 Condition 
116 Professional 1 Condition 
117 Prosecute 1 Action 
118 Recover 1 Action 
119 State 1 Condition 
120 Search 1 Action 
121 Select 1 Action 
122 Service 1 Action 
123 Social 1 Condition 
124 Source 1 Entity 
125 Support 1 Condition 
126 Target 1 Entity 
127 Task 1 Entity 
128 Wireless 1 Condition 
 
 
These categories can be dimensions by themselves because they present different perspectives 
from which to approach the problem. This means that the DFR status can be seen from the perspective of 
the processes involved, from the perspective of certain conditions that together represent the DFR status 
or from the perspective of which entities, on which those conditions and processes operate, must be 
considered to evaluate the level of DFR in an organization. In addition, the interactions among the three 
groups of words, naturally describe indicators of DFR status. Entities can be the object and subject of 
different processes and achieve different conditions. Processes can also fulfill or achieve a specific 
condition. 
One reason to not use these three categories of words as dimensions is that each would include 
too many indicators as many other terms within each category seem to be relevant and independent from 
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the others. Another reason is their poor usefulness in helping to discriminate indicators. Let us take an 
example. Imagine that we classify students into those who study biology, those who are above 21 years 
old, and those who are born in California. Several students would belong to all categories at the same 
time. Therefore, the dimensions major, age and birth place would lack discriminant validity. Therefore, we 
should choose either major, age or birthplace as a first level of categorization. Likewise, we should 
choose either entities, conditions or actions as a first level of categorization because indicators can easily 
belong to all of the simultaneously. Despite the reasonableness of this approach it is hardly adopted in 
the reviewed literature. For the purpose of this research, minimizing overlapping among dimensions is 
important. 
Although any of the groups of word sets can be selected as the initial perspective, conditions and 
actions are slightly more conceptual whereas entities include mostly tangible elements or elements of 
easier recognition. A glimpse to the impact list of this word sets in Table 1, also reveals the prevalence of 
entities at the top of the list - half of the top 30 words are entities -, which indicates that more indicators 
can be directly classified according to the entity they refer to than according to an action or condition they 
refer to. Therefore, only word groups representing entities will be used as potential dimensions. Because 
all actions and conditions found owe their existence to their association to one of the entities, any relevant 
factor of DFR will be classified into at least one dimension. Moreover, all actions are included in the 
“Procedure/Process/Operation/Method” entity because all actions are themselves a process or a stage in 
a process. The “Entities” group comprises terms such as procedures, data, people, and law, which are 
expected to define the domains within which indcators are circumscribed. By implementing this 
methodology the space of possible dimensions is reduced to 42. The following list shows the set of words 
grouped as entities with their respective impact. 
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Table 2. Word sets indicating dimensions classified as entities 
Term Count 
Procedure/Process/Operation/Method 56 
Demonstration/Evidence/Proof 47 
Data/Information/Record 46 
Code/Guideline/Law/Requirement/Rule 45 
Policy 37 
People/Personnel/Stakeholder/User 31 
Technical/Technology 30 
Case/Event/Incident 26 
Organization/Corporate 17 
System 17 
Computer/Hardware/Server 15 
Tools/Equipment 15 
Plan 14 
Chain/Flow 13 
Attack/Risk/Threat 11 
Premises/Site/Space/Workspace 10 
Business 9 
Context/Environment/External 9 
Infrastructure 9 
Team 9 
Document 8 
Network 8 
Architecture 6 
Cloud 6 
Resource 5 
Software 5 
Program 4 
Hypothesis 3 
Strategy 3 
Asset 2 
Intrusion 2 
Lab 2 
Time 2 
Customer 1 
Media 1 
Objective 1 
Service 1 
Source 1 
Target 1 
Task 1 
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Several terms show high recurrence among the items extracted from the literature, while other 
terms with fewer repetitions seem to be relevant and independent enough to be included as unique 
dimensions. There is, however, a big difference between the top and the bottom of the list in terms of 
recurrence. While terms at the top repeat tens of times, there are several terms at the bottom that appear 
only one or few times throughout the items selected as dimensions. Although the lack of convergence 
around a term among authors may indicate that such terms are not dimensions, it can also mean that 
some of these terms can be regrouped into better defined dimensions. 
For example, the terms Plan, Program, Objective, Target, Task and Strategy are all elements of 
the digital forensics strategic plan of the organization and can be put together; the term Document fits well 
with Data, Information goes with Record; Intrusion can be grouped with Attack, Risk and Threat go well 
together; Business goes with Organization/Corporate; Customer and Team can join the terms referring to 
People; Assets fits with Resources; Lab with Workspace; and Tools/Equipment with Computer and 
Hardware. In the context of the new list, the term Policy, which makes a category by itself with 37 counts, 
could be placed at the same level of Rules and Guidelines, which as a group are distinct from all other 
terms. These associations among terms would have been very difficult to detect in earlier stages of this 
research.  
As for the low-frequency terms that remain in the list (i.e. Hypothesis, Time, Media and Source), a 
second look at their originator items gives important information to make decisions on them as potential 
dimensions or not. The three times that the term Hypothesis shows up, it originates from the same paper, 
hence there is probably not a real recurrence in the literature for it, and it can be discarded as a 
dimension. The term Time comes from two different papers, and it is the judgement of the researchers 
that Time gives a relevant and unique perspective as to be kept as a potential dimension. Source and 
Media appear a single time each and might not be good descriptors of dimensions. The regrouping of 
word sets of potential dimensions with their aggregate counts is listed below. 
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Table 3. Potential dimensions extracted from Literature Review 
Dimensions Count 
Code/Guideline/Law/Policy/Requirement/Rule 82 
Procedure/Process/Operation/Method 56 
Data/Document/Information/Record 54 
Demonstration/Evidence/Proof 47 
Customer/People/Personnel/Stakeholder/Team/User 41 
Computer/Equipment/Hardware/Server/Tools 30 
Technical/Technology 30 
Case/Event/Incident 26 
Business/Corporate/Organization 26 
Plan/Program/Strategy/Objective/Target/Task 24 
System 17 
Chain/Flow 13 
Attack/Intrusion/Risk/Threat 13 
Lab/Premises/Site/Space/Workspace 12 
Context/Environment/External 9 
Infrastructure 9 
Network 8 
Asset/Resource 7 
Architecture 6 
Cloud 6 
Software 5 
Time 2 
 
 
It seems like these 22 groups of words selected represent the most internally consistent and 
externally differentiated categories where DFR factors can be placed. However, this selection is 
submitted to the judgement of qualified reviewers in order to validate the discriminant and convergent 
validity of the groups through a Q-Sort test. 
Q-Sort Test  
The 22 selected dimensions include 65 words. The reviewers are given the 65 words, which they 
classify in as few as possible unique categories containing only the words required to give sense to the 
dimension. This is a slight variation over conventional Q-sort tests in that no pre-established categories 
were suggested to respondents. Reviewers were free to assign as many categories as they wanted, each 
with as many words as they deemed appropriate.19 reviewers completed the Q-sort test. They are either 
technical people with experience in information systems and security, graduate students in information 
systems or computer sciences, or faculty. Each reviewer worked independently. All tests took place in 
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December, 2015. The instructions for the classification task can be seen in Appendix C. A summary of 
the demographics of respondents is shown below as number of respondents in each category:  
 
Table 4. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (Age) 
Reviewer's Age 
Below 18 (1) 0 
18 to 25 (2) 2 
26 to 33 (3) 6 
34 to 41 (4) 4 
42 to 49 (5) 4 
50 to 57 (6) 2 
Above 57 (7) 1 
 
Table 5. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (Gender) 
Reviewer's Gender 
Male (1) 11 
Female (2) 8 
 
Table 6. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (IS Experience) 
Reviewer's Experience in Information Systems 
Less than 1 (1) 0 
1 to 5 (2) 3 
6 to 10 (3) 4 
11 to 15 (4) 3 
16 to 20 (5) 5 
21 to 25 (6) 0 
More than 25 (7) 4 
 
 
Table 7. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (InfoSec Experience) 
Reviewer's Experience in Information Security 
Less than 1 (1) 4 
1 to 5 (2) 6 
6 to 10 (3) 4 
11 to 15 (4) 2 
16 to 20 (5) 1 
21 to 25 (6) 1 
More than 25 (7) 1 
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Table 8. Respondents’ demographics from Q-Sort Test (Self-Assessment) 
Reviewer's Selfvaluation of Expertise in Security 
Layman (1) 2 
Minimal (2) 1 
Below average (3) 0 
Average (4) 2 
Above average (5) 7 
Superior (6) 5 
Expert (7) 2 
 
 
The results of the sorting were organized and prepared for analysis using Microsoft Excel. The 
file with the raw data was named Data0 and imported into R (the open source and domain-specific 
programming language for statistics and data analysis). This research applies an unsupervised data 
mining technique called association rules in order to detect possible dimensions. Association rules are the 
algorithms used to perform market basket analysis through which the co-occurrence of products among 
transactions in a store is looked for in order to gain insights on cross-selling opportunities. It was deemed 
appropriate to apply the same technique in this research because the occurrence of products in 
transactions is very similar to the occurrence of words in selected categories chosen by respondents of 
the Q-sort test.  
Two differences exist between these two scenarios. First, whereas basket analysis aims to find 
causation relationships between products, the sole coexistence of words is enough indication of a 
category in this research. Second, unlike transactions, where a product can be not purchased at all or 
appear many more times than others, in our categories each word appears exactly as many times as 
respondents completing the classification task. These characteristics are important in defining the 
minimum value of parameters to assess the validity of the dimensions.  
One of the earliest and most fundamental algorithms for generating association rules is called 
Apriori (EMC 2015 Data Science and Big data analytics). The application of the apriori algorithm requires 
the creation of a model under which rules of association are created by R. Although the rules of 
association are found by the software in an unsupervised way, the parameters of the model must be 
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defined by the researcher. In particular, values for the support, confidence and minimum length 
parameters must be entered. 
The minimum length refers to the minimum number of items that are expected in a group or an 
itemset. Itemset is the generic term used by data miners using association rules for what this research 
calls groups of words or group sets, categories or potential dimensions. For our case, the minimum 
number for an itemset is two (2) because the research is trying to find which of the 65 words can be put 
together in a category in order to reduce the potential number of categories, and at least one pair of 
words will suffice to make a category. 
The support parameter refers to the proportion of a specific itemset (a word or group of words) 
that is expected to be found among the selections of respondents. In this research, there are 19 
respondents; hence, itemsets that are selected by at least 10 respondents have the support of the 
majority. Given that the total itemsets selected by the 19 respondents is 252 (see summary of Data0 
below), the minimum value for the support parameter is 10/252 or 0.03968254. Beacuse an itemset 
cannot be selected more than once by a respondent, the maximum possible support for any itemset is 
19/252 or 0.075396825.  
The confidence value indicates the probability that an itemset A is chosen in a selection given 
that another itemset B was chosen in the same selection. This probability is calculated by comparing the 
total times that the itemset A is selected with the total times that the itemset A is selected along with the 
given itemset B. In our case, each given itemset (a word or group of words) is selected exactly 19 times, 
once by each respondent. Therefore, an acceptable value for confidence that an itemset A implies the 
presence of another itemset B in the same selection is that at least 10 respondents put itemset A and 
itemset B together in the same category. This value is 10/19 or 0.5263. 
Analysis of Q-Sort Test Using Data Mining Association Rules 
Once the data is collected from the Q-sort tests, it is organized and imported to R, where the 
summary(data) instruction provides the characteristics of the data set: 
Summary of Data0 
Categories as itemMatrix in sparse format with: 
252 rows (Itemsets/categories) 
65 columns (items) and a density of 0.07539683  
Most frequent items: 
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Architecture Asset  Attack  Business  Case (Other)  
19  19  19            19  19 1140  
Itemset/Category length distribution: 
Sizes: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 16 17 18 21 22  
Number of categories: 43 28 35 30 25 28 23  7  6  8  6  2  5  1  1  2  1  1  
Descriptive Statistics: 
Min. 1st Qu.   Median  Mean    3rd Qu.    Max.  
1.000   2.000   4.000     4.901    6.250        22.000  
 
In the R output shown above, 252 rows indicate that a total of 252 categories were selected; “65 
columns” indicate the number of words to be classified. The “Most frequent items” is a list of the top five 
words most chosen (which in our case is irrelevant because all words are chosen 19 times, although it 
confirms that all selections are complete). The “Itemset/Category length distribution” shows the frequency 
of categories’ sizes. For example, categories of one element where chosen 43 times, while categories of 
17, 18, 21 and 22 words were chosen only once each. Finally, the “Descriptive statistics” show that the 
minimum words per category is one, while the maximum is 22, and the average size of a category in 
number of words is close to 5. 
Our sparse matrix has a size of 16,380 (252 groups times 65 words) and a density of 
0.07539683. This indicates that 1,235 selections were made (16380*0.07539683), which is correct 
because each of the 19 respondents assigned each of the 65 words (19*65=1,235). This is another way 
to assure that no words were missing or misspelled or counted twice. Excel’s filters and find functions 
were also used to assure this. The 19 respondents chose a total of 252 groups or categories, which gives 
an average of 13.26 dimensions per respondent (252/19). The mean size of a group is 4.9, but it must be 
an integer number, so we should say it is 5. Data0 is used as the raw data to create the model called 
Model0 with the parameters adopted. The instruction to build Model0 in R is: > Model0<-apriori(Data0, 
parameter = list(support=0.03968, confidence=0.5263, minlen=2)). 
The first part of the output (attached in Appendix D to facilitate replication of the analysis), show 
the type of algorithm implemented (Apriori), the values of the parameters used by the algorithm, and 
times of internal operations in the computations. 
The summary of Model0 below shows that, under these conditions, the algorithm finds 403 rules 
of which 156 involved 2 words, 135 rules involved 3 words, 76 rules involved 4 words, 30 rules involved 5 
words, and 6 rules involved 6 words. The “lhs” and “rhs” terms in the output refer to the left and right hand 
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sides of the rules, respectively. This is because, as explained above, the Apriori algorithm is mostly used 
for market basket analysis looking for rules where the existence of a product on the left implies the 
purchase of a product on the right. In our case, only the coexistence of words (instead of products) in a 
category (instead of a transaction) is relevant. 
Summary of Model0 
Set of 403 rules 
Rule length distribution (lhs + rhs): sizes 
2 3 4 5 6  
156 135 76 30 6  
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.  
2.000 2.000 3.000 2.995 4.000 6.000  
Summary of quality measures: 
    Support  confidence  lift        
Min.: 0.03968    Min.: 0.5263  Min.: 6.981   
1st Qu.: 0.04365    1st Qu.: 0.6842  1st Qu.:  9.075   
Median: 0.04762    Median: 0.8421  Median: 11.169   
Mean: 0.04922    Mean: 0.8176  Mean: 10.844   
3rd Qu.: 0.05357    3rd Qu.: 0.9474  3rd Qu.: 12.565   
Max.: 0.07540    Max.: 1.0000  Max.: 13.263   
Mining info: 
Data; Data0 
Ntransactions: 252 
Support: 0.03968 
Confidence: 0.5263 
                  
The complete set of rules is available as Appendix D, and can be obtained with the instruction > 
inspect(Model0) in R. 403 rules result from the application of the model using the selected parameters. 
The rules suggest that some words are associated with others in what can be considered a dimension of 
DFR. However, many of the rules are redundant for the purpose of this research. This happens for two 
reasons: first, unlike common transactions where products can be selected never or many times in a 
group of transactions, words in this research are selected once by each respondent and thus appear the 
same number of times (N) in the group of selections. If two words A and B appear together only once, 
they both will appear N-1 times not together; hence, both have the same confidence. If the association of 
these words passes the minimum parameter test of Model0, two rules will show up, one with word A 
implying word B and another with word B implying word A. Association of more words follow similar logic. 
The second reason for redundancy is that rules associating a subset of words that are contained 
within bigger sets of associated words in other accepted rules are unnecessary. For example, if a 
suggestion is accepted from a rule associating words A, B and C, six other accepted rules are redundant: 
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A implying B, B implying A, B implying C, C implying B, A implying C, and C implying A. Thus, only the 
rule involving A, B and C should be kept. 
After trimming off unnecessary rules, only 36 rules remain. They are shown in Table 5 in the 
original format resulting from R, and with their respective original number as posted in Appendix D, in 
order to facilitate tracking down the trimming process. The rules are grouped in clusters representing the 
dimensions found after the Q-sort test. Some of them, such as rules 335, 216, and 403, are exact 
representations of researcher’s choice of dimensions, which is meaningful given that reviewers were 
completely free to associate words in dimensions. Rule 363 involving four words was also predicted by 
the researcher, except for a fifth word not included by the reviewers. 
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Table 9. Potential dimensions after application of association rules algorithm 
# Rule Support Confidence Lift 
335 {Attack,Intrusion,Risk} => {Threat} 0.048 1.000 13.263 
359 {Attack,Event,Incident} => {Intrusion} 0.040 1.000 13.263 
252 {Attack,Target} => {Intrusion} 0.040 1.000 13.263 
17 {Threat} => {Target} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
              
234 {Site,Space} => {Workspace} 0.040 1.000 13.263 
235 {Site,Workspace} => {Premises} 0.040 0.833 11.053 
240 {Premises,Space} => {Workspace} 0.040 1.000 13.263 
243 {Environment,Space} => {Workspace} 0.040 0.833 11.053 
54 {Premises} => {Workspace} 0.048 0.632 8.377 
57 {Workspace} => {Lab} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
63 {Site} => {Environment} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
              
93 {Proof} => {Case} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
91 {Evidence} => {Proof} 0.063 0.842 11.169 
              
85 {Record} => {Document} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
              
95 {Information} => {Data} 0.063 0.842 11.169 
              
279 {Guideline,Strategy} => {Plan} 0.040 1.000 13.263 
120 {Strategy} => {Objective} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
              
100 {Policy} => {Requirement} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
87 {Law} => {Rule} 0.048 0.632 8.377 
131 {Policy} => {Procedure} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
275 {Guideline,Rule} => {Policy} 0.040 0.909 12.057 
              
147 {Guideline} => {Procedure} 0.044 0.579 7.679 
155 {Method} => {Procedure} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
135 {Process} => {Procedure} 0.048 0.632 8.377 
133 {Process} => {Flow} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
102 {Process} => {Operation} 0.056 0.737 9.773 
              
89 {Resource} => {Asset} 0.052 0.684 9.075 
              
216 {Corporate,Organization} => {Business} 0.052 1.000 13.263 
              
127 {Architecture} => {Infrastructure} 0.044 0.579 7.679 
              
273 {Code,Software} => {Program} 0.044 0.846 11.223 
97 {System} => {Software} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
              
363 {Computer,Hardware,Server} => {Equipment} 0.052 0.867 11.495 
367 {Computer,Hardware,Network} => {Server} 0.040 0.909 12.057 
265 {Equipment,Network} => {Hardware} 0.040 1.000 13.263 
137 {Technology} => {Computer} 0.040 0.526 6.981 
              
403 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team,User} => {Stakeholder} 0.044 0.917 12.158 
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Adjustment of Framework Based on Results of Q-sort Test 
 Exact coincidences, however, were not expected. Instead, patterns of words that frequently 
appear together in reviewers’ selections are looked for. These co-occurrences are even more meaningful 
if those words in identified dimensions do not appear in distinct dimensions, thus reinforcing the 
characteristics of internal validity within the groups and external validity among them. 
The 36 rules summarizing all supported co-occurrences display 12 distinct dimensions with no 
overlapping among them. These rules include 56 out of the 65 words presented. If each of the nine 
remaining words makes a dimension on its own, the result of the Q-sort test delivers a total of 21 
dimensions compared to 22 dimensions initially defined. In general, the two sets of dimensions are very 
similar and can be reconciled with minor adjustments described in the description of each dimension. 
The application of the Q-Sort test consist on printed labels that reviewers spreaded on a table 
and bundled together with rubber bands. Reviewers were told to choose a word to put on top of each 
bundle of words as their choice of that dimension name. The word that is chosen more times by the 
reviewers is adopted as the dimension’s name. As shown in the instructions of the Q-sort, reviewers could 
have chosen super categories where other categories were included. These super categories are also 
indication of the representativeness of the word as to be used as a dimension name. The basic practical 
framework is determined by the dimensions within which factors can be placed. The following is the final 
list of dimensions resulting from the reconciliation of the two sets of categories pre and post Q-sort test. 
DFR Dimensions 
1. People 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
users, customers, stakeholders, personnel, teams and people in general. There is a perfect match of the 
words included in this dimension between the researcher’s categorization and the result of the Q-sort test. 
“People” is the most selected word as category or super category name (14 times). 
2. Business 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the business, the organization or the corporation. There is a perfect match of the words included in this 
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dimension between the researcher’s categorization and the result of the Q-sort test. “Business” is the 
most selected name as category or super category (12 times). 
3. Events 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
events, incidents, targets, attacks, risks, intrusions, and threats. The researcher and the Q-sort test 
coincide in four words included in this dimension. A representative number of reviewers associated the 
words “event,” “incident,” and “target” with at least three of the others in the category. Therefore, their 
inclusion seems to be consensual. “Event” is the most selected name as category or super category (14 
times). 
4. Technology 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the hardware, the servers, the computers, the equipment, the network, the technology, and the technical 
issues. The researcher and the Q-sort test coincide in that the words computer, equipment, hardware, 
and server belong together. However, the pre Q-test classification had Tools as part of this category, and 
network and technology in different categories. Unlike the definition of technology as comprising 
hardware and software (Kroenke 2014), the reviewers did not include any of the words of the System 
category, where software is, at the levels of support and confidence expected. Likewise, the majority of 
reviewers did not include here the word “technical.” The relationship between “technical” and 
“technology,” though, shows up at the more lenient conditions of support 0.357 (9/252) and confidence 
0.473 (9/19). Given that the pre Q-sort categorization also puts them together, “technical” is included in 
this category. As for the word “tools,” the reviewers’ choice is adopted. “Technology” is the most selected 
name as category or super category (13 times). 
5. Information 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the information or the data. The initial category contained also “record” and “document,” but the majority 
of reviewers see these two words as making a different category. “Information” is the most selected name 
as category or super category (12 times). 
6. Document 
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This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
documents or records. Although the pre Q-test has these terms in the same category with “information” 
and “data,” the reviewers seem to associate them more with the word “proof.” This can be seen by 
creating a model in R with more lenient parameters (i.e., support = 0.357 or 9/252 and confidence = 0.473 
or 9/19). At this level, a rule associating record and proof shows up ({Record} => {Proof} support = 
0.03571429, and confidence = 0.4736842). Given this lack of agreement, this category will be kept as the 
majority of reviewers see it. “Document” is the most selected name as category or super category (2 
times). 
7. Evidence 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the proof, the demonstration, the case, the evidence or the chain of evidence. The pre Q-test has 
“demonstration” in the same category of “evidence” and “proof,” but the majority of reviewers include the 
word “case” instead of “demonstration.” Still, “demonstration” is by definition the action of giving proof or 
evidence, hence having it as an independent category would be redundant. Therefore, “demonstration” is 
included in this category as initially proposed. Likewise, “chain” is included in this category despite not 
being associated with any category by reviewers. The word “chain” is almost always used in the literature 
reviewed as “the chain of evidence;” hence, this is the natural category for it. “Evidence” is the most 
selected name as category or super category (13 times). 
8. Environment 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the premises, the site, the space, the workspace, the lab, and the environment in general. The pre Q-sort 
test did not include “environment,” but it included all other words in this category. The majority of 
reviewers, however, associate “environment” with “workspace,” “space,” and “site.” Moreover, it was 
considered the most comprehensive term. “Environment” is the most selected name as category or super 
category (15 times). 
9. Resources 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the assets, the tools or the resources in general. The category of “assets” and “resources” was predicted 
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exactly as it was proposed by the majority of reviewers. The word “tools” is added because reviewers did 
not agree placing it in any other category, and it is generic enough to be understood as any helpful 
resource available. “Resource” is the most selected name as category or super category (21 times). 
10. Infrastructure 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the architecture or the infrastructure. Both words were independent categories in the pre Q-sort test. The 
reviewers’ consensus is that they are together. “Infrastructure” is the most selected name as category or 
super category (6 times). 
11. System 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the software, the program, the code, and the system. All words in this category were proposed in distinct 
groups in the pre Q-sort test. However, the majority of reviewers put them together with no overlapping 
with other categories at the levels of support and confidence assigned. “Software” and “system” are the 
most selected names as category or super category (7 times), but “system” is selected more times (3) as 
super category than “software” (1). 
12. Methods 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the guidelines, the flow, the methods, the processes, the procedures, and the operations. “Policy” was 
associated with “procedures” by reviewers. However, it was also associated with two other words in a 
different category (rule and requirement), where it seems to fit better and agrees with the pre Q-sort 
classification. “Guideline” is also associated with “strategy” and “plan,” which belong to a different 
category. However, such an association has a weaker support than with “procedure.” Although the pre Q-
sort classification assigned guideline to the Law category, the evidence post Q-sort test supports leaving 
it in the Methods category. “Method” is the most selected name as category or super category (13 times). 
13. Law 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the law, the policies, the rules, and the requirements. “Policy” also shows up in the Methods category 
associated with “procedures.” However, it has a better fit in this category where it is associated with “rule” 
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and “requirement” as in the pre Q-sort classification. On the other hand, “guideline” is also associated 
with “rule” and “policy.” However, such an association has a weaker support than with “procedure;” 
hence, although the pre Q-sort classification assigned “guideline” to the Law category, the evidence post 
Q-sort test supports leaving it in the Methods category. An additional consideration is that factors with the 
word “legal” are not filtered by the word “Law;” therefore, “legal” must be added as a selection criterion 
when adding indicators to the Law dimension. “Law” is the most selected name as category or super 
category (8 times). 
14. Strategy 
This is the dimension comprising those factors in which the subjects of the action or condition are 
the strategy, the plan, the tasks, and the objectives. A majority of reviewers also associated “guideline” 
with “strategy” and “plan,” but with a weaker support than the relation between “guideline” and 
“procedure.” The evidence post Q-sort test supports leaving it in the Methods category. “Task” is not 
supported by reviewers in any category. However, it was included in the initial classification and has a 
better fit in the Strategy dimension because strategic plans are deployed through tasks. “Strategy” is the 
most selected name as category or super category (10 times).  
15. Miscellaneous 
The words “cloud,” “time,” “external,” and “context” did not have support from a significant number 
of reviewers to share the same category with any other word. They will be put in a separate dimension 
where factors with unclear classification can be placed. This dimension is called miscellaneous in order to 
convey the idea that it is not associated with any particular entity, but with general aspects. 
Reduction of Indicators per Dimension 
After the dimensions are defined, items representing factors or indicators are assigned to 
dimensions. This is done, initially, by matching the words describing them with the words describing each 
dimension. A sparse matrix as the one used in R is created in Excel with the list of entities (e.i., word sets 
or dimensions) in the first row and the list of items (factors or indicators) in the first column, and filled with 
the formula: =IFERROR(IF(SEARCH(“Dimension Word Cell”,”Factor Cell”)>0,1,0),0), 
If the item mentions the entity, the intersecting cell of item and entity displays a number one, 
otherwise, it displays a number zero “0”. A root word instead of the complete word is used in order to 
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improve the recall of words derived from the entity. For example the root “spa” retrieves the word “spatial” 
associated to “space” whereas “space” would not. A drawback is that by using “spa” the formula also 
retrieves “Transparency” because “spa” is included in that word. Yet, it is better to have extra items that 
can be trimmed off later, instead of losing factors that can be important in shaping dimensions. It also 
does not happen often enough times to demand writing a more complex algorithm. 
This matrix is loaded into MS Access in order to make selection queries for each dimension of the 
items including any of the words associated to that dimension; hence, obtaining the group of items by 
dimension. The fact that some items are listed in more than one dimension is acceptable and convenient 
because those factors/indicators must contribute relevant content to several dimensions. Other items are 
not listed in any of the dimensions because none of the words describing them is part of the words 
defining a dimension. This are classified as “Unclassified” factors/indicators. 
The complete list of items is sent back to Excel for further refinement. 1554 items are initially 
listed, including those unclassified and duplicated. This means that 439 items are duplicated factors. 
Before deleting repeated items, the list is transformed into a matrix by adding the dimensions in the first 
row. Each item is assigned a number one in its intersection with a column describing the dimension it 
belongs to, as shown below. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Extract of the list of 1554 classified factors by dimension 
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In order to get rid of the duplicated items, the list is ordered by FactorID which is a key field used 
to uniquely identify each item; hence, the duplicated factors/indicators are easily spotted next to each 
other. Only one of the items is left in the list, preserving its association to all dimensions to which it was 
assigned. In the image below records 263 and 264 corresponding to FactorID 260 are deleted and record 
265 remains with number ones marked in its intersections with business, evidence, and method. A list 
free of duplicates has 1115 items. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Extract of the list of reordered factors by FactorID to spot duplicates 
 
There are also factors with very similar description and different FactorID. For example, training, 
training of personnel, and staff training may appear as independent factors while being semantically 
equivalent. Because only one is needed, duplicates must be eliminated. In order to refine the allocation of 
unclassified or misclassified factors, the items are reviewed one by one, and marked with ones in the 
dimensions where they can belong. By later applying a filter of items by dimension, semantically 
equivalent items can be spotted and reduced to a single one.  
In addition, items addressing the same topic are grouped together for further elaboration of the 
appropriate questions. The figure below shows several items per cell separated by a period or a question 
mark. For example, row 32 groups several items under the FactorID 465 which together inquire about the 
organization’s ability to repeal attacks by implementing user authentication, firewalls and other technology 
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resources. Likewise, row 33 groups items under the FactorID 58 inquiring about the organization’s ability 
to perform a fast investigation in the event of an incident. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Extract of the list of regrouped factors without semantic duplicates 
 
Indicators grouped this way reduce the whole list to 148 Items throughout all dimensions. 
Because they still are independent phrases it is necessary to work on redacting specific phrases that can 
be put in a survey such that respondents can show their level of agreement with them. Redacting the 
items of the survey aims to identify the entities involved in the indicator, any relevant qualifying aspect of 
the entity (the type, the amount, etc.), the action that the entity exerts or that is exerted on the entity, and 
the attributes of such action that renders the factor measurable. As a result, each group of items can be 
represented by one or more questions. 
After re-estructuring these phrases, the number of independent questions or usable indicators 
increases to 206. However, few of the independent questions coming from different groups of items were 
found similar, merged into one, and assigned to the most appropriate dimension leaving. Also, given the 
importance that authors give to awareness as a factor affecting DFR, two similar questions asking for the 
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general perception of DFR are added at the beginning and at the end of the survey to test the impact of 
the survey as an instrument of awareness of DFR. 
In total, 191 questions remain. 
One more revision and adjustment is performed to assure that all rephrased questions are 
assigned to the dimension where they are most relevant. Provided that a professional is in charge of the 
assessment and detailed analysis of some of the items can be peformed in order to respond them, this 
detailed questionnaire classified by dimensions is a practical DFR framework that a practitioner can use 
to assess the level of DFR in an organization in a structural way. Most questions are stated such that they 
can be answered in terms of respondents’ agreement with the assertion. Few remaining questions require 
numeric answers. When strong agreement or higher numeric value is associated to higher digital forensic 
readiness, this correlation is positive. The theoretical relationship between each item and the DFR status, 
as inferred from the literature review, is added in the column to the right of the table. In few cases, it is to 
the practitioner to decide whether the response is associated to more or less DFR. This questionnaire can 
also help a professional DFR specialist spot when perceptions of respondents do not match the reality of 
the readiness of their organization. Questions IDs are not consecutive because the list was alphabetically 
reordered by dimensions. 
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Table 10. Practitioners’ DFR Framework 
QID Question Dimension 
DFR 
Corr. 
1 Industry sector of the organization. Business Depends 
2 Organization size in sales. Business Negative 
3 Organization size in number of employees. Business Negative 
4 Organization size in number of customers. Business Negative 
5 
The organization has a forensic culture of preserving evidence, 
following digital evidence preservation processes, and acquiring 
and sharing knowledge in computer security and digital forensics. 
Business Positive 
6 
The organization has a corporate culture of secrecy such that 
proactive forensics activities are kept from users and few staff 
knows detailed security information. 
Business Negative 
7 
The organization has a reputation of back-tracking intruders and 
assessing their danger to society. 
Business Positive 
8 
Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic 
readiness (e.g., they show support, provide governance, and 
assume full commitment, responsibility and accountability towards 
the forensic program). 
Business Positive 
9 Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive. Business Negative 
10 This organization is exposed to many risks and threats. Business Positive 
11 
Our firm has a public profile therefore protecting its reputation and 
image is a corporate objective. 
Business Positive 
12 This organization has a high number of locations. Business Negative 
41 
The organization has a quality assurance system that covers 
policies, activities, procedures, documentation, and management 
thereby ensuring consistency, efficiency and transparency of 
technical and non-technical business processes. 
Business Positive 
42 
The organization funding for digital forensic readiness (i.e., 
collection, analysis and preservation of digital evidence) is 
sufficient. 
Business Positive 
43 
The organization uses computer forensics to seek legal 
accountability for intruder behavior. 
Business Positive 
44 
IT security and digital forensics governance programs, policies, 
services, and procedures are mature enough to guarantee 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-
repudiation of information. 
Business Positive 
45 
IT security and digital forensics governance programs, policies, 
services, and procedures guarantee adequate management, skills, 
and resources to determine the source of an attack and the 
recovery of digital evidence. 
Business Positive 
40 
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state 
of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present verifiable 
digital evidence when needed, I would rate my organization's DFR 
as high. 
Business Depends 
191 
After completing this survey and given the definition of digital 
forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain, 
understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I 
would rate my organization's DFR as high. 
Business Positive 
46 The system security architecture is documented. Document Positive 
47 
The organization has an asset registry for items of electronic 
equipment that could record information. 
Document Positive 
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48 
The organization has a documented and validated investigation 
protocol guided by best practices. 
Document Positive 
49 
The organization has an archive of the organization’s incident, 
crime and dispute history identifying each case, date, impact, entry 
point of attack, security measures in place at the moment, 
suspected causes that allow the incident to occur, who knew what 
about the attack and when they knew it, investigative digital 
forensic team rosters and roles, descriptions of incident responses 
and errors, and technical and non-technical issues affecting the 
success or failure of the attack. 
Document Positive 
50 
The organization has reports on the lessons learned from 
incidents, including success in dealing with and recovering from 
the incident, what could have been done differently if the scenario 
had occurred on a different day or at a different time (regular hours 
versus off-hours) or at a different physical location (onsite versus 
offsite). 
Document Positive 
51 
The organization keeps records of user behavior with network-
based applications and documents anomalous observations. 
Document Positive 
52 
The organization maintains a database of file hashes for common 
operating system files and for deployed applications, using file 
integrity checking software on important assets. 
Document Positive 
53 The organization maintains a change management database. Document Positive 
54 
The organization maintains documented records (e.g., baselines) 
of network and system configurations. 
Document Positive 
55 
The organization has a secure location for logs storage that also 
stores meta-data, such as author and date, with the record. 
Document Positive 
56 
The organization stores records about training, procedures, 
people, roles, and policies. 
Document Positive 
13 
The organization provides security wizards for safe conduct within 
the workspace environment. 
Environment Positive 
14 
The organization can safely and effectively control and document 
the scene of a digital forensic incident. 
Environment Positive 
15 
The organization can conduct an onsite examination without 
affecting the integrity of the original evidence. 
Environment Positive 
16 The location of the organization makes it insecure. Environment Negative 
57 
Physical access to work sites and to the perimeter of any premises 
that contain servers are controlled and secured with security 
technologies such as physical access control, location sensors, 
and closed-circuit television (CCTV). 
Environment Positive 
58 
The organization's forensic laboratories are accreditated and 
frequently audited. 
Environment Positive 
59 
Computer forensic examiners in the organization have a proper 
laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite 
examinations. 
Environment Positive 
60 
The organization has multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless 
networks, and/or a mobile platform. 
Environment Negative 
17 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization's personnel have clear 
criteria on whether or not they should turn off a hacked system or 
device. 
Events Positive 
18 
The organization knows how to handle a politically sensitive or 
publicly embarrassing incident. 
Events Positive 
61 
The organization automatically preserves evidence related to a 
suspicious event, via hashing, in case of an incident. 
Events Positive 
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62 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to assess 
the impact on stakeholders and to propose forensic analysis 
hypotheses that will help identify potential charges. 
Events Positive 
63 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization knows which forensic 
tools and techniques it needs to deploy.  
Events Positive 
64 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization knows where to look 
in the system in order to identify case specific evidence supported 
by event log information and Internal integrity checks. 
Events Positive 
65 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization can anticipate its 
discovery needs and accelerate its investigation to find timely and 
useable evidence. 
Events Positive 
66 
The organization is able to forecast and control the escalation of 
costs when facing a digital forensic incident. 
Events Positive 
67 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization is able to determine 
whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination, 
seizure and removal of the system(s). 
Events Positive 
68 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to 
recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be 
involved in a legal inquiry. 
Events Positive 
69 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to 
determine the remoteness of the crime by identifying remote web 
access and establishing the location of the network intrusion 
detection system relative to an intruder. 
Events Positive 
70 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to 
determine the time, timeline of events, and duration of the incident. 
Events Positive 
71 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization will be able to 
determine the nature of the incident, the type of case, and the 
crime category.  
Events Positive 
72 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization can determine the 
technical skill and knowledge level of the suspect. 
Events Positive 
73 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization is able to determine 
what IT systems and types of technologies were involved, such as 
standalone systems, complex networks, multi-user systems, etc. 
Events Positive 
74 
The organizational plan of incident response incorporates policies, 
procedures, personnel assignments, and/or technical requirements 
to mitigate risk and prepare for events requiring digital forensic 
intervention. 
Events Positive 
75 
The incident response plan of the organization correlates events 
with an established Bayesian network, determines critical 
response times, and specifies when to activate the Disaster 
Recovery Plan (DRP) and the Business Continuity Plan (BCP). 
Events Positive 
76 
The organization applies an algorithm to assess evidence value by 
considering its nature (content or metadata), evidencial weight 
(completeness and admissibility), its temporal value (MAC times, 
cookies, cache and the index.dat file), its exposure and risk, and 
the cost/benefit of its retrieval..  
Evidence Positive 
77 
The organization knows what information in what format is 
required as evidence in a civil litigation or criminal proceeding as 
well as how to use it to determine the root cause of an event. 
Evidence Positive 
78 
The organization has a plan to prepare, map, store, transport, 
control access to, and present evidence, preserving its integrity 
and ensuring it makes a positive impact on the outcome of any 
legal action. 
Evidence Positive 
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79 
In case of a cyber incident, the organization can provide detailed 
log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every step (e.g. 
data collection, storage, examination, handling) which can 
demonstrate the authenticity, credibility, and reliability of electronic 
evidence, including information about the tools used. 
Evidence Positive 
80 
The organization has identified, classified, and prioritized the 
sources and types of potential evidence by considering the legality 
and cost-effectiveness of the collection process, alternative 
evidence sources, and the potential for escalation into formal 
investigations involving law enforcement agencies. 
Evidence Positive 
81 
The organization employs encryption standards and cryptographic 
hashes for evidence files. 
Evidence Positive 
106 
The organization applies a proportionality rule to collect only useful 
evidence upon good cause and balances liability vs. obligation in 
the retention of log data.  
Evidence Positive 
82 
The amount of data produced in the organization every month is 
high. 
Information Positive 
83 
The organization knows the sources and format of its data, when 
and where data is generated, the associated threats to the data, 
and how data is preserved for long-term storage. 
Information Positive 
84 
The organization requires network activity logs that lists date, time, 
and user stamps for all files, and triangulates logs with other data 
(e.g., timing of links, CCTV pictures, user identification records, 
etc.) to be able to guarantee internal integrity of authentication logs 
in client and server computers and prove timeline and association 
of data to metadata, including cloud-based resources. 
Information Positive 
85 
The organization uses statistical interpretation, data mining, 
filtering techniques and pattern matching to find digital evidence. 
Information Positive 
86 
The organization formats log data in a single format, such as 
syslog. 
Information Positive 
87 
The organization keeps data regarding the state of the file system, 
patterns of physical traces and imprints (i.e., logs, audits, what is 
logged, and how logging is done). 
Information Positive 
20 Wireless access is allowed in the organization. Infrastructure Negative 
88 
The organization mantains effective controls on information flow 
and channels (including remotely located logs) to prevent 
anonymous activities, access to central servers and systems 
housing potential evidence, access to digital forensics tools, and 
anti-forensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, 
steganography software etc.). 
Infrastructure Positive 
89 
The digital and physical infrastructure and architecture have been 
developed with embedded forensic capabilities in networks and 
computing platforms such that all authentication attempts are 
recorded, applications perform auditing, the design is fault tolerant, 
and the architecture facilitates recovery. 
Infrastructure Positive 
90 
The organization's systems security architecture configuration 
follows consistent standards throughout the entire platform. 
Infrastructure Positive 
91 
The organization implements endpoint security in order to maintain 
control over its data and decrease access to forensic data. 
Infrastructure Positive 
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92 
The organization routinely evaluates Internet activities (cookies, 
temporary files, URLs, email, instant messages), checks for gaps 
in the SMTP send-receiver pairs, acknowledges packet protocols, 
and monitors interactions between network applications and the 
traffic they generate. These monitored interactions include layer 7 
of the OSI model (e.g. static and dynamic web applications, web 
clients, web servers, application servers and web services). 
Infrastructure Positive 
93 The organization implements multitiered logging. Infrastructure Positive 
94 
The organization has centralized logging and data, thus audit 
records are forwarded to secure centralized log servers. 
Infrastructure Positive 
95 
Logging features are architected to support effective incident 
response. 
Infrastructure Positive 
96 
The organization implements strong user authentication and role 
based access control with the least privilege principle in mind and 
with separate life-cycle related logs per user. 
Infrastructure Positive 
97 
Strong two-factor authentication is required to access all critical 
systems. 
Infrastructure Positive 
98 
The organization implements defined procedures and public key 
infrastructure (PKI)  system architecture where log files relating to 
access (log-in, access to all files) are separated from PKI services-
related logs. 
Infrastructure Positive 
99 
Logs are shared across institutional boundaries. Information is 
kept in several repositories to minimize impact in case of loss of 
data. 
Infrastructure Positive 
100 
The organization’s IT infrastructure is monitored using intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), antivirus software, and spyware detection 
and removal utilities in servers, workstations, removable/portable 
devices, and network devices/activities (e.g. log network and host 
activity). This monitoring distinguishes between hardware and 
software and considers trade-offs involving IDS monitoring and 
reporting. 
Infrastructure Positive 
101 
Digital forensic tools are used for non-forensic purposes to 
enhance the organization's security architecture, for example to 
recover lost data. 
Infrastructure Positive 
102 The organization's wireless infrastructure is kept secure. Infrastructure Positive 
21 
The organization has policies defining a point of contact with 
authorities and how communications with external parties (e.g. 
stakeholders, law enforcement, ISPs) might occur, particularly with 
regard to emerging issues, potential risks, investigation results, 
and evidence release. 
Law Positive 
22 
The organization has policies clarifying consent of monitoring 
without expectation of privacy/ownership of data by employees, 
and conditions for Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) practices.  
Law Positive 
23 
The organization has policies clarifying its ownership of data and 
use of information systems resources by members of the 
organization, including data storage in personal devices with 
specific directives governing device type and the use of small/easy 
to hide devices. 
Law Positive 
24 
The organization has policies defining business scenarios that 
require digital evidence, what information must be preserved under 
certain circumstances and for how long, its accessibility, and the 
conditions necessary to destroy it without losing history, in 
compliance with records legislation. 
Law Positive 
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25 
The organization has policies that disallow the use of its intranet 
when handling digital evidence. 
Law Positive 
26 
The organization has corporate security policies that govern digital 
assets, forensic events, data collection/storage, preventive 
security, and codes of conduct. 
Law Positive 
27 
The organization implements measures to enforce forensic policies 
and make staff accountable of their digital forensic responsibilities. 
Law Positive 
28 
The organization has policies establishing the need for compliance 
with the regulatory framework of fiduciary, statutory and/or 
governmental regulations, even in the absence of forensic 
incidents (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, and penalties for security 
incidents). 
Law Positive 
29 
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are 
consistent with its personnel privacy policies and applicable 
employment law. 
Law Positive 
103 
Safeguards for sensitive information and measures for handling 
inadvertent exposures are implemented. 
Law Positive 
104 
Disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file 
encryption, and anti-forensic strategies (e.g. anonymous activities, 
data destruction/alteration, and onion routing) are banned. 
Law Positive 
105 
The organization has policies defining types of risks, information 
retention requirements, security countermeasures, resourcing, 
intelligence, trigger events for internal investigation, when external 
professional or formal investigation is required, and the actions 
that may be taken 
Law Positive 
107 
Organization policies define the legal and managerial authority 
required for search and examination during ongoing investigations 
to ensure compliance with information security  and regulatory 
requirements (e.g. rules of evidence for admissibility, 4th 
Amendment issues,  litigation holds, and timely reporting 
obligations to a judge). 
Law Positive 
108 
The organization has a suspicion policy used to continually review 
potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, potential crimes 
and disputes, and threats from opportunists, criminals, competitors 
or disgruntled employees. This policy indicates what evidence of 
an attack would look like and how to manage people leaving the 
company. 
Law Positive 
109 
The organization has policies for the specific jurisdictional 
requirements of countries where it has an operating presence and 
offers guidance on other industry-specific and multi-jurisdiction 
conditions regarding admissible evidence. 
Law Positive 
110 
The organization has policies on roles and responsibilities of all 
people and external organizations involved in digital forensic 
investigations, as well as separate policies for those involved in 
preserving, maintaining, and examining evidence (e.g., 
response/investigative teams and security personnel). 
Law Positive 
111 
The organization has received legal advice and review of forensic 
policies and high-level procedures regarding privacy, subpoenas, 
warrants, admissibility, data protection, human rights, limits to 
surveillance, obligations to staff members and others, disclosure in 
legal proceedings, and legal requirements and constraints on 
collection and preservation of potential digital evidence. 
Law Positive 
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30 
The organization has a broad and complete digital forensics model 
defining the standardized phases (capture, store, analyze, 
preserve, integrate, and present evidence) of the response and 
investigation process.  
Method Positive 
112 
The organization conducts regular compliance reviews and 
updates its policies, procedures, and organizational memory 
according to changes in risk assessment, the legal framework 
and/or organizational requirements (e.g. moving to the cloud). 
Method Positive 
113 
The organization has formal incident response procedures 
describing the trigger events to start active monitoring and 
systematic gathering of potential digital evidence (including pre-
incident data collection), first response guidelines to preserve 
evidence, when and how to report incidents, how to choose an 
investigation model, and how to set action plans. 
Method Positive 
114 
The organization has formal procedures describing packaging, 
transportation, storage, handling, and preservation of physical and 
digital evidence.  
Method Positive 
115 
The organization has archive management procedures to assure 
that records (including those in the cloud) possess content, context 
and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of 
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability. 
Method Positive 
116 
The organization has formal procedures to assess its needs for 
digital evidence according to its risk assessment practices and its 
regulatory/legal framework. 
Method Positive 
117 
The organization has procedures (e.g., penetration tests, probes, 
audit analysis of server and network logs, and alerts from incidents 
detection/deterrence systems) describing the configuration and 
use of active monitoring and logging mechanisms to continually 
detect and deter incidents in system activities and electronic 
communications, including procedures to prevent alteration of 
intercepted communications. 
Method Positive 
118 
Forensic techniques are embedded in the organization's regular 
information management audits. 
Method Positive 
119 
Information security audit procedures follow standards, guidelines, 
and best practices that include protection of IT and business 
systems, monitoring of the forensics process, and patch 
management. 
Method Positive 
120 
The organization has reliable procedures for gathering admissible 
post-incident evidence which include: how to discover hidden data, 
weighed criteria that guide the collection of evidence based on 
storage volatility, sampling & reduction techniques, verifying the 
integrity of the data, and how to store and manipulate data. 
Method Positive 
121 
The organization has a formal unbiased procedure for examination 
of post-incident digital and physical evidence without modifying it. 
It includes choosing a forensic investigation model, a 
triage/prioritization model for analysis and interpretation by 
selecting which data source to check first and why, and managing 
all of the tasks in the investigation process. 
Method Positive 
122 
The organization has procedures for performing regular and 
sporadic backup of systems (e.g. imaging a hard disk, capturing 
volatile information or securing physical evidence), ensuring the 
use of hashing functions during evidence acquisition, and retaining 
backups for a specific period of time to facilitate recovery.  
Method Positive 
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123 
The organization has policies and procedures guiding reasonable 
and appropriate use of forensic tools. 
Method Positive 
124 
The organization has procedures for performing RAM forensics 
and the collection of volatile data in the order of volatility and 
priority that are related to a specific organizational requirement and 
that deal with the forensic blurriness affecting fidelity and quantity 
of evidence acquired in live digital forensics. 
Method Positive 
125 
The organization can demonstrate due diligence and compliance 
with the organization’'s policies and all applicable laws and 
regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation process. 
Method Positive 
126 
The organization has a formal process for the selection, use, 
testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in the 
organization's information systems, including the test and 
calibration of evidence collection devices and specifying their 
frequency of calibration. 
Method Positive 
127 
The organization's forensic procedures have been reviewed by 
experts and/or published in peer reviewed articles. 
Method Positive 
128 
The organization's forensic procedures are accepted within the 
relevant scientific community. 
Method Positive 
129 The organization's forensic procedures have known error rates. Method Positive 
130 
The organization's forensic procedures state that the Daubert test 
will be applied to any expert testimony. 
Method Positive 
131 
The organization's forensic procedures have been tested and are 
kept up to date. 
Method Positive 
19 
In our organization, the forensic incident handlers do a good job of 
collecting evidence about compromised systems. 
People Positive 
31 
The organization's non-IT staff has substantial training in digital 
forensics; they understand forensics technologies and have 
practical experience with them.     
People Positive 
32 
The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics 
program; they see the tangible/intangible benefits of technologies 
such as anti-spyware. 
People Positive 
33 
Self-education on new forensic technologies is common among 
personnel in the organization. 
People Positive 
34 
The organization's employees have knowledge of information 
management. 
People Positive 
35 Employees have digital forensic skills. People Positive 
36 
The organization's staff learns effectively from previous incident 
response experiences. 
People Positive 
37 Employees understand the organization's security policies. People Positive 
132 
The organization has identified and developed the technology and 
personnel computing expertise to perform computer and network 
forensics and manage legal evidence properly. 
People Positive 
133 
The organization has a multi-disciplinary forensic 
response/investigative team, involving legal, IT, law enforcement, 
business, and auditing representatives, ready to work 
collaboratively on assigned roles in case of a cyber incident. 
People Positive 
134 
The organization's multi-disciplinary forensic 
response/investigative team is internal rathern than external. 
People Positive 
135 
Investigators who are members of the forensic team have 
education and certifications in digital forensics. 
People Positive 
136 
Information security auditors' assessment produces confidence in 
the security system. 
People Positive 
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137 
The organization identifies and profiles system use, users, 
suspects, attackers, and victims at risk through: (1) ID 
management, (2) authorization and authentication credentials, (3) 
accesibility, responsibility, and ownership of data and financial 
instruments, and (4) personal information in data. 
People Positive 
138 
The organization monitors user behavior by tracing back the 
actions of each employee and retaining application and local user 
files (e.g. home directory, file properties, registry, profiles, and 
signatures). 
People Positive 
139 The organization uses keystroke monitoring on its computers.  People Depends 
140 
The organization traces custody of an individual's devices for 
upgrades and change of office or role.  
People Positive 
141 
The organization's investigators' background is more scientific than 
practical. 
People Depends 
142 
Interactions among the organization's forensic staff, other 
personnel, and external institutions involved in forensics or security 
processes flow smoothly based on mutual trust. 
People Positive 
143 
Staff members have a strong understanding of the organization's 
security policies. 
People Positive 
144 
The organization has the expertise and capabilities to distinguish 
anomalous events or criminal activities from normal operational 
activities. 
Resource Positive 
145 
The organization has the ability to repel attacks using tools such 
as firewalls, user authentication, and diversification. 
Resource Positive 
146 
The organization has active digital forensic capabilities in live 
system environments including automated live analysis, 
authentication of collected data, and containment of incidents. 
Resource Positive 
147 
Corporate physical and digital assets are classified and controlled 
considering their value, data linked to them, and likelihood of being 
targeted. 
Resource Positive 
148 
The organization has the technology (e.g. relevant software and 
automated tools) and human capacity to capture all types of 
communications and store, analyze, preserve, integrate, secure, 
and present admissible evidence in order to hold intruders 
accountable in a court of law, and pursue legal remedies. 
Resource Positive 
149 
The organization lists the technologies and processes needed for 
the forensic readiness program, and coordinates the deployment 
of these resources. 
Resource Positive 
150 
The organization has forensic toolkits that each include a hardware 
write blocker, e-camera, gloves, forms, supplies, etc. 
Resource Positive 
151 
The organization removes or relocates critical assets for better 
management and implementation of the forensic program. 
Resource Positive 
152 
The organization possesses and implements updated techniques 
and automated tools to investigate anti-forensics methods. 
Resource Positive 
153 
The organization has the ability and resources to recreate the 
investigated environment. 
Resource Positive 
154 
The organization has sufficient decryption capabilities to counter 
the increasingly pervasive use of encryption technologies. 
Resource Positive 
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38 
The organization offers personnel and IT staff standardized 
training and certification programs in digital forensics including 
information security awareness, sensitivity of evidence, how to 
recognize and respond to an incident, roles and legal aspects of 
the digital evidence process, latest threats, use of IT and forensic 
tools, forensic policies' content, forensic examination, best 
practices in information security, and proper staff incident 
response behavior. 
Strategy Positive 
155 
The organization calculates the cost-benefit of collecting and 
analyzing digital evidence by weighing benefits against threats and 
risks, internal vs outsourcing costs, and return on security 
investment (ROSI). 
Strategy Positive 
156 
The organization performs a risk assessment considering 
vulnerabilities, threats, unknown risks, level of digital evidence 
exposure to threats, potential loss, cost of measures and threats, 
and benefit of measures. 
Strategy Positive 
157 
The organization provides appropriate ongoing training 
opportunities to managers, internal investigators, and members of 
the Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT). 
Strategy Positive 
158 
The organization has a business continuity plan to minimize 
interruption to the business while gathering admissible evidence, 
to provide or restore essential services during an attack, to avoid 
financial loss, and to recover assets using replication or backup. 
Strategy Positive 
159 
The impact of the implementation of digital forensic readiness in 
network operation, architecture, transmission frequencies, power 
consumption, overhead or sensitivity has been high. 
Strategy Negative 
160 
Corporate policies and procedures are developed collaboratively 
using collaboration tools to maintain a shared workspace. 
Strategy Positive 
161 
The organization prioritizes roles over positions, differentiates 
information management from systems/technology management, 
and segregates duties of digital forensics and information security 
teams. 
Strategy Positive 
162 
The organization has dedicated roles relating to security and 
forensics, such as team leader, incident investigator, digital 
forensics specialist, work space administrator, security/system 
administrator, security/system architect, prosecutor, law 
enforcement executive, point of contact/media liaison, and legal 
adviser. 
Strategy Positive 
163 
The corporate information security best practices include collection 
and preservation of potential digital evidence. 
Strategy Positive 
164 
The corporate governance model development process was 
informed by a well-developed forensic readiness policy. 
Strategy Positive 
165 
The organization's information systems development life cycle 
(ISDLC) includes collection and preservation of potential digital 
evidence. 
Strategy Positive 
166 
The organization understands digital forensics training 
requirements and encourages both formal and informal learning. 
Strategy Positive 
167 
The organization looks for external policies, regulations, legislation 
and recommendations to shape its policies, prevent incidents, and 
implement control practices, countermeasures, and risk 
management. 
Strategy Positive 
168 
The organization follows best practice security standards that have 
been validated by an international information security certification 
process. 
Strategy Positive 
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169 
The organization controls security information through dashboards 
and metrics that continuously and dynamically measure 
information security performance. 
Strategy Positive 
170 
The organization uses an external company such as an 
Independent Center for Incident Management (ICIM) to perform 
forensic analysis but has internal triaging capabilities. 
Strategy Positive 
171 
The organization manages external digital forensic investigators, 
establishes their capabilities and response times, and validates the 
accreditation of their laboratories. 
Strategy Positive 
172 
The organization participates in Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs). 
Strategy Positive 
173 
The organization's risk assessment process evaluates potential 
losses, classifies digital evidence exposure correlated with threats, 
checks security through audits, calibrates audits, and revisits 
residual risks after controls are implemented. 
Strategy Positive 
174 
The organization knows and adopts standards of the digital 
forensics discipline, including automated practices, and strives to 
monitor emerging academic digital forensics research. 
Strategy Positive 
175 
The organization performs security benchmarking to assess the 
preparedness of competitors and enemies. 
Strategy Positive 
176 
The organizational structure (e.g rank hierarchy, privileges, and 
roles and responsibilities model) has been designed or reviewed 
with consideration given to digital forensics needs. 
Strategy Positive 
177 
Information technology and information security objectives are 
aligned with the business mission and objectives. 
Strategy Positive 
178 
The organization's privacy policy and controls are aligned with the 
objectives of the digital forensics readiness program (e.g. 
compliance with regulation & legislation, internal investigation, 
forensic response, and legal evidence management). 
Strategy Positive 
179 
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about 
admissibility and reliability of digital evidence for our organization 
is difficult. 
Strategy Negative 
180 Our organization needs to produce reliable evidence: Strategy Positive 
39 The organization's security system is reliable. Systems Positive 
181 
The organization possesses automated systems, such as intrusion 
detection systems, which provide alarms upon detection of 
potential incidents and provide reports to track incidents and 
perform audit trails. 
Systems Positive 
182 
The organization implements tamper-proof mechanisms for its 
systems. 
Systems Positive 
183 
The organization's security configuration provides hardware 
independence from operating systems. 
Systems Positive 
184 
The organization uses security event management software (SEM) 
or incident management software with an event triggering function. 
Systems Positive 
185 
All relevant devices and systems in the organization are 
synchronized with logging time recorded according to time-zones. 
Systems Positive 
186 
Information systems -- including operating systems, hardware, and 
software applications -- are properly configured for security. 
Systems Positive 
187 
The organization supervises the responsible use of appropriate 
and current digital forensic tools and systems, including automated 
evidence collection systems such as IDS. 
Systems Positive 
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188 
The organization uses imaging technologies with lossless 
compression and hashing functions to preserve forensic evidence. 
Technology Positive 
189 
The organization's technology -- such as hardware, software, and 
forensic tools -- has been certified or validated. 
Technology Positive 
190 
The organization's storage technology is appropriate in capacity 
and functionality, including storage visualization abilities. 
Technology Positive 
 
Higher Level Questionnaire 
Because it will probably demand considerable time and knowledge for an individual respondent to 
complete this questionnaire, a higher-level questionnaire is developed to perform exploratory factor 
analysis and develop a statistically supported framework of DFR. While the dimensions previously 
developed are useful to define the practitioners’ DFR framework and facilitate the reduction of the number 
of indicators, a conceptual model requires a different approach where the indicators are grouped 
according to their mutual, or lack of it, correlation. It is also important to note that items distilled from the 
literature may comprehend both formative and reflective indicators. Therefore, it is necessary to make this 
distinction. 
Based on the definition of formative and reflective indicators, this research considers formative 
those factors adding up to a better status of DFR, while deeming reflective those which are a perception 
of respondents. In the first case, the respondent simply acknowledges a reality, whereas in the second 
he/she gives his/her opinion. Figure 8 shows an extract of this classification as extant or perceptual 
indicators, using factors 465, 58, 9, 628, and 656, previously presented in Figure 7. 
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Figure 8. Extract of list of extant and perceptual questions 
 
The higher level questionnaire reduces the length and amount of questions by omitting lower-
level details associated to some questions. For example, instead of asking whether the organization has 
a laboratory with proper tools and technologies (item 59), whether such laboratory is certified and 
frequently audited (item 58), and whether its technology has been validated (item 189), a higher-level 
question simply asks about the existence of the laboratory and the forensic tools. The certification and 
validation of the laboratory and tools are at a deeper level of specialization in DFR that is not expected 
from most organizations at this moment. If having a laboratory and tools for forensic investigation turns 
out to be a good predictor of the forensic preparedness then further assessment should investigate more 
specific conditions of those tools and laboratory. 
Another characteristic of the higher-level questions is that they can be classified in one of five 
subtypes. It can be seen that most items refer to something that the organization has, something that it 
does or something that it knows. Few remaining items are demographic characteristics of the firm or a 
respondent’s perception of an organizational situation. Therefore, we can name the subtypes as: 
demographic, has, does, knows, and perceived. This reordering facilitates respondent’s understanding of 
the questions.  
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Most questions are Likert-type questions. Few other questions are Yes/No or ranges, and when 
possible, semantic differential scales are used because they yield the same statistic results, increase 
nomological validity and reduce time response (Chin, Johnson & Schwarz 2008). In order to make it 
easier for respondents to identify the subject of the questions, each specific group has one general 
introduction. Therefore, respondents know that all items below refer to a “has”, “does”, “knows” or 
“perception” of the organization. Although most “demographics”, “has”, “does”, and “knows” questions 
correspond to the originally labeled extant indicators, there are few exceptions. For example, while the 
higher-level questionnaire asks whether the firm “has” a culture of secrecy, the researcher reads this as a 
perceptual question based on the judgement of the respondent. The same happens with several “knows” 
questions because whether the firm knows something or not is decided by the respondent’s perception. 
On the contrary, it is more unlikely that something that the respondent acknowledges as existing 
in, or being performed by the organization, is simply a matter of opinion. In general, questions move from 
extant to perceptual in the following order of subtypes: demographics, has, does, knows, perceived. The 
list of the 76 higher-level questions is attached as Appendix E and presents items subtypes, a new ID 
identifier per question, and the items from the detailed questionnaire that are covered by each item of the 
higher-level questionnaire, to facilitate back tracking. 
Factor Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is performed on the extant and perceptual factors first in a pilot 
study and later on the final study. Given that factor analysis can be used as a clustering technique to 
group respondents, let us make clear that the objective of this EFA is to group variables and not 
respondents. 
For the perceptual factors, this research uses maximum likelihood as the extraction method, thus 
assuming that these factors are a reflection of the real DFR status. As for the extant factors, these are 
considered formative of the DFR construct; therefore, they are treated as components, and the principal 
components extraction method is used in this case. In the pilot study, both extractions were done using 
SPSS with the orthogonal varimax rotation, which maximizes the variance of the loadings of variables 
within factors. The highest loading of an indicator, then, defines to what factor it should be assigned. 
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Pilot Test for Factor Analysis 
The pilot test is performed to test distribution of the variables - in this case the questions - on 
factors. For this research, the unit of measure is the organization. Therefore, it was required to have 
direct feedback from IT professionals working on IT security in each one of the organizations because 
they are the most qualified witnesses of the DFR status of their firms. In addition, they are the ones who 
better understand the technical terminology used in the questions. Because the surveys were directed to 
this specific respondent profile, many surveyed were discarded for not complying with the requirements. 
20 out of 151 respondents who took the survey qualified as valid surveyed. The demographics of these 
respondents in terms of number of respondents per level in each question are shown below: 
 
Table 11. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Age) 
Respondent's age 
Below 18 0 
18 to 25 2 
26 to 40 10 
41 to 60 8 
Above 60 0 
 
Table 12. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Gender) 
Respondent's gender 
Male 14 
Female 6 
 
Table 13. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Tenure) 
Respondent's years in the organization 
Less than 2 0 
2 to 5 4 
6 to 10 10 
11 to 20 6 
More than 20 0 
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Table 14. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Position) 
Respondent's current position 
IT Director 8 
It Analyst 1 
CIO 2 
CEO 1 
Co Op 1 
Superv. 1 
CISO 1 
Systems Architect 1 
IT VP 3 
Mngr 1 
 
Table 15. Respondents’ demographics from pilot study (Years in position) 
Respondent's years in position 
Less than 2 1 
2 to 5 9 
6 to 10 8 
11 to 20 2 
More than 20 0 
 
 
Each IT professional provides information about a specific organization. The demographics of 
these organizations in terms of number of organizations per level in each question are as follows: 
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Table 16. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Industry) 
Organization's Industry 
Manufacturing and Process Industries (Non-computer) 0 
Online Retailer 1 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Application Service Provider (ASP) 0 
Communications Carrier 0 
Aerospace 0 
Banking/Finance/Accounting 3 
Insurance/Real Estate/Legal 0 
Federal Government (including military) 0 
State/Local Government 1 
Medical/Dental/Healthcare 3 
Transportation/Utilities 1 
Construction/Architecture/Engineering 1 
Data Processing Services 1 
Wholesale/Retail/Distribution 1 
Education 4 
Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment 0 
Research/Development Lab 0 
Business Services/Consultant 0 
Computer Manufacturer (Hardware, software, peripherals) 0 
Computer/Network Services/Consultant 4 
Computer Related Retailer/Wholesaler/Distributor 0 
Other 0 
 
Table 17. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Sales) 
Organization's Year Sales in $1000 
Less than 50 0 
Between 50 and 200 0 
Between 200 and 500 1 
Between 500 and 2,000 7 
More than 2,000 12 
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Table 18. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Employees) 
Organization's Number of Employees 
1 to 50 0 
Between 51 and 200 3 
Between 201 and 500 6 
Between 501 and 2000 6 
More than 5,000 5 
 
Table 19. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Customers) 
Organization's Number of Customers 
1 to 20 0 
Between 21 and 200 1 
Between 201 and 1,000 4 
Between 1,001 and 10,000 11 
More than 10,000 4 
 
Table 20. Organizations’ demographics from pilot study (Data) 
Organization's Monthly Produced Data 
Less than 10 MB 0 
Between 10 and 500 MB 0 
Between 0.5 and 50 GB 2 
Between 50 GB and 1 TB 5 
More than 1 TB 13 
 
Results of Pilot Study 
18 questions represent perceptual variables and are, therefore, included in the search for factors 
that reflect the DFR status. As shown in the rotated factor matrix delivered by SPSS, six factors were 
found as representative of these 18 variables. A gray background shows the highest loading of each 
variable. 
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Table 21. Perceptual factors extracted from EFA 
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Per1 -0.461 0.024 -0.276 0.118 -0.556 0.036 
Per2 0.87 -0.269 0.006 -0.004 0.108 0.152 
Per3 -0.261 0.731 -0.181 0 0.269 0.022 
Per4 -0.225 0.677 0 -0.063 0.117 0.031 
Per5 -0.014 0.238 -0.062 0.079 0.965 0.015 
Per6 -0.067 0.433 -0.33 -0.437 0.04 0.158 
Per7 0.278 -0.231 0.22 0.043 -0.027 0.904 
Per8 0.799 -0.231 0.27 0.126 0.141 0.102 
Per9 0.354 -0.288 0.457 0.148 0.202 -0.009 
Per10 0.701 -0.133 -0.013 0.431 -0.061 -0.149 
Per11 -0.182 0.927 -0.09 -0.173 -0.112 -0.238 
Per12 0.821 -0.225 0.282 -0.219 -0.028 0.128 
Per13 0.07 0.085 0.72 0.163 -0.112 0.335 
Per14 -0.026 -0.097 0.058 0.991 0.042 0.038 
Per15 0.528 -0.194 0.444 0.325 0.263 -0.085 
Per16 0.426 -0.298 0.204 0.306 -0.067 -0.541 
Per17 0.476 -0.347 0.768 -0.084 0.146 -0.134 
Per18 -0.712 0.162 -0.507 0.09 0.027 0.019 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
 
 
Factor analysis shows that six perceptual factors extracted explain 77% of the total variance 
explained by the set of 18 perceptual variables. The name of each factor was chosen based on the 
variable that has the highest loading on it, while making it general enough to account for all other 
variables in the factor. The following is a list of the factors with their corresponding variables and loadings, 
as well as the percentage of the variance of all variables that the factor explains. The questions are 
added as they show up in the questionnaire, but it should be remembered that they are introduced as 
something that the organization has, does, knows or is perceived, thus the reader should add those 
words accordingly. 
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Table 22. Perceptual variables per factor from pilot study 
Perceptual Factor 2: Hesitation 
Variance 
15% 
  
Var Load Question 
Per11 0.927 
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about admissibility and reliability 
of digital evidence for our organization is hard. 
Per3 0.731 Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive. 
Per4 0.677 This organization is exposed to many risks and threats. 
Perceptual Factor 3: Awareness 
Variance 12.5% 
Var Load Question 
Per17 0.768 
How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a digital forensic 
incident. 
Per13 0.72 A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from users) 
Per9 0.457 
The organization's employees have knowledge of information management and 
security policies. 
Perceptual Factor 4: Knowledge 
Variance 9.7% 
Var Load Question 
Per14 0.991 Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a cyber incident. 
Per6 -0.44 The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure. 
Perceptual Factor 5: Self-image 
Variance 8.5% 
Var Load Question 
Per5 0.965 Our firm has a public profile. 
Per1 -0.56 
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness 
to obtain, understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would 
rate my organization's DFR as: 
Perceptual Factor 6: Confidence 
Variance 7.8% 
Var Load Question 
Per7 0.904 
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are consistent with its 
personnel privacy policies and applicable employment law. 
Per16 -0.54 
How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and accelerate its investigation 
in case of a cyber incident. 
 
 
53 questions were considered extant variables and therefore included in the search for factors 
that form the DFR status. As shown in the rotated factor matrix delivered by SPSS, 11 factors were found 
as representative of these 53 variables. 
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Table 23. Extant factors extracted from PCA 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
  Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Ext1 0.229 0.646 0.27 0.184 0.395 0.115 0.083 -0.005 -0.22 0.006 0.38 
Ext2 -0.005 0.167 0.139 0.159 0.2 0.07 0.011 -0.029 0.914 0.057 0.008 
Ext3 0.091 -0.103 -0.117 -0.075 0.084 -0.034 0.933 0.11 -0.1 0.117 -0.073 
Ext4 0.452 0.576 0.154 0.2 0.373 -0.003 0.142 0.38 0.168 0.093 -0.037 
Ext5 0.583 0.626 -0.123 0.158 0.215 0.207 0.158 0.043 0.269 0.019 -0.034 
Ext6 -0.014 0.651 0.358 0.063 0.193 0.441 0.138 0.258 0.202 0.123 0.085 
Ext7 0.182 0.873 0.205 0.02 0.268 0.014 0.128 0.075 0.019 -0.059 -0.07 
Ext8 0.198 0.673 0.196 0.192 0.054 0.522 0.137 -0.074 0.278 -0.047 0.04 
Ext9 0.524 0.265 0.074 0.637 0.063 0.132 0.11 0.002 0.259 0.02 -0.307 
Ext10 0.363 0.704 0.097 0.32 0.032 0.086 -0.258 0.144 -0.091 0.076 -0.077 
Ext11 0.029 0.04 0.235 0.262 -0.039 0.25 0.856 -0.121 0.021 -0.004 -0.002 
Ext12 0.287 0.322 -0.033 0.809 0.184 0.191 -0.024 0.026 -0.007 0.109 0.143 
Ext13 0.239 0.308 0.079 -0.053 0.583 0.441 0.026 0.432 0.129 -0.213 0.048 
Ext14 0.326 0.255 0.167 0.085 0.716 0.145 0.148 -0.014 0.294 -0.244 -0.156 
Ext15 0.024 0.082 0.39 0.805 0.12 0.25 0.083 0.172 0.188 -0.093 0.071 
Ext16 0.722 0.088 0.177 0.4 0.217 0.192 -0.09 0.039 0.072 0.116 -0.335 
Ext17 0.51 0.479 0.191 0.401 0.005 0.06 0.105 -0.179 0.371 0.031 -0.319 
Ext18 0.228 0.249 0.264 0.384 0.1 0.776 0.107 0.068 -0.092 -0.041 0.015 
Ext19 0.791 0.313 0.179 -0.016 0.294 0.034 0.073 0.048 0.057 -0.247 0.058 
Ext20 0.703 0.386 -0.107 0.134 0.43 0.028 0.086 0.235 0.099 -0.069 0.133 
Ext21 0.173 0.16 0.818 0.184 0.233 0.103 0.136 0.262 0.206 0.059 0.028 
Ext22 0.313 0.604 -0.148 0.206 0.214 0.545 0.138 0.199 0.211 -0.024 -0.093 
Ext23 0.221 0.094 0.083 0.075 0.936 -0.025 -0.009 0.005 -0.007 0.062 0.011 
Ext24 0.199 0.177 0.624 0.272 0.192 0.523 0.111 -0.25 0.038 -0.144 -0.056 
Ext25 0.766 -0.106 0.271 0.283 0.089 0.222 0 -0.009 0.047 -0.099 0.361 
Ext26 0.104 0.231 0.009 0.105 0.063 -0.044 0.884 -0.046 0.171 -0.094 0.072 
Ext27 0.44 0.103 0.612 0.378 0.128 -0.081 0.144 0.022 0.125 0.011 0.441 
Ext28 0.592 0.044 0.176 0.388 0.162 0.347 0.015 -0.018 -0.046 0.452 0.026 
Ext29 -0.028 0.455 0.46 0.276 0.13 0.102 0.001 0.031 0.072 0.132 0.156 
Ext30 -0.048 0.202 0.203 -0.245 0.017 0.092 0.689 0.533 -0.08 -0.019 0.078 
Ext31 0.672 0.228 -0.126 0.18 0.179 0.112 -0.056 0.59 -0.011 0.118 0.143 
Ext32 0.288 0.076 0.606 0.052 0.002 0.67 0.011 0.153 0.096 0.067 0.087 
Ext33 0.388 0.454 0.336 0.071 -0.043 0.474 0.014 0.102 0.129 0.479 -0.114 
Ext34 0.09 0.078 0.69 0.263 0.292 0.085 0.008 0.053 0.322 0.019 -0.351 
Ext35 0.117 0.272 0.097 0.372 0.725 0.107 -0.017 0.002 0.117 0.222 0.111 
Ext36 0.382 0.466 0.2 0.538 0.23 0.044 0.182 0.331 0.122 -0.066 -0.062 
Ext37 0.3 0.245 0.414 0.341 -0.128 0.108 0.109 0.643 -0.139 -0.085 -0.043 
Ext38 0.325 0.186 0.828 -0.131 0.005 0.214 -0.028 -0.013 -0.175 -0.057 0.051 
Ext39 0.628 0.511 0.12 0.108 0.074 -0.134 0.001 -0.039 0.129 0.455 -0.013 
Ext40 0.83 0.15 0.167 0.407 0.001 0.11 0.07 0.032 0.076 0.036 0.207 
Ext41 0.021 0.564 0.096 -0.056 0.534 0.2 0.254 0.133 0.086 -0.297 0.056 
Ext42 0.722 0.263 0.309 -0.19 0.329 -0.079 0.105 -0.277 0.049 -0.039 0.071 
Ext43 0.43 0.2 0.534 0.397 0.097 0.084 0.063 0.017 -0.134 0.378 0.192 
Ext44 0.83 0.143 0.369 0.125 0.108 -0.012 0.033 0.155 -0.1 0.076 -0.205 
Ext45 0.842 -0.024 0.241 0.012 0.288 0.076 0.029 -0.062 -0.128 -0.031 -0.183 
Ext46 0.43 0.401 0.179 0.071 0.295 0.292 -0.068 0.072 -0.238 -0.54 -0.067 
Ext47 0.611 0.355 0.394 0.236 -0.033 0.202 0.273 -0.008 0.215 -0.108 -0.195 
Ext48 0.284 -0.012 0.359 0.585 0.475 -0.019 0.029 -0.103 0.108 0.155 -0.21 
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Ext49 0.215 0.411 0.369 0.27 0.53 -0.041 0.004 -0.099 0.003 -0.131 -0.005 
Ext50 0.847 0.076 0.133 0.202 0.068 0.367 0.117 -0.03 -0.023 0.121 0.134 
Ext51 0.779 0.225 0.114 0.352 0.217 -0.135 0.093 0.22 -0.107 -0.069 -0.02 
Ext52 0.696 0.034 0.199 -0.024 0.014 0.29 0.048 0.274 0.051 0.191 0.489 
Ext53 0.764 0.282 -0.179 -0.144 -0.079 0.257 -0.106 0.197 0.089 0 -0.085 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
       Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
       a Rotation converged in 12 
iterations. 
         
 
 
Although SPSS delivers 11 principal components or extant factors, no variable has its highest 
loading on factor 11. Moreover, no variable loaded above 0.5 in that factor. Therefore, only 10 extant 
factors are considered, which together explain around 90% of the total variance explained by the set of 53 
extant variables: 
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Table 24. Extant variables per factor from pilot study 
Extant Factor 1: Preparedness 
Variance 22.6% 
Var Load Question 
Ext50 0.847 
How to determine the nature, crime category, types of technologies used or involved, 
and technical skill and knowledge of a suspect in a cyber incident. 
Ext45 0.842 
Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to deploy in case of a 
cyber incident. 
Ext40 0.83 
Mature and adequate governance models as well as an information systems 
development life cycle (ISDLC) informed by a well-developed forensic readiness 
policy. 
Ext44 0.83 How to conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original evidence 
Ext19 0.791 
Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of competitors and 
enemies. 
Ext51 0.779 
How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every 
step, including information about the tools used, in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext25 0.766 
A documented system security architecture configuration with consistent standards 
throughout the entire platform. 
Ext53 0.764 
How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the organization's policies 
and all applicable laws and regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation 
process. 
Ext16 0.722 
Develops corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using collaboration tools 
to maintain a shared workspace. 
Ext42 0.722 Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a mobile platform. 
Ext20 0.703 
Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel devices, use of 
systems, privacy, and consent of monitoring. 
Ext52 0.696 
What the sources and format of the organization's data are, when and where data is 
generated, the associated threats to the data, and how data is preserved for long-
term storage. 
Ext31 0.672 
Archive management procedures to assure that records (including those in the cloud) 
possess content, context and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of 
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability. 
Ext39 0.628 
A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the business while gathering 
admissible evidence, to restore essential services during an attack, to avoid financial 
loss, and to recover assets and data. 
Ext47 0.611 
How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination, 
seizure and removal of the system(s), in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext28 0.592 
A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite computer forensic 
examiners. 
Ext17 0.51 
Controls security information through dashboards and metrics that continuously and 
dynamically measure information security performance. 
Extant Factor 2: Control 
Variance 13.1% 
Var Load Question 
Ext7 0.873 
Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs and data, and 
assesses the value of potential evidence. 
Ext10 0.704 
Controls access to data and evidence through strong authentication, access control 
lists, user logging, encryption, and implements measures for handling inadvertent 
exposures. 
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Ext8 0.673 
Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous activities and anti-
forensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, and steganography 
software) and assesses Internet activities such as cookies, temporary files, URLs, 
email, instant messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs. 
Ext6 0.651 
Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS), 
security event management software (SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware 
Ext1 0.646 The organization's security system has been proven to be reliable. 
Ext5 0.626 
Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure conduct and digital 
forensics tools and techniques. 
Ext22 0.604 
Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory and/or governmental 
regulations (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, admissibility rules, reporting requirements, 
international law, and penalties for security incidents). 
Ext4 0.576 
Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their digital forensic 
responsibilities and the use of digital forensic tools. 
Ext41 0.564 
Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and functionality, including storage 
visualization abilities. 
Extant Factor 3: Policing 
Variance 10.7% 
Var Load Question 
Ext38 0.828 
Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly pervasive use of 
encryption technologies. 
Ext21 0.818 Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them. 
Ext34 0.69 
Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and volatile data, and 
analyzing admissible evidence. 
Ext24 0.624 
A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers policies, activities, 
procedures, training, roles, documentation, and management. 
Ext27 0.612 
A change management database that includes file hashes for common operating 
system files and for deployed applications, using file integrity checking software on 
important assets. 
Ext43 0.534 Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic readiness. 
Ext29 0.46 
A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the associated meta-
data identifying times and authors. 
Extant Factor 4: Prevention 
Variance 9.3% 
Var Load Question 
Ext12 0.809 
Looks for legal and technical advice, including published standards, regarding 
forensic policies, procedures, and information security, and monitors emerging 
academic digital forensics research. 
Ext15 0.805 
Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate physical and digital 
assets according to a digital forensic program. 
Ext9 0.637 
Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic capabilities such as 
authentication traffic monitoring, tamper proof mechanisms and logging time 
synchronization. 
Ext48 0.585 
How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be involved in a 
legal inquiry, in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext36 0.538 
The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer and network forensics 
and manage legal evidence properly. 
Extant Factor 5: Documentation 
Variance 8.9% 
Var Load Question 
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Ext23 0.936 
A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing roles and 
procedures to capture, store, map, analyze, preserve, control access to, integrate, 
and present evidence. 
Ext35 0.725 
A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in 
the organization's information systems and the forensic readiness program. 
Ext14 0.716 Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices. 
Ext13 0.583 Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews. 
Ext49 0.53 
How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, timeline of events, and 
duration of a cyber incident. 
Extant Factor 6: Investigation 
Variance 6.9% 
Var Load Question 
Ext18 0.776 
Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their capabilities and 
response times, and validates the accreditation of their laboratories. 
Ext32 0.67 
Procedures describing the configuration and use of active monitoring and logging 
mechanisms, including procedures to prevent alteration of intercepted 
communications. 
Extant Factor 7: Permissiveness 
Variance 6.5% 
Var Load Question 
Ext3 0.933 Allows wireless access. 
Ext26 0.884 
Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, crime and dispute 
history and lessons learned. 
Ext11 0.856 
Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file encryption, and anti-
forensic strategies (e.g. anonymity, data destruction/alteration, and onion routing). 
Ext30 0.689 
A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, crimes 
and disputes, and threats from opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees. 
This policy indicates how to manage people leaving the company. 
Extant Factor 8: Focus 
Variance 4.3% 
Var Load Question 
Ext37 0.643 
Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first responders and 
investigators ready to work collaboratively with legal, IT, law enforcement, business, 
and auditing representatives in case of a cyber incident. 
Extant Factor 9: Redress 
Variance 3.9% 
Var Load Question 
Ext2 0.914 Seeks accountability for intruders. 
Extant Factor 10: Traceability 
Variance 3.2% 
Var Load Question 
Ext46 -0.54 
Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in case of a cyber 
incident. 
Ext33 0.479 
Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT and business 
systems, and monitoring of the forensics process. 
 
 
Summary of Pilot Study 
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The pilot study is done to assess the feasibility of the surveys and to have a first view of the 
content validity of the factors. However, conclusions about final factors are done over the final sample. 
The number of factors extracted from the pilot was limited to those with Eigen values above or 
equal to one. The factor analysis delivers 16 factors, 6 perceptual factors and 10 extant factors. This is a 
very similar number to that of the dimensions found via Q-Sort test; 15 in that case. This hindsight is used 
in the definition of the number of factors to extract from the final sample, which is a key decision 
researchers make in the application of factor analysis. 
The sample size is insufficient to make conclusive decisions. However, the pilot test shows that 
the survey, although long and in-depth, is feasible. Some respondents actually made comments such as 
“I loved this survey[,] very important,” “great survey, would like to take more,” “Nice survey!,” and “Great 
survey, would complete another one like it.” This improves the possibility that respondents will thoroughly 
complete the survey despite its length. It is also an indicator that questions were understood and 
informative. As expected, the results obtained in the pilot were suitable for exploratory factor analysis, in 
the perceptual set, and for principal components analysis in the extant set. The percentage of variance 
extracted for the perceptual and extant factors, 77% and 90% respectively, fall into acceptable levels for 
factor analysis in social sciences (Hair, Black, Bavin & Henderson 2010). 
The refinement of factors could continue with the removal of variables and even reorganization of 
factors based on theoretical analysis. However, this should be done when the final survey is run and a 
more solid sample of observations is obtained. No variables are removed at this moment to avoid missing 
variance that could be explained by those variables or shared variance with other variables in the 
consolidation of factors. The names of factors from the pilot study are not final, but provide a glimpse for 
the denomination of final factors and the direction that the refinement of those factors can take. 
Final Study 
A final survey was run among IT professionals using the same questionnaire tested under the 
pilot study. Unlike the pilot study’s requirement of IT professionals working on the security area in IT 
departments, the final study relaxes this requirement and includes IT professionals working on IT 
departments. This decision acknowledges that all IT related personnel are nowadays inevitably involved 
in IT security. In addition, some managers and directors of IT departments, which make a considerable 
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segment of potential respondents, could have skipped choosing security as one of their functions simply 
for not being involved in the traditionally technically-related tasks of firewall configurations, antivirus 
updates and backups. The final collection of responses confirms the appropriateness of this decision: IT 
managers, administrators, VPs, and CIOs are popular positions cited by respondents. 52% of those who 
finished the survey reported IT management as their role at work. The data was collected through 
Qualtrics between the months of March and April of 2017 among organizations in the U.S. 1.243 attempts 
to complete the survey were done. However, strict requirements for the time taken to complete the survey 
were implemented such that responses completed in less than 6 minutes were considered not 
acceptable. The average respondent took over 14 minutes and the median was over 10 minutes. Two 
control questions to verify that respondents were thoughtfully reading the questions were strategically 
added to the questionnaire. 250 respondents who comply with all the conditions and representing equal 
number of organizations were selected for the analysis. The complete demographics for the respondents 
and the organizations they represent are as follows: 
 
Table 25. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Age) 
Respondent's age 
Below 18 0 
18 to 25 14 
26 to 40 151 
41 to 60 81 
Above 60 4 
 
Table 26. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Gender) 
Respondent's gender 
Male 154 
Female 96 
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Table 27. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Tenure) 
Respondent's years in the organization 
Less than 2 25 
2 to 5 84 
6 to 10 85 
11 to 20 44 
More than 20 12 
 
Table 28. Respondents’ demographics from final study (Years in position) 
Respondent's years in position 
Less than 2 44 
2 to 5 142 
6 to 10 41 
11 to 20 21 
More than 20 2 
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Table 29. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Industry) 
Organization's Industry 
Manufacturing and Process Industries (Non-computer) 20 
Online Retailer 3 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Application Service Provider (ASP) 9 
Communications Carrier 4 
Aerospace 1 
Banking/Finance/Accounting 9 
Insurance/Real Estate/Legal 4 
Federal Government (including military) 7 
State/Local Government 6 
Medical/Dental/Healthcare 23 
Transportation/Utilities 6 
Construction/Architecture/Engineering 1 
Data Processing Services 11 
Wholesale/Retail/Distribution 4 
Education 10 
Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment 3 
Research/Development Lab 5 
Business Services/Consultant 22 
Computer Manufacturer (Hardware, software, peripherals) 31 
Computer/Network Services/Consultant 50 
Computer Related Retailer/Wholesaler/Distributor 8 
Other 13 
 
Table 30. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Sales) 
Organization's Year Sales in $1000 
Less than 50 13 
Between 50 and 200 25 
Between 200 and 500 25 
Between 500 and 2,000 46 
More than 2,000 141 
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Table 31. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Employees) 
Organization's Number of Employees 
1 to 50 24 
Between 51 and 200 26 
Between 201 and 500 50 
Between 501 and 2000 68 
More than 5,000 82 
 
Table 32. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Customers) 
Organization's Number of Customers 
1 to 20 7 
Between 21 and 200 35 
Between 201 and 1,000 49 
Between 1,001 and 10,000 64 
More than 10,000 95 
 
Table 33. Organizations’ demographics from final study (Data) 
Organization's Monthly Data 
Less than 10 MB 3 
Between 10 and 500 MB 13 
Between 0.5 and 50 GB 41 
Between 50 GB and 1 TB 72 
More than 1 TB 121 
 
 
The objectives of the EFA are twofold, data reduction for the extant variables and structure 
identification for the perceptual variables. In the case of the extant variables, this study assumes that they 
represent what DFR is, according to a comprehensive review of the literature. Even with the reduction of 
variables performed during this research the number of these variables, 53, is still large for a 
parsimonious model. Digital forensics experts will benefit from a statistically-based reduction of the 
variables into fewer factors. On the other hand, the 18 perceptual variables discovered may not tell the 
whole story about the reflective indicators of DFR. The literature reviewed is mostly of a practical nature 
rather than of a theoretical or concept-based nature; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that most of 
what DFR is made of has been contemplated, but perceptions of such DFR may remain to be covered. 
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Conceptual models of behavioral or perceptual indicators of DFR status have not been proposed by 
researchers; therefore, there are no grounds to suggest completeness of the perceptual factors found in 
the literature. Still, the perceptual factors inferred during the present review, while not comprehensive, 
can shed light on the underlying structure of the DFR latent perceptual factors. Consequently, structure 
identification is a better objective for the perceptual variables. 
Sample Size for Final Study 
The sample size of the final study is 250 observations, roughly five times the number of the 
bigger of the two sets of variables (53 extant variables vs. 18 perceptual variables), which is 
recommended for EFA (Hair et al. 2010). The separation between extant and perceptual variables also 
avoids mixing dependent and independent variables in the analysis, as warned by Hair et al. Perceptual 
variables are a reflection of the real status of DFR represented by extant variables. Therefore, variables 
of both sets should not be mixed. 
Factorability of Data 
Hair et al. (2010) recommend a visual exploration of the data to detect that sufficient correlation 
among variables and heterogeneity of those correlations exist in order to consider the data feasible for 
factor analysis. Correlations above 0.3 are considered appropriate. After visual exploration, both data sets 
provide evidence of their feasibility for factor analysis. Moreover, this research quantifies this evidence. 
To do this, the number of substantial correlations was counted and their proportion in respect to 
the total correlations was calculated. The number of possible correlations among perceptual variables is 
153, given by the formula n*(n-1)/2, where n = 18, the number of perceptual variables. Likewise, the 
number of possible correlations among extant variables is 1,378, where n = 53, the number of extant 
variables. As an example, the formula =IF(ABS(C3)>=0.3,1,0) in Excel, was used to assign a number one 
to the correlation in cell C3. The application of this formula with reference to the correlations’ cells range 
identifies those correlations greater or equal to 0.3. The count was 69 for the perceptual correlations and 
1,240 for the extant correlations, which corresponds to 45% and 90% of substantial correlations, 
respectively. 
Partial correlations higher than 0.7 indicate that variables have high unique variance, leaving 
small variance that could be explained by other variables. This shows poor suitability for factor analysis 
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according to Hair et al. (2010). A look at the anti-image matrices of both variable sets shows that no 
partial correlation was greater or equal to 0.7. Likewise, the Bartlett test of sphericity that reviews that 
there are significant correlations among the variables shows statistical significance with a p value that is 
inferior to 0.0005 for both perceptual and extant variables. These results indicate suitability for factor 
analysis. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO MSA) is an indicator of the 
proportion of correlations over the sum of correlations and partial correlations. Kaiser proposes the 
following interpretation of the results: below 0.50, unacceptable; in the 0.50s, miserable; in the 0.60s, 
mediocre; in the 0.70s, middling; in the 0.80s, meritorious; and in the 0.90s, marvelous (Kaiser 1974). The 
KMO is 0.885 or “meritorious” for the perceptual set and 0.962 or “marvelous” for the extant set. 
Factor Extraction 
Initially, the latent root criterion is used for the extraction of factors from both sets of variables. 
This method extracts only factors accounting for the variance of at least one single variable, i.e. an Eigen 
value of one. An orthogonal Varimax rotation is applied to simplify the factor structure. The result of these 
extractions is four perceptual factors and eight extant components, as shown in the table below, where a 
dark gray background identifies the highest loading of each variable and the light gray background 
identifies significant loadings on other factors. 
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Table 34. Perceptual factors extracted through Latent Root Criterion (Eigen value = 1) 
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
Per7 .696 .142 .002 .017 
Per9 .664 .230 .010 .107 
Per8 .613 .394 .106 .190 
Per10 .533 .205 .109 .135 
Per14 .504 .132 .080 .292 
Per16 .478 .336 .002 .451 
Per15 .474 .081 .188 .402 
Per12 .445 .410 .075 .287 
Per1 -.380 -.808 -.095 -.092 
Per18 -.519 -.658 -.027 -.242 
Per2 .485 .553 .101 .186 
Per6 -.005 .006 .677 .116 
Per4 .043 .111 .569 .008 
Per11 -.028 -.028 .546 -.015 
Per3 .089 -.102 .429 .242 
Per13 .051 .247 .388 .067 
Per5 .229 .081 .326 .002 
Per17 .278 .309 .214 .700 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
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Table 35. Extant factors extracted through Latent Root Criterion (Eigen value = 1) 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Ext6 .692 .171 -.037 .208 .223 .126 .132 .045 
Ext7 .686 .154 .167 .191 .134 .184 .183 .119 
Ext9 .686 .194 .315 .267 .121 .176 .083 .037 
Ext8 .644 .265 .087 .075 .239 .217 .031 .083 
Ext10 .623 .081 .225 -.051 .330 .183 .139 .095 
Ext1 .572 .214 .257 .274 .157 -.005 .216 -.041 
Ext12 .550 .180 .245 .317 .166 .349 .104 -.190 
Ext4 .522 .183 .184 .374 .198 .307 .095 -.102 
Ext13 .481 .169 .174 .168 .236 .460 .178 -.035 
Ext5 .430 .203 .323 .308 .216 .332 .239 -.062 
Ext52 .088 .740 .009 .011 .218 .011 .226 -.043 
Ext49 .190 .689 .118 .253 .254 .229 .041 .006 
Ext46 .294 .648 .278 .212 -.050 .160 .200 .121 
Ext48 .066 .620 .197 .266 .196 .239 .040 -.008 
Ext51 .346 .596 .336 .175 .136 .143 .052 .012 
Ext50 .288 .595 .341 .286 .180 .205 .043 .042 
Ext45 .364 .528 .269 .229 .160 .165 .216 .125 
Ext44 .220 .518 .308 .350 .114 .176 .235 -.083 
Ext53 .333 .463 .404 .070 .312 .157 .130 .020 
Ext35 .401 .247 .588 .105 .249 .182 .085 -.008 
Ext47 .135 .389 .566 .240 .069 .119 .139 .078 
Ext40 .211 .291 .522 .441 .225 .125 .207 -.023 
Ext27 .056 .225 .520 .421 .179 .271 .195 .180 
Ext31 .276 .185 .482 .381 .363 .201 .065 .049 
Ext38 .191 .306 .467 .331 .216 .248 .101 -.049 
Ext2 .399 .221 .456 .074 .255 .177 .043 -.100 
Ext26 .245 .251 .451 .396 .255 .219 .168 -.059 
Ext36 .338 .280 .424 .255 .079 .224 .360 -.113 
Ext39 .110 .343 .407 .197 .371 .256 .217 -.048 
Ext33 .282 .188 .393 .315 .370 .184 .296 .019 
Ext28 .125 .255 .153 .772 .035 .220 .068 .046 
Ext18 .279 .202 .291 .569 .068 .423 -.077 -.008 
Ext30 .242 .199 .125 .507 .474 .101 .238 .017 
Ext37 .202 .341 .273 .507 .238 .254 .109 .000 
Ext29 .270 .207 .021 .503 .492 .078 .205 .036 
Ext23 .330 .197 .303 .468 .329 .160 -.027 .071 
Ext17 .290 .130 .278 .424 .287 .363 .143 -.014 
Ext25 .271 .313 .285 .388 .323 -.040 .257 -.004 
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Ext22 .302 .213 .237 .089 .654 .208 .004 -.035 
Ext20 .335 .234 .050 .096 .623 .098 .170 -.014 
Ext21 .365 .157 .360 .178 .536 .237 .124 -.039 
Ext32 .132 .145 .429 .250 .509 .252 .187 .086 
Ext24 .234 .219 .296 .323 .506 .166 .092 .124 
Ext16 .374 .193 .240 .080 .379 .341 .288 -.123 
Ext11 .175 .152 .241 .214 .085 .658 .038 .031 
Ext14 .239 .226 -.001 .258 .187 .623 .142 .027 
Ext15 .284 .171 .268 .071 .168 .584 .153 .034 
Ext19 .274 .143 .411 .346 .216 .506 .135 -.037 
Ext42 .096 .181 -.106 -.015 .127 .403 .615 .223 
Ext41 .183 .305 .280 .067 .082 .041 .572 -.086 
Ext34 .325 .109 .210 .169 .355 .064 .539 .028 
Ext43 .177 .108 .256 .453 .126 .094 .525 -.023 
Ext3 .074 .027 .019 .037 .015 .019 .029 .918 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations. 
 
 
Several considerations must be taken into account before settling for the factors extracted, such 
that conceptual bases and statistical support are maintained. First, the statistical significance of loadings 
should be evaluated under stricter levels than those of correlation coefficients, given the larger standard 
errors of loadings. In order to obtain a 0.05 significance level for a sample of 250 observations, a target 
power level of 80% is achieved with minimum factor loadings of 0.35 (Hair et al. 2010). Only the 
perceptual variable PER5 (Our firm has a public profile) loading on factor 3 has a factor loading below this 
limit, at 0.326. Given that PER5 also has a low communality of 0.165 (i.e., small variance that is explained 
by other perceptual variables) it becomes a candidate for deletion. This is shown with gray background in 
the table of communalities below. This does not mean that the perception in an organization of having a 
public profile is not a reflection of its DFR status, but simply that no other variable in the set of perceptual 
variables of this research explains a similar construct significantly. All other perceptual and extant 
variables have factor loadings above the significant level of 0.35. 
Regarding communalities, nine other perceptual variables have what is considered low levels 
(below 0.5 or at least half of their variance explained by other variables in their respective set). All of the 
extant variables have communalities above 0.5. These values coincide with the assumption that the set of 
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perceptual variables is unlikely to be as comprehensive as the set of extant variables given the technical 
orientation of the current literature in DFR. It is expected that future research can detect more perceptual 
variables of DFR sharing variance with those proposed here. 
 
Table 36. Communalities on Four-factor Perceptual Solution 
Communalities of Perceptual Variables 
  Initial Extraction 
Per1 0.672 0.815 
Per2 0.62 0.586 
Per3 0.218 0.261 
Per4 0.31 0.338 
Per5 0.197 0.165 
Per6 0.317 0.472 
Per7 0.396 0.504 
Per8 0.589 0.578 
Per9 0.46 0.505 
Per10 0.339 0.356 
Per11 0.259 0.3 
Per12 0.497 0.455 
Per13 0.252 0.218 
Per14 0.373 0.363 
Per15 0.405 0.428 
Per16 0.505 0.545 
Per17 0.495 0.708 
Per18 0.735 0.762 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
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Table 37. Communalities on Eight-Factor Extant Solution 
Communalities of Extant Variables 
  Initial Extraction 
Ext1 1 0.588 
Ext2 1 0.529 
Ext3 1 0.853 
Ext4 1 0.633 
Ext5 1 0.644 
Ext6 1 0.638 
Ext7 1 0.658 
Ext8 1 0.61 
Ext9 1 0.732 
Ext10 1 0.619 
Ext11 1 0.6 
Ext12 1 0.692 
Ext13 1 0.619 
Ext14 1 0.618 
Ext15 1 0.582 
Ext16 1 0.599 
Ext17 1 0.593 
Ext18 1 0.717 
Ext19 1 0.707 
Ext20 1 0.606 
Ext21 1 0.679 
Ext22 1 0.672 
Ext23 1 0.599 
Ext24 1 0.603 
Ext25 1 0.575 
Ext26 1 0.628 
Ext27 1 0.677 
Ext28 1 0.756 
Ext29 1 0.661 
Ext30 1 0.664 
Ext31 1 0.667 
Ext32 1 0.649 
Ext33 1 0.627 
Ext34 1 0.611 
Ext35 1 0.68 
Ext36 1 0.636 
Ext37 1 0.621 
Ext38 1 0.579 
Ext39 1 0.587 
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Ext40 1 0.706 
Ext41 1 0.552 
Ext42 1 0.66 
Ext43 1 0.615 
Ext44 1 0.639 
Ext45 1 0.651 
Ext46 1 0.711 
Ext47 1 0.592 
Ext48 1 0.595 
Ext49 1 0.708 
Ext50 1 0.713 
Ext51 1 0.661 
Ext52 1 0.656 
Ext53 1 0.633 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
On the other hand, 7 perceptual and 26 extant variables present more than one significant factor 
loading. These cross-loadings are: 
Table 38. Cross-loadings 
Variables Factors 
PER8, PER16, PER1, PER18 and PER2 Factors 1 and 2     
PER16 and PER15       Factors 1 and 4 
 
  
EXT4           Factors 1 and 4 
 
  
EXT13           Factors 1 and 6 
 
  
EXT45           Factors 1 and 2 
 
  
EXT44           Factors 2 and 4 
 
  
EXT53 and EXT47       Factors 2 and 3 
 
  
EXT35 and EXT2       Factors 1 and 3 
 
  
EXT40, EXT27 and EXT26     Factors 3 and 4 
 
  
EXT36           Factors 3 and 7 
 
  
EXT31           Factors 3, 4 and 5 
 
  
EXT39, EXT33 and EXT32     Factors 3 and 5 
 
  
EXT18 and EXT17       Factors 4 and 6 
 
  
EXT30 and EXT29       Factors 4 and 5 
 
  
EXT21           Factors 1, 3 and 5 
 
  
EXT16           Factors 1 and 5 
 
  
EXT19           Factors 3 and 6 
 
  
EXT42           Factors 6 and 7 
 
  
EXT34           Factors 5 and 7 
 
  
EXT43           Factors 4 and 7     
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Different extraction criteria, rotation methods, and/or deletion of variables can improve 
significance of loadings and reduce cross-loadings. 
Another consideration to explore about the loadings is regarding factors defined by a single 
variable, which make it impractical to assess reliability. This assessment aims to reduce measurement 
errors by testing that the items in a factor are consistently measuring the same construct. One variable in 
each set falls under this condition PER17 and EXT3. However, they both have high loadings on the factor 
they define and non-significant loading in others, which means that deleting them, could not only 
eliminate the variables, but also a potential real factor from the model. Assessment of reliability on those 
factors defined by a single variable is left for future research if/when new variables for those factors are 
found. 
Finally, there is the evaluation of the variance extracted after rotation, which is 46.45% for 
perceptual factors and 64.33% for the extant ones. Hair et al. (2010) assert that a 60% or even lower 
level of total variance extracted is commonly accepted as satisfactory in the social sciences. Given that 
the variance explained by the extant factors is above 60% with all variable loadings being significant, 
analysis and labeling proceeds with the factors extracted. For the perceptual factors, extra refinement can 
increase the variance explained and the significance of PER5, as well as a better simplification of their 
structure. 
Deletion of variables is avoided for different reasons in each set of variables. In the case of the 
extant variables, each of the variables tested is the product of thorough conceptual analysis of the extant 
literature and thus is deemed to have an important meaning for the definition of DFR. Those variables’ 
cross-loadings over different factors might not be due to a problem of the variables but due to a problem 
in the definition of the factors. Therefore, eliminating variables will leave us with an incomplete view of 
DFR. The elimination of variables from the perceptual set, on the other hand, is not recommended for a 
different reason. It is clear in this research that the perceptual set that arose from the literature does not 
give a complete reflection of a DFR status. Thus, the lack of significance of a variable and the cross-
loadings of others might not respond to poor variables, but to the absence of other variables that help 
shape the structure of the perceptual factors. Because this is an exploratory approach to a model of DFR, 
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future researchers will benefit from testing all possible significant factors found in this research. Therefore, 
the refinement will aim to produce a factor model with as many as possible significant variables. 
It should be noted that the factors extracted in the final study, four perceptual and eight extant, 
are fewer than those extracted in the pilot study and the dimensions of DFR for practitioners resulting 
from the Q-Sort test. In the case of the perceptual variables, this confirms Hair et al.’s contention that for 
fewer than 20 variables the latent root criterion extracts a conservative number of factors. Considering 
that the pilot study and the Q-Sort test are the only antecedents available for the application of an a priori 
criterion for the number of factors to extract, new factor analyses are run to extract more perceptual 
factors. 
The comparison between the four-factor extraction obtained under the latent root criterion and a 
five-factor extraction with an a priori criterion are shown below. The same number of variables has cross-
loadings, but PER1 has an additional cross-loading, thus, cross-loadings increase instead of decrease. A 
benefit of the five-factor extraction, though, is that PER5’s factor loading of 0.326 increases to 0.347, very 
close to significance, but still below it. Likewise, its communality increases from 0.165 to 0.208 and the 
total variance explained increases from 46.45 to 49.4%. 
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Table 39. Comparison between four and five factor solutions 
 
 
A six-factor extraction delivers the same number of cross-loadings than with the latent root 
criterion, but brings all variables to significance, while increasing the variance explained to 51.63%. An 
extraction of seven factors delivers similar results to those of the six-factor extraction, but no variable has 
its highest loading on the seventh factor. 
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Table 40. Comparison between six and seven factor solutions 
 
 
The same exercise of extracting more a priori factors for the extant set was run for 9, 10, 11, 12 
and 13 factors, resulting in the eleven-factor model being the solution with fewer cross-loadings while 
keeping all variables significant. The thirteen-factor solution failed to converge after 25 iterations. It does 
deliver fewer cross-loadings after converging at the thirtieth iteration, but four of them become single-
variable factors, in contrast to two in the ten and eleven-factor solutions. Still, the decision between the 
eleven-factor solution with fewer cross-loadings and the initially extracted eight-factor solution can be 
decided in favor of parsimony, following Hair et al.’s (2010) warning that for more than 50 variables, the 
latent root criteria tends to deliver too many factors. Thus, eight factors should be sufficient. 
The labeling of factors proceeds, then, with the eight-factor solution of the extant set and the six-
factor solution of the perceptual set, both presenting significant factor loadings for all variables. In these 
solutions, most cross-loadings appear in variables which are not those with the highest loading in a factor; 
hence, they will not affect labeling. The only exception is PER12, which is the main variable loading 0.498 
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in factor 6 and cross-loading 0.484 in factor 1. This cross-loading is considered in the labeling of 
perceptual factors 1 and 6. 
Reliability 
Reliability is measured through Cronbach’s Alpha. Two perceptual variables show negative 
loadings, PER1 and PER18, but the former defines a single-variable factor whereas the latter is part of 
factor one. Therefore, PER18 must be reverse scored in order to approprietaly calculate the Cronbach’s 
Alpha for that factor. All extant factors have Cronbach’s Alphas in the generally accepted level of 0.7, 
except for factor eight which Cronbach’s Alpha cannot be calculated because it is a single-variable factor. 
Likewise, two perceptual factors’ Cronbach’s Alpha cannot be calculated for the same reason. 
Perceptual factors 4, 5, and 6 have Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.584, 0.489, and 0.423, respectively. Only 
factor one in the perceptual set has a Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.7. It is expected that future research can 
discover additional perceptual factors with more satisfactory reliability measures. 
Factors from Final Study 
The following is a list of the factors with their corresponding variables and loadings, as well as the 
percentage of the variance of all variables that the factor explains and the reliability measure of each 
factor. Appendix F (Final Survey) can be used o determine whether the item refers to something that the 
organization has, does, knows or perceives. 
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Table 41. Perceived Organizational Commitment (COMM) 
Perceived Organizational Commitment 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.855 
Variance 20.5% 
Var Load Question 
Per8 .714 
The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics program and implement 
lessons learned from previous incidents. 
Per9 .683 
The organization's employees have knowledge of information management and 
security policies. 
Per7 .671 
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are consistent with its 
personnel privacy policies and applicable employment law. 
Per2 .572 Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic readiness. 
Per10 .547 
Information technology and information security objectives are aligned with the 
business mission and objectives. 
Per16 .524 
How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and accelerate its investigation 
in case of a cyber incident. 
Per14 .494 Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a cyber incident. 
Per15 .457 How to handle a politically sensitive or publicly embarrassing incident. 
 
Table 42. Summary of DFR Assessment (SDFR) 
Summary of DFR Assessment 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.865 
Variance 7.7% 
Var Load Question 
Per1 -.783 
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness 
to obtain, understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would 
rate my organization's DFR as: 
Per18 -.565 
After completing this survey and given the definition of digital forensic readiness 
(DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present verifiable 
digital evidence when needed, I would rate my organization's DFR as: 
 
Table 43. Perceived Response Control (RESP) 
Perceived Response Control 
Cronbach's Alpha N/A 
Variance 7.3% 
Var Load Question 
Per17 .704 
How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a digital forensic 
incident. 
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Table 44. Perceived Burden (BURD) 
Perceived Burden 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.584 
Variance 7.3% 
Var Load Question 
Per11 .627 
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about admissibility and reliability 
of digital evidence for our organization is hard. 
Per6 .596 The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure. 
Per3 .426 Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive. 
 
Table 45. Perceived Exposure (EXPO) 
Perceived Exposure 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.489 
Variance 4.4% 
Var Load Question 
Per4 .576 This organization is exposed to many risks and threats. 
Per5 .385 Our firm has a public profile. 
 
Table 46. Perceived DFR Culture (CULT) 
Perceived DFR culture 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.423 
Variance 4.4% 
Var Load Question 
Per12 .498 
A forensic culture of preserving evidence and sharing knowledge in computer 
security and digital forensics. 
Per13 .464 A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from users) 
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Table 47. Extant Technological Capacity (TECH) 
Technological Capacity 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.916 
Variance 12.2% 
Var Load Question 
Ext6 .692 
Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS), 
security event management software (SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware 
Ext7 .686 
Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs and data, and 
assesses the value of potential evidence. 
Ext9 .686 
Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic capabilities such as 
authentication traffic monitoring, tamper proof mechanisms and logging time 
synchronization. 
Ext8 .644 
Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous activities and anti-
forensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, and steganography software) 
and assesses Internet activities such as cookies, temporary files, URLs, email, 
instant messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs. 
Ext10 .623 
Controls access to data and evidence through strong authentication, access control 
lists, user logging, encryption, and implements measures for handling inadvertent 
exposures. 
Ext1 .572 The organization's security system has been proven to be reliable. 
Ext12 .550 
Looks for legal and technical advice, including published standards, regarding 
forensic policies, procedures, and information security, and monitors emerging 
academic digital forensics research. 
Ext4 .522 
Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their digital forensic 
responsibilities and the use of digital forensic tools. 
Ext13 .481 Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews. 
Ext5 .430 
Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure conduct and digital 
forensics tools and techniques. 
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Table 48. Extant Incident & Evidence Expertise (IEXP) 
Incident & Evidence Expertise 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.919 
Variance 10.2% 
Var Load Question 
Ext52 .740 
What the sources and format of the organization's data are, when and where data is 
generated, the associated threats to the data, and how data is preserved for long-
term storage. 
Ext49 .689 
How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, timeline of events, and 
duration of a cyber incident. 
Ext46 .648 
Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in case of a cyber 
incident. 
Ext48 .620 
How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be involved in a 
legal inquiry, in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext51 .596 
How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every 
step, including information about the tools used, in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext50 .595 
How to determine the nature, crime category, types of technologies used or involved, 
and technical skill and knowledge of a suspect in a cyber incident. 
Ext45 .528 
Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to deploy in case of a 
cyber incident. 
Ext44 .518 How to conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original evidence 
Ext53 .463 
How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the organization's policies 
and all applicable laws and regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation 
process. 
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Table 49. Extant DFR Embeddedness (EMBD) 
DFR Embeddedness 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.928 
Variance 9.8% 
Var Load Question 
Ext35 .588 
A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in 
the organization's information systems and the forensic readiness program. 
Ext47 .566 
How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination, 
seizure and removal of the system(s), in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext40 .522 
Mature and adequate governance models as well as an information systems 
development life cycle (ISDLC) informed by a well-developed forensic readiness 
policy. 
Ext27 .520 
A change management database that includes file hashes for common operating 
system files and for deployed applications, using file integrity checking software on 
important assets. 
Ext31 .482 
Archive management procedures to assure that records (including those in the cloud) 
possess content, context and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of 
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability. 
Ext38 .467 
Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly pervasive use of 
encryption technologies. 
Ext2 .456 Seeks accountability for intruders. 
Ext26 .451 
Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, crime and dispute 
history and lessons learned. 
Ext36 .424 
The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer and network forensics 
and manage legal evidence properly. 
Ext39 .407 
A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the business while gathering 
admissible evidence, to restore essential services during an attack, to avoid financial 
loss, and to recover assets and data. 
Ext33 .393 
Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT and business 
systems, and monitoring of the forensics process. 
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Table 50. Extant Investigative Capacity (INVE) 
Investigative Capacity 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.897 
Variance 9.6% 
Var Load Question 
Ext28 .772 
A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite computer forensic 
examiners. 
Ext18 .569 
Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their capabilities and 
response times, and validates the accreditation of their laboratories. 
Ext30 .507 
A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, crimes 
and disputes, and threats from opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees. 
This policy indicates how to manage people leaving the company. 
Ext37 .507 
Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first responders and 
investigators ready to work collaboratively with legal, IT, law enforcement, business, 
and auditing representatives in case of a cyber incident. 
Ext29 .503 
A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the associated meta-
data identifying times and authors. 
Ext23 .468 
A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing roles and procedures 
to capture, store, map, analyze, preserve, control access to, integrate, and present 
evidence. 
Ext17 .424 
Controls security information through dashboards and metrics that continuously and 
dynamically measure information security performance. 
Ext25 .388 
A documented system security architecture configuration with consistent standards 
throughout the entire platform. 
 
Table 51. Extant Policing (POLI) 
Policing   
Cronbach's Alpha 0.870 
Variance 8.3% 
Var Load Question 
Ext22 .654 
Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory and/or governmental 
regulations (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, admissibility rules, reporting requirements, 
international law, and penalties for security incidents). 
Ext20 .623 
Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel devices, use of 
systems, privacy, and consent of monitoring. 
Ext21 .536 Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them. 
Ext32 .509 
Procedures describing the configuration and use of active monitoring and logging 
mechanisms, including procedures to prevent alteration of intercepted 
communications. 
Ext24 .506 
A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers policies, activities, 
procedures, training, roles, documentation, and management. 
Ext16 .379 
Develops corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using collaboration tools 
to maintain a shared workspace. 
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Table 52. Extant Active Control (ACON) 
Active Control 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.807 
Variance 7.2% 
Var Load Question 
Ext11 .658 
Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file encryption, and anti-
forensic strategies (e.g. anonymity, data destruction/alteration, and onion routing). 
Ext14 .623 Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices. 
Ext15 .584 
Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate physical and digital 
assets according to a digital forensic program. 
Ext19 .506 
Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of competitors and 
enemies. 
 
Table 53. Extant Backup Resourcing (BACK) 
Backup Resourcing 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.699 
Variance 4.9% 
Var Load Question 
Ext42 .615 Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a mobile platform. 
Ext41 .572 
Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and functionality, including storage 
visualization abilities. 
Ext34 .539 
Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and volatile data, and 
analyzing admissible evidence. 
Ext43 .525 Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic readiness. 
 
Table 54. Extant Wireless Accessibility (WIRE) 
Wireless Accessibility 
Cronbach's Alpha N/A 
Variance 2.2% 
Var Load Question 
Ext3 .918 Allows wireless access. 
 
 
Conceptual Model from EFA 
In light of the findings and the conceptual analysis, the DFR model consists of eight extant and 
six perceptual factors. The extant factors, representing 53 variables, define what DFR is, according to the 
literature. The perceptual factors, representing 18 variables, should reflect the DFR status as defined by 
the extant factors. This is depicted by the following model where ovals represent the extant and 
127 
 
perceptual DFR constructs and rectangles represent the latent factors that comprise the extant DFR, on 
one side, and those which reflect the perceptual DFR, on the other. The small squares indicate the 
number of variables loading on each factor. The demographic variables have not yet been included in the 
analysis. 
 
 
Figure 9. Conceptual model from exploratory factor analysis 
 
Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables were not included in the factor analysis. Even though they can be 
considered extant conditions, they do not correspond to things that the organization has, does or knows; 
hence, it would be inappropriate to include them in the EFA. Nevertheless, this study found five relevant 
characteristics supported by the literature that can eventually affect DFR. Four of the demographic 
variables are continuous and refer to the size of the organization, i.e., Yearly Sales, Number of 
Employees, Number of Customers, and Amount of Data produced in a month. The fifth demographic 
variable nominally identifies the industry to which the organization belongs. One way to assess these 
variables effect is to develop a composite measure of extant DFR and use it as the dependent variable in 
a regression on them. 
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This research recommends that future researchers use summated scales for each factor, thus, 
including, only and equally, each one of their respective indicators with significant loadings. However, the 
factors’ impact on the Extant or Perceived DFR constructs should not be treated equally because 
variables in factors defined by few variables would have a larger impact than the variables in factors 
defined by many variables. For example, the variable defining the Perceived Response Control factor 
would have nine times the weight of a variable in the Perceived Organizational Commitment factor. A 
more conservative approach would be to give an equal weight to each variable and calculate a composite 
Extant DFR and a composite Perceived DFR.  By running a multiple regression of the composite Extant 
DFR on the four continuous organizational demographic variables (i.e., Sales, Number of Employees, 
Number of Customers and Amount of Data), a significant effect of the Number of Employees on the 
Extant DFR (p value = .006) is obtained. The other demographics are not significant when considering all 
these variables in the model. This is shown in the following table where the significant variable DemEmp 
is highlighted with a gray background. 
 
Table 55. Test for Continuous Demographic Variables 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 
(Constant) 2.88 0.187   15.393 0 2.511 3.248 
DemSal -0.023 0.042 -0.043 -0.549 0.584 -0.105 0.059 
DemEmp -0.112 0.041 -0.223 -2.764 0.006 -0.192 -0.032 
DemCus 0.024 0.044 0.042 0.542 0.588 -0.062 0.11 
DemDat -0.073 0.054 -0.108 -1.361 0.175 -0.178 0.033 
a. Dependent Variable: EXTDFR 
 
This suggests that the number of employees could be a predictor of EXTDFR, although in the 
opposite direction inferred from the literature. Even though “a higher number of employees increase the 
risks for criminal incidents” (Barske et al. 2010), this condition might create awareness of the risks and 
make organizations take measures to counter those risks and be more prepared for them. Also, bigger 
organizations are more likely to count among their employees some with the qualifications required for 
DFR. 
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Further, a multiple covariate ANCOVA test is run to test the effect of the industry to which the 
organization belongs. Barske et al. (2010) suggest that financial firms might have a higher incidence of 
criminal activity than other firms. Thus, a dummy variable separating financial institutions from 
organizations in other industries was created and used as the variable of interest. The other 
organizational demographic variables are used as covariates. This test was not significant for the impact 
of Industry. The appropriateness of this test was validated by a test of homogeneity of variance based on 
median, which resulted in failing to reject the equality of the variance of the residuals in the two groups. 
The number of covariates satisfies Huitema’s (1980) suggestion of being less than 0.1 * N - J + 1, where 
J is the number of groups and N, the sample size. 
 
Table 56. Test for Nominal Demographic Variable 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (DemInd6 = 1
b
) 
Dependent Variable:   EXTDFR   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 
9.406
a
 5 1.881 4.731 0 
Intercept 63.895 1 63.895 160.685 0 
DemSal 0.114 1 0.114 0.288 0.592 
DemEmp 2.987 1 2.987 7.512 0.007 
DemCus 0.132 1 0.132 0.333 0.564 
DemDat 0.737 1 0.737 1.855 0.175 
DemInd6 0.113 1 0.113 0.284 0.594 
Error 97.024 244 0.398     
Total 1277.562 250       
Corrected 
Total 
106.43 249       
a. R Squared = .088 (Adjusted R Squared = .070) 
b. Dummy variable for the sixth choice of Industry (Finance) = 1 
 
 
Notwithstanding, applying a more sophisticated analysis such as SEM is recommended in the 
future in order to obtain a more precise picture of the interactions of the constructs, factors and indicators 
proposed herein. 
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Testing Awareness 
This research took an additional step by directly asking its respondents about their perception of 
the DFR status in their organizations. This question was asked twice, at the beginning and at the end of 
the survey, to take into account the effect of the survey as a mechanism that creates awareness of the 
construct. If a significant difference is detected between the pre- and post-survey perception of DFR, 
then, the survey itself affects this perception. Otherwise, we can think that respondents already had a 
clear idea of what the DFR status was in their organizations. By running a t-test it is found that the mean 
for both PER1 and PER18 is the same, 3.52. Their Pearson correlation is 0.762, showing high 
consistency between them along respondents. The survey, then, does not seem to have an effect on 
respondents’ answers. This effect may change if subjects not as qualified as those surveyed in this 
research are recruited. Otherwise, the instrument has shown good potential to be deployed again as it is. 
Given that PER1 and PER18 are asking the exact same question at different times, it was 
estimated appropriate to move PER18 to the Summary of DFR Assessment factor in the final model. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Employees variable, conceptualy affecting the Extant DFR, was found significant; hence, the 
complete DFR framework should include this variable. However, running independent regressions for 
each of the organization size variables shows that thay all are significant predictors of DFR. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to think that organization size is the broader factor affecting DFR and Number of 
Employees is the proxy variable to which this factor can be reduced. This conceptual approach is visually 
represented by creating a box for the Organization Size factor which contains the proxy variable Number 
of Empoyees. 
This demographic factor, although an existent condition, is of a different nature from the extant 
variables and, thus, not expected to be part of the components of DFR. The exact relationship between 
this and the extant factors should be the subject of future studies. The present model places the 
Organization Size factor apart from the extant factors to emphasize the difference. 
The relationships among the Extant and Perceptual factors within their repective groups are also 
to be defined by future research as many different configurations can be devised from this initial 
framework. Given that the information currently used for exploratory purposes should not be used to 
confirm proposed models, those configurations must be theoretically supported and tested on new data. 
However, an additional step can be pursued by running a second order factor analysis on the 
factors already found. Because the factors have been chosen so they are orthogonal, the correlations 
among them resulting from the new factor analysis are low. The MSA KMO indicators are 0.50 and 0.532 
for the Extant and Perceptual variables sets respectively, which are considered not adequate for factor 
analysis. Still, one point of attention is that the perceptual factors are considered as reflective of DFR; 
therefore, they should move together reflecting changes in DFR. However, the low correlations among 
them, as shown below, do not support this assumption. 
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Table 57. Correlations among Perceptual Factors 
Correlation Matrix 
  COMM SDFR RESP BURD EXPO CULT 
COMM 1.000 .137 .164 -.021 .025 .127 
SDFR .137 1.000 .012 -.037 .082 .130 
RESP .164 .012 1.000 .084 .028 .099 
BURD -.021 -.037 .084 1.000 .163 .080 
EXPO .025 .082 .028 .163 1.000 .019 
CULT .127 .130 .099 .080 .019 1.000 
 
 
There could be different explanations for this to happen, from lacking perceptual variables that 
help define the perceptual factors to having a different configuration for the relationship of the factors with 
each other. Testing these hypotheses requires new data and must be undertaken in future studies. The 
framework proposed herein acknowledges this uncertainty by using a dotted box to enclose all perceptual 
factors within the Extant DFR construct. 
Some of the factors found in the pilot study, such as those related to Commitment, Control, 
Policing, and Investigation, remain equally relevant in the present framework. Other factors from the pilot 
study have been condensed in the more consistent factors resulted from the final study. 
Conceptual Model of DFR 
As a result of the previous considerations, a proposed framework of DFR is proposed including 
the demographic factor Organization Size measured through Number of Employees as a predictor of 
Extant DFR, distinct from the components extracted from the factor analysis. The model also depicts the 
fact that the Perceptual factors are yet to be statistically proven to be reflections of the latent construct 
Perceived DFR. The DFR framework developed in this study is represented by the following conceptual 
model: 
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Figure 10. Conceptual model of DFR 
 
The demographic, perceptual, and extant factors are explained in better detail in the following 
table: 
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Table 58. Definition of factors 
 
Demographic Factor 
 
 
Number of Employees 
This is the only demographic factor that showed some effect in the extant DFR and is a simple count 
of the number of employees in the organization. 
                  
 
Perceptual Factors 
 
                  
Perceived Organizational Commitment 
This factor represents the commitment of the managers and all personnel with the digital forensics 
program reflected in the knowledge of the personnel and the consistency of the DFR program with 
the corporate objectives and the employees’ privacy. 
                  
  
 
              
Summary of DFR Assessment 
This factor is a straightforward assessment of the general perception of DFR before and after the 
application of the survey. Although the pos-survey variable loaded higher in factor one, it also loads 
higher in this factor, where it is conceptually considered to belong. 
                  
  
 
              
Perceived Response Control 
This factor captures the ability of the organization to balance the benefits of the investigation with its 
costs, as perceived by their personnel. 
                  
                  
Perceived Burden 
This factor explores aspects that can be perceived as obstacles for the implementation of DFR 
measures, such as legal requirements, the location of the firm, and the costs associated to the DFR 
program. 
                  
  
 
              
Perceived Exposure 
This factor detects the organization’s personnel feelings of being exposed to attacks, for example, 
by disgruntled employees or for having a public profile or given the nature of the firm activities. 
                  
  
 
              
Perceived DFR Culture 
This factor assesses the perception that a culture exists in favor of preserving evidence and keeping 
up to date knowledge of DFR. 
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Extant Factors 
 
                  
Technological Capacity 
This extant factor evaluates the DFR capacities of the organization in terms of digital and physical 
infrastructure, systems, software, hardware, tools, training, monitoring, and qualified consultancy. 
                  
  
 
              
Incident & Evidence Expertise 
This factor explores the knowledge of the organization personnel about the sources and qualifiers of 
data; the identification, causes and consequences of incidents; the people involved and the incident; 
and the appropriate tools and techniques to investigate and manage potential evidence in order to 
demonstrate due diligence. 
                  
  
 
              
DFR Embeddedness 
This factor examines the extent to which the DFR program and practices are part of the corporate 
plans, processes, and systems, as well as customary in people’s behaviors. 
                  
  
 
              
Investigative Capacity 
This factor evaluates whether the organization has the infrastructure and specialized personnel to 
perform digital investigations. 
                  
  
 
              
Policing 
This factor assesses the completeness and adequacy of corporate policies regarding regulatory 
compliance, accessibility to network and resources, ownership of data, use of systems and tools, 
expectations of privacy, and incident management. 
                  
  
 
              
Active Control 
This factor evaluates the actions taken by the organization in order to control access to its systems 
and facilities, and the use of anti-forensic strategies and tools. 
                  
  
 
              
Backup Resourcing 
This factor examines the financial, physical and digital resources for the storage and analysis of 
data. 
                  
  
 
              
Wireless Accessibility 
This factor measures to what extent wireless access to the corporate resources is available. 
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Assumptions and Limitations 
The assessment of digital forensic readiness (DFR) has proven to be a complex endeavor. Many 
variables are involved and only the occurrence of an event can truly unveil the preparedness of an 
organization to collect, analyze, preserve and provide digital evidence about it. In addition, practical rather 
than theoretical literature is available for the exploration of this construct from a quantitative stand point. 
In response to these limitations, this study decided to obtain information about DFR indicators 
from what is assumed to be the most qualified source: the academic literature. It is assumed here that 
this literature represents what defines the construct in a comprehensive way. On the other hand, the 
collection of data from organizations assumed that IT professionals in those organizations are 
knowledgeable enough to represent the DFR characteristics of those organizations. 
Consequently, the Extant DFR proposed is assumed to be a comprehensive measure of DFR. On 
the other hand, given the limited availability of research exploring perceptual or behavioral aspects of 
DFR, some perceived factors should be seen with caution as more indicators are needed for their 
assessment. Still, the perceived organizational commitment and perceived DFR factors found here show 
good measures of reliability. 
There are also limitations in terms of the generalizability of this study. Because this is the first 
and, heretofore, only statistically supported framework of the DFR construct, it is difficult to provide solid 
assessments of nomological validity; rather new researchers will benefit from this study to make it a 
reference for the assessment of the validity of their own DFR proposals. More research must be done to 
validate the scales and framework proposed herein. Likewise, data from different geographic regions 
outside the United States should be collected in order to prove the appropriateness of the framework in 
other contexts. Moreover, in the current rapidly evolving technological environment, it is expected that 
some aspects of the framework will need to be adjusted to these changes.  
Contribution and Directions for Future Research 
This research has undertaken the assessment of DFR by reviewing all DFR-related literature that 
was found until 2015 and methodically distilling potential indicators of DFR in organizations. This process 
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has included a variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques for the classification and quantification of 
dimensions, factors and indicators, such as semantic analisis, Q-Sort tests, association rules, and 
exploratory factor analysis.  
The approach of the study has been inductive rather than deductive, thereby building theory 
rather than testing. However, the exercise of regressing the proposed composite perceived DFR on the 
proposed composite extant DFR produces a significant p value below 0.0005 with an adjusted R-Square 
of 0.746. The results are, then, encouraging, not only in terms of the assessment of DFR, but also in 
terms of the feasibility of developing a methodology to quantify a construct whose quantification has been 
elusive heretofore. 
In the process, several contributions have been provided to the discipline of digital forensics, to 
the field of information systems and to the social sciences, in general. The three most general of these 
contributions are: 
• Providing a practitioners’ framework for the assessment of DFR; 
• Providing the first quantitative approach to measure the DFR construct; 
• Proposing an innovative methodology for the structured assessment of unstructured problems, 
such as measuring DFR and other qualitatively-treated constructs. 
These contributions have complementary but distinct implications for practitioners and 
academics. 
Implications for Practice 
In first place, this study delivered a practitioner’s framework of DFR that allows professionals to 
focus, in a systematic way, on the aspects that are more relevant in the evaluation of DFR in 
organizations. The dimensions proposed refer to entities that must be easily recognized by practitioners 
of IT security and digital forensics. Likewise, the indicators represent actions and conditions associated to 
those entities in a straightforward fashion. 
The practitioner’s framework proposed in Table 10 has not been subjected to statistical validation. 
Therefore, some demographic variables later found not to be significant predictors of the Extant DFR 
remain in the framework. This was purposely done because these variables have support from the 
literature and should not be discarded in real assessments of DFR. Practitioners can, instead, accumulate 
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data on their real assessments in order to prove or disprove the relevance of such variables. Also, some 
indicators inferred to be negatively correlated to the Extant DFR variable, such as the culture of secrecy, 
the firm’s location, and the cost of the forensic program seem to be, instead, positively correlated to it. 
One possible cause of this lies in the wording of the question or the interpretation of the 
respondents in the final survey. Another, perhaps, more plausible cause, is that those external elements 
seen as particular disadvantages for a firm make it more proactive in implementing measures that 
strengthen its DFR posture. For example, keeping the DFR program secret from employees might not be 
good for DFR, while keeping it secret from external agents, could be. This will require the practitioner to 
be cautious in the inquiries and diligent in the interpretation of responses. 
The framework is not aimed to be a deterministic predictor of DFR but rather a structured tool 
through which DFR assessments can be compared and improved. Practitioners should use the 
framework as a guide to perform an organized assessment of DFR but be active in the interpretation of 
the results. 
Implications for Research 
The second outcome of this study offers a conceptual model separating what can be considered 
as a status of DFR from the perceptions reflecting that status. This model is more appropriate for 
academics and researchers, who would benefit from the statistically supported framework in order to 
advance in the investigation of the construct. More research is needed, especially in the assessment of 
the Perceptual DFR. Likewise, replication of the study can help confirm the consistency of the Extant DFR 
factors. Additionally, new trends and technologies, such as blockchain and the Internet of Things (IoT), 
which were not mentioned as potential indicators of DFR status, should be included in future explorations 
of the DFR construct. New research should work on the confirmatory power of the framework and its 
continuous refinement. 
Future research is expected to focus on the improvement of the scales of indicators for each 
factor and on each factor’s impact on the final status of DFR. The suggestion, then, is to find an 
alternative measure of DFR against which these factors could be compared. It is also recommended that 
specific indicators for those new factors are developed. New data should be collected to run a 
confirmatory analysis and, further, a structural equation model of this framework. Researchers should 
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also provide guidelines for practitioners along the lines of Capability Maturity Models where real or ideal 
organizations at different levels of DFR can be used as examples to compare and contrast the status of 
those ones under evaluation. 
As an additional contribution, this study has implemented innovative modifications to the 
application of the Q-Sort test and association rules algorithms that have demonstrated not only their 
usefulness, but the potential for new implementations of these techniques. Furthermore, this study 
provides an approach for the whole process of providing structure to an essentially unstructured problem, 
such as the assessment of DFR. This process can be summarized as the comprehensive review of the 
literature available on the construct, the identification of potential indicators, the classifications and 
refinement of those indicators, and the exploration of the latent factors explaining those variables and 
their relationships. Researchers in the social sciences are encouraged to use and test this approach to 
help building structured methodologies for the assessment of the plethora of elusive constructs in our 
disciplines. 
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Factor 
Re-
Classification 
Paper Name Year 
Awareness of unknown risks 
Factor 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Security policy Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Security organization Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Assets classification and control Factor 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Personnel security Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Physical and environmental security Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Communications and operations  Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Management Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Access control Factor 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Systems development and 
maintenance Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Business Continuity management Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Compliance Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 
17799 - 1 (BS 7799) 2000 
Having International Information 
Security Certification Factor VonSolms 2000 2000 
Cultivating an Information Security 
Culture Right Dimension VonSolms 2000 2000 
Implementing Metrics to 
Continuously and Dynamically 
Measure IS aspects Factor VonSolms 2000 2000 
Management of People Leaving the 
Company Factor VonSolms 2000 2000 
Electronic Device type Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Tools & Equipment Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Securing and Evaluating the Scene  Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Documenting the Scene  Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Evidence Collection Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Packaging, Transportation, and 
Storage Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Crime Category  Factor US DoS/NIJ 2001 2001 
Ability to collect evidence Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Cost of forensics Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Multitiered logging  Factor Tan 2001 2001 
How Logging is Done Factor Tan 2001 2001 
What is Logged Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Factor Tan 2001 2001 
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Forensic Acquisition Dimension Tan 2001 2001 
Evidence Handling Dimension Tan 2001 2001 
Centralized logging  Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Formatting data in a single format, 
such as syslog Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Logging time synchronization 
according to time-zones Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Accuracy of the time to which 
devices are synchronized Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Time-Stamping Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Permissions Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Trade-offs involved with IDS 
monitoring and reporting Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Liability vs. obligation in the retention 
of log data Factor Tan 2001 2001 
File System Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Integrity of NIDS log data Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Sitting of NIDS relative to an intruder Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Imaging and Backup Factor Tan 2001 2001 
Chain of custody Dimension Tan 2001 2001 
Transport and encryption Dimension Tan 2001 2001 
Physical storage & transport of 
evidence Dimension Tan 2001 2001 
Retaining Information.  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Do the organization copy and retain 
application and local user files?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Do the organization copy and retain 
computer and network activity logs?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Planning the response.  Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Does the organization have a 
forensic team?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Does the organization have an 
intrusion response procedure?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is there a formal investigative 
procedure?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Training.  Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is there training for the response 
team?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is there training for the investigative 
team?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is there training on DF for all 
personnel that use computers?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Accelerating the investigation.  Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is personal file encryption 
prohibited?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is disk scrubbing tools and file 
shredding software prohibited?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Are data indexes utilized?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is information fusion utilized?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Prevent anonymous activities.  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
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Is onion routing prevented or used?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Are date, time and user stamps in 
file required? Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is strong user authentication used? Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Are strong access control 
mechanisms used?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Protect the evidence. Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is there rigid control over access for 
systems housing potential evidence?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Are evidence files and connections 
encrypted?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Is there strong integrity checking 
technology?  Factor Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 2001 
Information States Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Security Services Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Security Countermeasures Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Time Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Education Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Training.  Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Literacy Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Awareness Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale 
& Welch 2001 2001 
Reliable unbiased methods to extract 
and analyze evidence Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 2002 
Standardization of procedures Factor Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 2002 
Self education on new forensic 
technologies Factor Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 2002 
Storage technology Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 2002 
Chain of custody Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 2002 
System, audit, application, and 
network management logs Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Network traffic capture Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Data regarding the state of the file 
system Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Centralization of loggins Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Physical access control logs or 
CCTV pictures Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Immediate physical work 
environment around the computer 
system Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Preserving Chain of evidence Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Record of user behavior within the 
boundaries of network application Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Interaction between network 
applications and the traffic they 
generate Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
151 
 
Documenting observations Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Links among timing of links, CCTV 
pictures, user identification logs, etc. Factor Ahmad 2002 2002 
Infrastructure digital and physical Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003 
Operations Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003 
Training Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003 
Equipment Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003 
Maintenance of the target 
environment Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 2003 
Event Log information Factor 
Chen, Clark, Devel & Mohay 
2003 2003 
Remoteness of crimes Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
Amount of data available to analyze Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
What is the nature of the incident? Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
How can we be sure that there even 
was an incident? Dimension Stephenson 2003 2003 
What was the entry point into the 
target system? Was there only one? Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
What would evidence of an attack 
look like? What are we looking for? Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
What legal issues need to be 
addressed (policies, privacy, 
subpoenas, warrants, etc.)? Dimension Stephenson 2003 2003 
Who was in a position to cause/allow 
the incident to occur? Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
What security measures were in 
place at the time of the incident? Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
What non-technical (business) 
issues impacted the success or 
failure of the attack? Dimension Stephenson 2003 2003 
Who knew what about the attack and 
when did they know it? (Stephenson 
2003) Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
Investigator background (Scientific 
vs. Practical) Factor Stephenson 2003 2003 
Technique - Whether the theory or 
technique can be and has been 
tested. Factor 
Stephenson 2003 / Daubert 
test 2003 
Technique - Whether it has been 
subjected to peer review and 
publication. Factor 
Stephenson 2003 / Daubert 
test 2003 
Technique - Its known potential rate 
of error & maintenance of controlling 
standards Factor 
Stephenson 2003 / Daubert 
test 2003 
Technique - The degree of 
acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community. Factor 
Stephenson 2003 / Daubert 
test 2003 
Logs from involved computers, 
detection systems, firewalls, etc. Dimension 
Stephenson 2003 / Daubert 
test 2003 
A. Identification  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
A1. Event/Crime Detection  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
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A2. Resolve Signature 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
A3. Profile Detection  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
A4. Anomalous Detection  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
A5. Complaints  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
A6. System  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
B. Preservation 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
B1. Case Management  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
B2. Imaging Technologies  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
B3. Chain of Custody  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
B4. Time Synchronization 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C. Collection 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C1. Preservation  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C2. Approved Methods 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C3. Approved Software  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C4.Approved Hardware  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C5. Legal Authority  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C6. Lossless Compression 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C7. Sampling  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C8. Data Reduction Recovery 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
C9. Recovery Techniques 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D. Examination 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D1. Preservation  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D2. Traceability  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D3. Validation Techniques 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D4. Filtering Techniques  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D5. Pattern Matching  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
D6. Hidden Data Discovery 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
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D7. Hidden Data Extraction 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E. Analysis 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E1. Preservation  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E2. Traceability  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E3. Statistical  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E4. Protocols  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E5. Data Mining  
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E6. Timeline  
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E7. Link 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
E8. Spatial 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F. Presentation   
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F1. Documentation 
Dimension 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F2. Expert Testimony 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F3. Clarification 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F4. Mission Impact Statement 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F5. Recommended Countermeasure 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
F6. Statistical Interpretation 
Factor 
DFRWS cited by Stephenson 
2003 2003 
Lack of awareness of tangible and 
intangible benefits Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Firm interest in prosecuting 
offenders Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Industry Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Confidence in the security systems Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Managers awareness and kowledge 
of security investigations Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Ability to recognize an incident Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Regulatory penalties for security 
incidents Factor Tan, Ruighaver & Ahmad 2003 2003 
Forensic toolkit (e-camera, gloves, 
etc.) and equipment, forms and 
supplies Factor Wolfe 2003 2003 
Documenting the chain of evidence Factor Wolfe 2003 2003 
Management Example and Support 
of security Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Codes of conduct and security 
policies Dimension Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Fiduciary, statutory or government 
regulations Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
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Impact of previous security events Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Budget Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Politically sensitive or public 
embarrassment type incident Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Threat of opportunist, criminal, 
competitor or disgruntled employee Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Chain of evidence Dimension Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
IDS, IPS, Network traffic and logs Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Internal forensics group or external 
Computer Emergency Response 
Team - CERT Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Laboratory and specialized hardware 
and software Dimension Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Audit that confirms good practices 
and tests the controls in place Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Defining a risk mode Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Following best practice security 
standards Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Implementing good security products Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Defining security policies and 
procedures Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Training IT staff and educating users Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Continually reviewing the security 
threats Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Knowing and monitoring the 
organization’s IT infrastructure Factor Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 2003 
Chain of custody Dimension 
Bradford, Brown, Perdue & 
Self 2004 2004 
Honey pots Factor 
Bradford, Brown, Perdue & 
Self 2004 2004 
Secrecy of proactive forensics 
system from users Factor 
Bradford, Brown, Perdue & 
Self 2004 2004 
Infrastructure Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2004 2004 
Preservation of physical and digital 
evidence Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2004 2004 
1. Awareness (that investigation is 
needed) Factor Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
2. Authorisation (Legal or 
Managerial) Factor Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
3. Planning  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
4. Notification  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
5. Search for and identify evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
6. Collection of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
7. Transport of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
8. Storage of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
9. Examination of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
10. Hypothesis  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
11. Presentation of hypothesis  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
12. Proof/Defense of hypothesis  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
13. Dissemination of information Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
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IDS Factor Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
Having external investigators Factor Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
Information flow and controls Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
Influence of external policies, 
regulation and legislation on the 
policies of the investigating 
organisation Factor Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
Link between external policies, 
regulation & legislation, and 
organisational policies to information 
controls Factor Ciardhuáin 2004 2004 
Cost Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
1. Where is data generated? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
2. What format is it in? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
3. For how long is it stored? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
4. How is data currently controlled, 
secured and managed?  Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
5. Who has access to the data?  Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
6. How much data is produced? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
7. Is it archived? If so where and for 
how long? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
8. How much is reviewed? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
9. What additional evidence sources 
could be enabled? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
10. Who is responsible for this data? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
11. Who is the formal owner of the 
data? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
12. How could data be made 
available to an investigation? Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
To what business processes does 
data relate?  Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Does data contain personal 
information? Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Definition of business scenarios 
requiring digital evidence Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Identification of sources and types of 
potential evidence Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Identification of evidence collection 
requirements Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Capability for securely gathering 
legally admissible evidence  Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Establishment of policies for secure 
storage and handling of potential 
evidence Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Monitoring of incidents detection and 
deterrence systems Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Specify when escalation to formal 
investigation must be launched Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Train personnel in incident 
awareness, roles and legal aspects 
of digital evidence process Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Document incident-based case for 
the incident and its impact Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
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Ensure legal review to facilitate 
action in response to incident Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Keeping business continuity (w/o 
interruption) Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Benefit/cost proportionality  Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Potential crimes and disputes  Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Legality of collection process Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Evidence collection requirements Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Retention of information Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Planning of the response Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Training Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Acceleration of the investigation Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Prevention of anonymous activities Factor Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Legal Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Technical Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Non-technical Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Personnel and external 
organizations Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Understanding possible evidence 
sources, how to gather evidence 
legally and cost-effectively, when to 
escalate into a formal investigation, 
and how to put together a case 
involving law enforcement agencies. Dimension Rowlingson 2004 2004 
Need for privacy Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Maturity of information security 
posture Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Legal requirements and constraints 
on collection and preservation of 
potential digital evidence Dimension Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
A method for analyzing the 
organizations’ need for digital 
evidence Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Identification and classification of 
potential digital evidence sources Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Enumeration of technologies and 
processes for utilizing these sources Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Guidelines for preserving digital 
evidence, processes, procedures, 
and suggestions to use technologies Dimension Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Guidance on when and how to report 
incidents Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Organization’s crime and dispute 
history Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
The different crimes and disputes the 
organization is likely to be exposed 
to Factor Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Assets and customers Dimension Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 2004 
Management support Factor Wolfe 2004 2004 
Forensic policies Dimension Wolfe 2004 2004 
Validity of capture process Factor Wolfe 2004 2004 
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Chain of evidence Dimension Wolfe 2004 2004 
Computing knowledge of 
investigators Factor Wolfe 2004 2004 
Teaching System Administrators and 
Incident Handlers how to respond to 
an incident Factor Casey 2005 2005 
Training individuals who deal with 
network intrusions as both Incident 
Handlers and Forensic Examiners. Factor Casey 2005 2005 
Identify the firm's most valuable 
digital assets Factor Casey 2005 2005 
Develop a strategy to prepare the 
underlying systems from a forensic 
viewpoint Dimension Casey 2005 2005 
Internal monitoring of network 
activities Factor Casey 2005 2005 
Case management and incident 
tracking Dimension Casey 2005 2005 
Amount of information that Incident 
Handlers preserve on compromised 
systems Factor Casey 2005 2005 
Communicating information to law 
enforcement, ISPs, and other third 
parties  Factor Casey 2005 2005 
Developing reputation of tracking 
back intruders Factor Casey 2005 2005 
DF accreditation of staff Factor Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Laboratory accreditation and auditing Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Follow regulations Factor Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
A quality assurance system that 
covers quality policies, activities, 
procedures, documentation, and 
management. Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Procedures to control the quality of 
documents Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Accreditation of outsourcing 
laboratories Factor Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Monitoring of the forensics process Factor Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Archive Management Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 2005 
Forensic knowledge of IT 
management Dimension Quinn 2005 2005 
Policies and procedures Dimension Quinn 2005 2005 
Training of IT staff Factor Quinn 2005 2005 
Assess risk considering 
vulnerabilities, threats, 
loss/exposure, etc.; Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Develop an information retention 
plan (both pre/post-incident); Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Develop an Incident Response Plan, 
including policies, procedures, 
personnel assignments, technical 
requirements Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Develop technical capabilities (e.g. Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
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response toolkits); 
Train personnel;  Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Prepare host and network devices; Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Develop evidence preservation and 
handling procedures; and Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Develop legal activities coordination 
plan (both pre/post-incident) Factor Beebe & Clark 2005 2005 
Timely short investigation process Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
1. Find useable evidence 
immediately; Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
2. Identify victims at acute risk; Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
3. Guide the ongoing investigation; Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
4. Identify potential charges; Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
5. Accurately assess the offender’s 
danger to society Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Does the warrant allow for the 
seizure and removal of the 
system(s)? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Is there sufficient particularity in the 
warrant and application for the 
warrant that allows for an onsite or in 
situ examination? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Are there any 4th Amendment issues 
that need to be addressed? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
What are the reporting obligations to 
the issuing magistrate or judge?  Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Are there particular discovery issues 
present or anticipated? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Conducting an onsite examination 
affects the integrity of the original 
evidence? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
The type of case? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
How critical is the time factor? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
What are the skills and abilities of 
the computer forensic examiners? Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
What type of technology is involved 
(standalone systems, complex 
networks etc.)? Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Can the scene be safely and 
effectively controlled? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Can the systems in question be 
powered off or must they remain 
“live”? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
What is the technical skill and 
knowledge level of the suspect? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Do the computer forensic examiners 
have the proper equipment for onsite 
examinations? Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Maintaining the integrity of digital Dimension Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 2006 
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evidence Wedge & Debrota 2006 
Maintaining the chain of custody of 
evidence Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Complying with rules of evidence for 
admissibility at the Federal and State 
levels Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Planning and pre-raid intelligence Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Multiple physical and virtual 
locations, wired and wireless 
networks, and OS Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Triaging the investigation (Rank in 
terms of importance or priority) Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Toolkit (with hardware write blocker) Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Profiling use/users/suspects (Home 
directory, File properties, Registry) Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Define temporal value of evidence 
(MAC times, cookies, cache and the 
index.dat file) Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Evaluate type of Internet activities 
(Cookies, Temps, URLs, Email, IM) Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Focus on case specific evidence Factor 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, 
Wedge & Debrota 2006 2006 
Resistance through Firewalls Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Resistance through User 
authentication Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Resistance through Diversification Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Recognition through IDS Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Recognition through Internal Integrity 
Checks Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Recovery through Incident response Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Recovery through Replication Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Recovery through Backup systems Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Recovery through Fault tolerant 
designs Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Redress through computer forensics Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Redress by pursuing accountability 
for intruder behavior in the legal 
system Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Redress through active defense Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2006 2006 
Policies including contacting law 
enforcement, performing monitoring, 
and 
conducting regular reviews of 
forensic policies and procedures Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Procedures and guidelines for 
performing forensic tasks,based on Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
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the organization’s policies and all 
applicable laws and regulations 
Policies and procedures supporting 
reasonable and appropriate use of 
forensic tools Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Legal advisors review of forensic 
policy and high-level procedures Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
IT professionals prepared to 
participate in forensic activities Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Interactions between forensic staff 
and other teams Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Separation of policy for incident 
handlers and others with forensic 
roles Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Policies on roles and responsibilities 
of all people and external 
organizations Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
The policy should discuss 
jurisdictional conflicts Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Providing Guidance for Forensic 
Tool Use Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Sensitive information safeguards and 
handling of inadvertent exposures Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Performing regular backups of 
systems and maintaining previous 
backups for a specific period of time Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Enabling auditing on workstations, 
servers, and network devices Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Forwarding audit records to secure 
centralized log servers Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Configuring mission-critical 
applications to perform auditing, 
including recording all authentication 
attempts Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Maintaining a DB of file hashes for 
the files of common OS and 
application deployments, and using 
file integrity checking software on 
important assets  Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Maintaining records (e.g., baselines) 
of network and system 
configurations  Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Establishing data retention policies 
for historical reviews of system and 
network activity Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Comply with requirements to 
preserve data on ongoing litigation 
and investigations Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Destroying data that is no longer 
needed Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Procedures for performing routine 
tasks (e.g. imaging a hard disk, 
capturing and recording volatile 
information from systems, or 
securing physical evidence Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Demonstrate conclusively the Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 2006 
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authenticity, credibility, and reliability 
of electronic records 
Dang 2006 
Capability to perform computer and 
network forensics Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Incident handling teams should have 
robust forensic capabilities Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Incorporating forensic considerations 
into the information system life cycle Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Centralized logging  Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Security monitoring controls (e.g. 
IDS, antivirus software, and spyware 
detection and removal utilities) Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Monitoring of user behavior, such as 
keystroke monitoring Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Developing a plan to acquire the 
data, acquiring the data, and 
verifying the integrity of the acquired 
data.   Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Detailed log and documentation of 
every step of data collection, 
including information about tools 
used Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Audience Consideration Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Consistency of processes Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Awareness of data sources Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Proactive collection of data Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Procedure for collecting volatile data Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Attacker Identification Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
1. What are the potential sources of 
data?  Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
2. Of the potential sources of data, 
which are the most likely to contain 
helpful information and why?  Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
3. Which data source would be 
checked first and why?  Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
4. Which forensic tools and 
techniques would most likely be 
used?  Which other tools and 
techniques might also be used?  Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
5. Which groups and individuals 
within the organization would 
probably be involved in the forensic 
activities?  Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
6. What communications with 
external parties might occur, if any?  Dimension 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
7. From a forensic standpoint, what 
would be done differently if the 
scenario had occurred on a different 
day or at a different time (regular Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
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hours versus off-hours)?  
8. From a forensic standpoint, what 
would be done differently if the 
scenario had occurred at a different 
physical location (onsite versus 
offsite)? Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
The existence of a toolkit Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
The existence of a response team Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Clear weighed criteria on whether 
turning off a hacked device Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Clear weighed criteria on volatility 
orders to collect evidence in each 
case Factor 
Kent, Chevalier, Grance & 
Dang 2006 2006 
Information Management Team 
including experts in computer 
forensics, law, information 
management, information 
technology, and auditing Dimension Luoma 2006 2006 
Electronic document retention and 
deletion policy Dimension Luoma 2006 2006 
Fexibility to implement litigation 
holds by suspending routine 
document deletion when litigation is 
imminent Factor Luoma 2006 2006 
Determination of what documents 
should be retained and when they 
should be destroyed Factor Luoma 2006 2006 
Management support for the forensic 
team Factor Luoma 2006 2006 
Information Management Director 
distinct from the Information 
Systems/Technology Director Factor Luoma 2006 2006 
Employees knowledge on 
information management and 
awareness of policies Dimension Luoma 2006 2006 
Regular information management 
audit Factor Luoma 2006 2006 
Determining sources of electronic 
data being used by the 
organization’s employees Factor Luoma 2006 2006 
Information Security Governance 
thorugh top management 
commitment Factor VonSolms 2006 2006 
Information Security Governance 
thorugh organizational structures Factor VonSolms 2006 2006 
Information Security Governance 
thorugh user awareness and 
commitment Factor VonSolms 2006 2006 
Information Security Governance 
thorugh technology, policies, 
procedures and enforcement Factor VonSolms 2006 2006 
Planning Information Retention 
Requirements Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
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Define the business scenarios that 
require digital evidence Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Identify available sources and 
different types of potential evidence Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Determine the evidence collection 
requirement Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Establish policy for secure storage 
and handling of potential evidence Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Establish a capability for securely 
gathering legally admissible 
evidence to meet the requirement Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Synchronize all relevant devices and 
systems Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Gather potential evidence Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Prevent anonymous activities Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Planning the response.  Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Ensure monitoring is targeted to 
detect and deter major incidents Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Implement IDS Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Specify circumstances when 
escalation to a full formal 
investigation should be launched Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Establish a Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Establish capabilities and response 
times for external digital forensic 
investigation professionals Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Digital Forensic Training Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Train staff in incident awareness to 
understand roles and sensitivity of 
evidence Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Develop an in-house investigative 
capability if required Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Enhance capability for evidence 
retrieval Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Accelerating the DF investigation.  Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Document and validate an 
investigation protocol against best 
practice Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Acquire appropriate DF tools and 
systems Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Ensure legal review to facilitate 
action in response to the incident Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Define responsibilities and authority 
for CERT and investigative teams Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Define circumstances for engaging 
professional investigative services Factor 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky 
& Grobler 2006 2006 
Speed of reaction Factor Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
Review of previous incidents Factor Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
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Incident response team Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
Organisational policies and 
procedures Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
Pre-emptive systems in place Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
Corporate governance material 
converted into a Forensic Readiness 
Policy Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
Legal context Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 2007 
Management conviction of the 
importance of DFR Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Good corporate governance, 
specifically IS governance Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
To enrich / augment the security 
program of the organization so 
adequate evidence, processes and 
procedures are in place to determine 
the source of an attack Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Use of DF tools Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
To prevent the use of anti-forensic 
strategies for example data 
destruction or manipulation and data 
hiding Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
IS and DF awareness training Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
IS and DF policies Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Identifying all the business scenarios 
that will require digital evidence Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Determine the vulnerabilities and 
threats and what evidence will be 
required to determine the rootcause 
of the event Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Determine what information is 
required for evidence (the format and 
exactly what is required) Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Determine how to legally capture 
and preserve the evidence 
considering privacy Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Ensure that monitoring is targeted to 
detect and deter incidents; Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Augment the IRP to specify when to 
escalate to a full investigation; Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Define the first response guidelines 
to the Incident response plan to 
preserve evidence Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Determine when and how to activate 
Disaster recovery plan (DRP) and 
Business Continuity plan (BCP) Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Establish an organizational structure 
with roles and responsibilities to deal 
with DF in the organization with 
segregation of DF and IS teams 
duties Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Establish a digital evidence 
management program Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Incorporate DF techniques in the IS Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
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auditing procedures 
Access controls should be reviewed 
to prevent anonymous activities; Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Establish a capability to securely 
gather admissible evidence by 
considering technology and human 
capacity Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Use DF tools and processes to 
demonstrate good corporate 
governance Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Use DF tools for non-forensic 
purposes to enhance the ISA, for 
example data recovery if a hard disk 
crashes Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Developing a preservation culture in 
the organization to preserve all 
processes and activities should an 
investigation arise;  Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Design all security controls to 
prevent any anti-forensic activities 
(No password crackers, key-loggers, 
steganography software etc.) Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Monitoring and controlling removable 
/ portable devices Factor Grobler & Louwrens 2007 2007 
Accepting an expanded role for 
systems and network administrators Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Understanding of how legal 
requirements for admissible 
evidence can be translated into 
information system requirements Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Embedding forensic capabilities in 
networks Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Ability to repel attacks using tools 
such as Firewalls, User 
authentication, and Diversification. Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Ability to detect an attack or a probe 
using IDS, and Internal integrity 
checks. Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Ability to provide essential services 
during attack and restore services 
using Incident response, Replication, 
Backup systems, and Fault tolerant 
design. Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Ability to hold intruders accountable 
in a court of law and to retaliate 
using Forensics (the who), legal 
remedies and active defense. Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
The identification of relevant target 
assets. Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
The test and calibration of the 
collection devices and their 
frequency of calibration Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Including DF into the ISDLC Factor 
Endicott-Popovsky, Frincke & 
Taylor 2007 2007 
Identification of assets of value Factor 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
166 
 
Performance of risk assessment for 
potential losses and threats Factor 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
Removal of assets that do not 
warrant the effort of prosecution Factor 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
Identification of associated data 
linked to valuable assets  Factor 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
Identification of collection and 
storage needs for data Factor 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
Establishment of policies in terms of 
digital assets, forensic events, data 
collection and storage Dimension 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
Forensics policy enforcement  Factor 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & 
Frincke 2007 2007 
Is the evidence based on a testable 
theory or technique? Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
In the case of a particular technique, 
does it have a known or potential 
error rate? Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Does the technique have and 
maintain standards controlling its 
operation? Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Is the underlying science generally 
accepted within the relevant 
scientific community? Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Has the theory or technique been 
subjected to peer review? Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Lack of Standards within the 
Discipline Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Storage capacity Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
File and operating systems Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Online storage Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Storage visualization abilities Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Decryption ability Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Small and easy to hide storage 
devices Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Volatility Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
A triage process model of analysis 
and interpretation of digital evidence Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Ability to recreate the investigated 
environment Factor 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Multidisciplinary approach (Law, IT, 
Enforcement, Business) Dimension 
Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 
2008 2008 
Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs)  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Digital investigation procedures  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Sharing of logs across institutional 
boundaries Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Interaction with law enforcement  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
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Interaction with the media Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Independent Center for Incident 
Management (ICIM) Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Collectively define access policies Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Role based access control with the 
least privilege principle in mind Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Establish adequate levels of trust 
between the involved institutions and 
personnel Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Managing all the tasks and 
processes in the response and 
investigation processes  Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Analysis of logs and alerts gathered 
by IDSs, server logs, and network 
logs Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Roles and Responsibilities Model Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Process Model defining the phases 
of the response and investigation 
process Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Strong two-factor authentication Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Secured network perimeter around 
the servers of a centralized 
workspace Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Plethora of useful tools (IDS, 
Centralized logging) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Distinguish between site roles and 
collaboration roles Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Site Technical Roles (Lead, Incident 
Investigator, Digital Forensics 
Specialist, Security/System 
Administrator, Security/System 
Architect) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Collaboration Technical Roles (Lead, 
Incident Investigator, Digital 
Forensics Specialist, Workspace 
Administrator) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Site Legal Roles (Legal Adviser, 
Liason with Law Enforcement) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Law Enforcement Roles (Prosecutor, 
Investigator, Executive, Media 
Liason) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Preparation of security system 
architecture documentation Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Train staff on latest threats and 
software tools Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Follow recommended practices to 
prevent incidents Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Deploy intrusion detection and 
forensics data collection capabilities Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Develop incident response policies, Dimension Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 2009 
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procedures and legal coordination 
plan 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 
Establish and maintain a 
collaborative workspace hosting 
environment Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Develop/deploy collaborative tools, 
policies and procedures Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Chain of custody  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Identify the lessons that can be 
learned from the handling of the 
incident Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Wizards in the workspace 
environment  Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs) Factor 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, 
Freemon, Welch & Butler 2009 2009 
Multi-user systems Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Digital signatures  Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Encryption standards Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Anti virus software environments and 
filtering firewalls Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Authorization and authentication 
credentials Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
ID Management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Information Security Awareness Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Information Security Management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Legal & Regulatory Compliance Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Network Security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Perimeter Security Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Physical Security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Privacy Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Risk Management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Software Security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Standardization, configuration 
management Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
PKI implementation Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Endpoint security Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Managed cybersecurity provider Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Two-factor authentication Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Employee misuse Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Intrusion detection systems Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Patch management Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Wireless infrastructure security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Internal network security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Access control Factor Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Management involvement, risk 
management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
User education, training and 
awareness Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
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Policy & regulatory compliance 
(Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA) Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
Data protection Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 2009 
An overall forensic policy  Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Technical readiness procedures and 
processes Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Non-technical readiness procedures 
and processes Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Monitoring and auditing  Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Hardware and software configured 
properly Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Education of forensic team members 
and appropriate certifications Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Multi-disciplinary team  Factor Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Architecture Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Alignment of privacy policy with 
business policies Factor Reddy & Venter 2009 2009 
Virtualization Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Size of storage Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Variety of storage device Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
OS and File formats Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Cost of tools Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Pervasive encryption Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Cloudification Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Legal limitations Dimension Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Mobile computing Dimension Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Training Dimension Garfinkel 2010 2010 
International laws Dimension Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Functionality of DF tools Dimension Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Lack of standardization and 
automation in DF processes Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Poor transfer of academic research 
to practice Factor Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Collaboration Dimension Garfinkel 2010 2010 
Strategy Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Compliance & Monitoring Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Policy & Procedures Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Technology  Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Digital Forensic Response Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Perception of high cost of forensics Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Lack of forensic skills Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Organization size Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
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Industry sector Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Available funding Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Number of employees Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Employees accessibility to financial 
instruments Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Staff IT skills Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Public profile condition  Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Proper legal authority to conduct the 
search and examination Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Chain of custody is kept for the 
evidence Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Using forensic tools that have been 
validated Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
The use of imaging and hashing 
functions to acquire evidence Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Quality assurance to ensure that the 
examination and analysis Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
ICT systems configuration Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Policy, people and process 
adaptation to DF Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Updating the organisation’s policies 
and procedures  Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Improvements in training of 
employees  Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
The systematic gathering of potential 
digital evidence  Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
The secure storage of potential 
digital evidence  Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Preparation for events requiring 
digital forensic intervention Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Enhanced capability for evidence 
retrieval  Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Legal advice  Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Developing of an in-house digital 
forensics examination and analysis 
capacity Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Identifying and understanding 
retention records legislation Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Determining which scenarios could 
potentially require digital evidence   Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Identifying the available sources and 
different types of digital evidence Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Identifying policies needed to ensure 
DFR and legality of the DFR 
practices Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Identify the technological and human 
resources needed for DFR Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Ensure sufficient funding the set up 
and maintain the DFR program Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
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A policy for the acceptable use of 
information systems resources by 
members of the organization Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy clarifying organization 
ownership of information systems 
resources and data w/o expectation 
of privacy or ownership by 
employees, plus consent of 
monitoring Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy about information systems 
monitoring Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy which states what 
information and under what 
circumstances is preserved Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy which states the periods of 
time and categories of digital 
evidence retention, as well as the 
storage and secure handling thereof   Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy which states the 
circumstance when internal 
investigations can be initiated and 
the actions that may be taken Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy which states the manner 
and circumstances of evidence 
release to external parties Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy for the roles and 
responsibilities of parties involved in 
preserving, maintaining and 
examining evidence Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
A policy which stipulate a legal 
review process for any digital 
forensic investigation or incident Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Logs Factor 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Computers and Servers Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Acquisition and Analysis technology Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Evidence Storage technology Dimension 
Barske, Stander & Jordaan 
2010 2010 
Interdisciplinary formal programs to 
educate professionals Dimension 
Duranti & Endicott-Popovsky 
2010 2010 
Infrastructure preparedness Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of evidence 
management plan (EMP) Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of evidence map Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of evidence 
management policies Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of procedures to 
manage CDE Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Existance of risk mitigation plans 
including evidence and process 
requirements Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Application of an algorithm to Factor Grobler, Louwrens & Von 2010 
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calculate completeness and 
admissibility of the evidence 
Solms 2010 
Implementation of an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Definition of trigger events for 
investigations Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Preparation for containments of 
incidents to include containment on 
live systems Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of a DF awareness 
program Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of a DF training 
program Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Development of a management 
capability for DF investigators and 
CERT Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Documentation and validation of a 
DF investigation (DFI) protocol 
against best practice Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Effectiveness of controls against IT 
and IS objectives Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Use of IT tools Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Controls for the responsible use of 
DF tools Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Existence of Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Minimization of business interruption Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Effectiveness of controls Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
IT & IS Objectives vs business 
objectives Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Efficiency Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Responsible use of DF tools Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Specific requirements per country, 
jurisdiction, and industry for 
admissible evidence Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Ability to prove compliance Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Active DF capabilities in live system 
environments Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Pre-defined trigger event or 
procedures to start active monitoring Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Soundness of processes Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Education level of investigators and 
staff Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Availability of acceptable tools and 
technologies Factor 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 2010 
Establishment of policies and 
procedures Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
Legal Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
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Policies Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
Governance Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
People Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
Process Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
Technology Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von 
Solms 2010 (2) 2010 
The digital media in question Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Implemented processes and 
methodologies Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Legal aspects Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
The individuals involved in the 
investigation Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Do not use the intranet for policies 
regarding the handling of digital 
evidence Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Have a centralized co-ordination 
point so staff members are clear on 
who should be contacted Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Use an external company to perform 
forensic analysis but have internal 
‘triaging’ capabilities Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Business aspects Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Social aspects  Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Technical aspects Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Legal apects e.g. admissibility and 
jurisdiction Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Recognition of the range of 
personnel within the firm who can be 
involved in a legal inquiry Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Unreasonable expectations of 
security policy understanding from 
staff Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Automated tools reducing 
dependence on humans Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Too many staff knowing too much 
detailed security informationFirst 
responder preparation Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Security training Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
First response errors Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Firm's reputation Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Organizational culture Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
DF budget Factor Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 2010 
Wireless access Factor Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 2010 
Monitoring Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 2010 
Logging Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 2010 
Preservation Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 2010 
Analysis Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 2010 
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Report Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 2010 
Cloud computing Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Hegarty 2010 2010 
Jurisdictional difficulties Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Hegarty 2010 2010 
Encryption Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Hegarty 2010 2010 
Response time Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Hegarty 2010 2010 
Availability of an audit trail Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Hegarty 2010 2010 
Previous success in recovering from 
incidents Factor 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Resourcing of the incident response 
capability Dimension 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Availability and application of 
technical expertise Dimension 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Support from senior management Factor 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Lack of effective learning from 
incident response Factor 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Organizational willingness to update 
organizational memory Factor 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Organizational skill in creating, 
acquiring and transfering knowledge Dimension 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Encouraging both formal, informal 
and double-loop learning Factor 
Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 
2010 2010 
Enterprise objectives reflected in the 
security policies Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Develop and implement a risk-based 
IS audit strategy Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Plan audits to ensure that IT and 
business systems are protected and 
controlled Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Conduct audits in accordance with IS 
audit standards, guidelines and best 
practices Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Communicate emerging issues, 
potential risks and audit results to 
key stakeholders Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Advise on the implementation of risk 
management and control practices Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Use of cryptographic hashes for 
dead forensics Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Ability to distinguish malicious from 
benign activities Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Requirement of timeliness of serving 
electronic documents in court Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Due diligence and the ability to 
demonstrate this Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
A dedicated role relating to security 
and forensics Factor Pangalos & Ketos 2010 2010 
Keeping business continuity (w/o 
interruption) Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Benefit/cost proportionality  Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
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Corporate security policies Dimension 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Revisit the risk analysis paradigm Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Law framework Dimension 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Security policy Dimension 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
The scene, the requirements, the 
methodology and tools used, the 
results and reports Dimension 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Retained records accessibility Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Electronic version should accurately 
represent the original format Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Meta-data such as author and date 
should be retained with the record Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Adapt current Information Security 
Best Practices to include aspects of 
Digital Forensic Readiness Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Support of Good Information 
Security Governance Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Integration of Forensics and Audit 
practice Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Ability to hold intruders accountable 
in a court of law and the ability to 
retaliate Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Processes related to data backup 
and recovery Dimension 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Establish new roles for Forensics Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Full responsibility and accountability 
from management Factor 
Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 
2010 2010 
Existence of gaps in the SMTP send-
receiver pair Factor VanStaden & Venter 2010 2010 
Risk profile of the individual user Factor Serra & Venter 2011 2011 
Adoption of a probe based security 
monitoring on electronic 
communications Factor VanStaden & Venter 2011 2011 
Remote web access Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Lamb 2011 2011 
Virtualised platform or resource Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Lamb 2011 2011 
Independence from hardware and 
OS profiles Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Lamb 2011 2011 
Physical access to the relevant 
server computer Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Lamb 2011 2011 
Encryption Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Lamb 2011 2011 
Lack of standardisation and cross-
platform development Factor 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & 
Lamb 2011 2011 
To gather admissible evidence 
legally and without interfering with 
business  processes;  Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
To gather evidence targeting the 
potential crimes and disputes that Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
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may adversely impact an 
organization; 
To allow an investigation to proceed 
at a cost in proportion to the incident;  Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
To minimize interruption to the 
business from any investigation; Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
To ensure that evidence makes a 
positive impact on the outcome of 
any legal action. Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
1. Scenario definition  Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
2. Identification of possible sources 
of evidence Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
3. Defining procedures for pre-
incident collection, storage and 
manipulation with data representing 
possible evidence Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
4. Defining procedures for pre-
incident analyses of  data 
representing possible evidence Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
5. Defining procedures for incident Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
6. Defining procedures for post-
incident collection, storage and 
manipulation with data representing 
possible evidence Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
7. Defining procedures for post-
incident analyses of data 
representing possible evidence Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
8. Defining PKI system architecture Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
9. Implementing defined procedures 
and PKI system architecture Dimension Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
10. Assessment of digital forensic 
readiness implementation Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
There should exist separate log files 
relating to access (log-in, access to 
all files) Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
There should exist separate user life-
cycle related log Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
There should exist separate PKI 
services-related logs Factor Valjarevic & Venter 2011 2011 
Lack of technical forensics 
standardization both in the industry 
and academia Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Complexity of the information 
security legal background Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Differences in jurisdictions Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Specifying what needs to be 
preserved and for which set of 
events Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Identifying techniques and 
methodologies Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Organizational policy which will 
consider the preventative side of 
security Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Digital evidence (DE) identification. Factor Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011 
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2011 
Risk Assessment by classifying DE 
exposure and correlating with 
threats. Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Control to DE access and 
maintenance of a digital chain of 
custody (DCOC). Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Statistical representation of the DE 
by establishing a Bayesian network; 
it will calculate the relationship 
between cost and benefit factors of 
each measure. Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
The events that will escalate an 
event into a full forensic 
investigation; the policy should 
specifically correlate events with the 
established Bayesian network. Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Evidence Management Plan 
development Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Single point of contact (SPOC) 
establishment with legal authorities. Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Digital forensic investigation (DFI) 
model choice - the procedure to be 
followed after an incident occurs. Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Technical infrastructure standards. 
Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Staff training procedures on the 
policy’s contents Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 
2011 2011 
Time period required to perform a 
digital forensic investigation. Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Cost involved in performing a digital 
forensic investigation. Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Ability to collect the evidence without 
disrupting the environment. Dimension Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Acknowledgement packet protocol Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Assuring no alteration of intercepted 
communications Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Ability to capture all types of 
communication Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Authenticity and integrity of data 
packets in capture and store Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Verifiability of authenticity and 
integrity of data packets Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Data packets should have a 
timestamp Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Representativity of the sequence of 
the packets Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Implementation of forensic readiness 
that does not affect current network 
operation, architecture, transmission 
frequencies, consumption power, 
overhead or sensitivity. Factor Mouton & Venter 2011 2011 
Automated live collection of a pre-
defined data in the order of volatility 
and priority, and related to a specific Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
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requirement of an organization 
Event Triggering Function Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
Automated preservation of the 
evidence related to the suspicious 
event, via hashing Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
Automated live analysis of the 
evidence Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
Use forensics techniques such as 
data mining to support initial 
hypothesis of incident Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
Automated report for the proactive 
component Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
Techniques and automated tools to 
investigate antiforensics methods Factor 
Alharbi, Weber-Jahnke & 
Traore 2011 2011 
Privacy Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 2011 
Jurisdiction Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 2011 
Cloud storage Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 2011 
Legal procedure Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 2011 
A block-to-last-chunk name mapping 
in the cloud Factor Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 2011 
Persistent storage of chunk location 
and metadata in a master server Factor Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 2011 
Weighing costs against risks for 
implementing DFR Factor Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
Number and amount of activities 
required for digital forensics Factor Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
Return on security investment 
(ROSI)  Factor Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
Organisational resources 
coordination Dimension Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
Organization's high level 
determination Factor Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
Development of IT infrastructure Dimension Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
IT security and DF programmes 
maturity Dimension Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 2012 
Legal requirements Dimension Leigh 2012 2012 
IT systems in use. Dimension Leigh 2012 2012 
Where data is stored. Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
Back-up procedures. Dimension Leigh 2012 2012 
Electronic document retention and 
archiving policies. Dimension Leigh 2012 2012 
The number of documents likely to 
be located Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
Tracing custody of individual's 
devices for upgrades, people's 
change of office or role. Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
Asset registry for items of electronic 
equipment that could record 
information Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
Employment law or privacy issues Dimension Leigh 2012 2012 
Training staff in awareness and 
incident behavior Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
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Centralization of data Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
Storage in personal devices Factor Leigh 2012 2012 
Determine crimes and disputes the 
organization is exposed to Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Underestimate the demands that the 
legal system makes for ensuring 
admissibility and reliability of digital 
evidence Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Underestimate how often they may 
need to produce reliable evidence Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Identify potential evidence based on 
a risk analysis combined with a 
cost/benefit approach Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Maturity of information security 
posture Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Information security auditors' 
assessment Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Likely threats Dimension Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Sorts of evidence it is likely to need 
in a civil litigation or criminal 
proceeding Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
How to secure data Dimension Hamidovic 2012 2012 
The amount and quality of evidence 
already collected Factor Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Legal problems (e.g. admissibility, 
data protection, human rights, limits 
to surveillance, obligations to staff 
members and others, and disclosure 
in legal proceedings) Dimension Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Management, skill, and resource 
implications and developed an action 
plan Dimension Hamidovic 2012 2012 
Information retention Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Response planning Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Training Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Investigation acceleration Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Anonymous activities prevention Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Evidence protection Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
People Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Process Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Policy Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Technology Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Computer Incident response Team 
(CIRT) information and skills 
management Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Security awareness Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Planning of incident response Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Development of investigation 
methodology Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Definition of organizational 
requirements Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
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Definition of legal requirements Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Existance of reactive and proactive 
tools Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Security/forensic orientation of 
network design Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Modern storage devices own volition 
in the absence of computer 
instructions Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Hashing tool for authentication of 
collected data in dead forensics Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Tool for authentication of collected 
data in live  forensics Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Forensic blurriness affecting fidelity 
and quantity of evidence acquired in 
live forensics Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Storage technology Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Rising surge of anti-forensic tools Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Mature technical environment Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Policies & Procedures Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Incident Management Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Response Team Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Securing the evidence without 
contaminating it Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Acquiring the evidence without 
altering or damaging the original Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Authenticating that the recovered 
evidence is the same as the original 
seized data Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Analysing the data without modifying 
it Factor Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 2012 
Management commitment and 
leadership to secure information 
systems Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
The adoption of standards for 
information security Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
User awareness of the issues, 
threats and best practices in 
information security Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
The implementation of policies, 
processes and procedures to secure 
the information system Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Adequate technology to secure the 
information system Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Compliance with regulatory 
requirements according to 
information security information Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Establishment of a dashboard of 
measurement and control of the 
security information Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Risk analysis Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Measure maturity of repositories of 
information Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
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Security indicators Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Check security through audits Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Penetration tests Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Security benchmark Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Security of premises Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Architecture and Systems Security Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Application security Factor 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Development of action plans Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi 
& Regragui 2012 2012 
Cloud service’s systems functionality Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Records management including the 
cloud Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Information governance and 
assurance (confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authentication and non-
repudiation) Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Appraisal strategies Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Retention schedules Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Disposition plans Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Assuring the records posses content, 
context and structure Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Assuring records authenticity, 
reliability, integrity and usability Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Identify where to look in the system Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Identify how to store and for how 
long Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Data retrieval mechanism Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Tamper-proof mechanism Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Create evidence Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Capture evidence Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Organize evidence Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Pluralize evidence Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Assessing evidence for evidential 
weight Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Curation of evidence movement 
through time Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Patterns of physical traces and 
imprints (logs, audits) Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
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Manifestation of evidence Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Calibration audits Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Chain of custody is kept for the 
evidence Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Cross-disciplinary teams Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Senser location near key assets Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
IDS Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Monitoring of regulation and 
legislation Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
The preservation, continuity, 
mainainability and resilience of cloud 
information Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Relocate critical assets for better 
management Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Keeping association of data to 
metadata when moving to the cloud Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Monitoring organizational regulations 
compliance when moving to the 
cloud Factor 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Cloud warehousing Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Legal framework and jurisdictions Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 2012 
Generally accepted standardized 
training and certification programs Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Daubert test of technique (tested, 
peer reviewed, error rate and 
accepted) Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Policies from yasinsac & Manzano Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Digital assets value assessment Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Risk assessment Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Digital assets filtering Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Data identification Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Forensic policy writing and Legal 
review Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Forensic policy ensurance Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Digital evidence management Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Incident response process Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Staff training Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Identify sources of potential evidence Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Calculate value of digital evidence Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Correlate potential sources with 
threats Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Calculate level of digital evidence 
exposure to threats Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Conduct assessment of digital 
evidence from its value and 
exposure Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
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Identify potential cost of measures 
and threats Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Identify potential benefit of measures Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Relate cost and benefits trhough a 
Bayesian Network Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
measures and threats Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Depict results on a Cost-Benefit 
factor relation model Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Choose a forensic investigation 
model to perform after incident Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Develop chain of custody Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Decide on trigger event of full DF 
investigation Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Decide on single point of contact 
with authorities Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Prioritization model Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
Business continuity plan Factor Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 2012 
System monitoring Factor VanStaden & Venter 2012 2012 
Risk Assessment Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Digital Evidence Management  Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Staff Training Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Incident Response Process Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Policies & Procedures  Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Business Scenarios Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Digital Evidence Preparation Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
IR Team Preparation Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Response Toolkit Preparation  Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Legal review Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Tracing back the actions of each 
employee Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Human factor Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & 
Li 2013 2013 
Specific methodology to capture, 
stored, analyze, preserve, integrate, 
present evidence Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 
2012 2012 
Relevant software tools to capture, 
stored, analyze, preserve, integrate, 
present evidence Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 
2012 2012 
Outsourcing costs Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 
2012 2012 
Risk assessment analysis Dimension 
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 
2012 2012 
Regulatory framework meeting Factor Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012 
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organizational needs 2012 
Cost-benefit analysis of compliance 
costs vs. value-added proactive 
security benefits Factor 
Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 
2012 2012 
Event analysis Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
DFR information Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Costing Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Access control Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
User interface Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Staff from multiple departments and 
business units Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Network infrastructure and 
computing platforms Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Monitor or log network and host 
activity Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Secure storage of logs Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Distinguish whether hardware or 
software elements are being 
monitored Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Automated alarm upon detection of 
potential or actual incident Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Configuration procedures for 
monitoring and logging Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Investigative teams (DF teams) and 
incident response teams descriptions Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Training requirements and training Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Business process descriptions Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Organisational DF policies and 
policies related to DFR Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Existence of a suspicion policy Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Law enforcement contact policy Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Escalation procedures Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Incident response procedure Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Law enforcement contact procedure Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Defined organisational structure, 
privileges and rank hierarchy Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Staff involved in DFR and incident 
response Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Security event management 
software (SEM) Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Incident management software Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Storage of information about training, 
procedures, people, roles, policies, 
etc. Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Documentation of incidents and 
investigation archive  Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Leave management Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Organization size Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
Organization industry Factor Reddy & Venter 2013 2013 
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Multi-jurisdictions Factor Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Multi-tenants of data Factor Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
A lack of forensic readiness 
mechanisms in cloud infrastructures Factor Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Escalation of costs Factor Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Applications layer that interact with 
layer 7 of the ISO/OSI model (e.g. 
static and dynamic web applications, 
web clients, web servers, application 
servers and web services Factor Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Ram forensics Factor Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Network forensics Dimension Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Computer forensics Dimension Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 2013 
Centralized logging  Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Data and Process provenance Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
The proportionality rule to collect 
only useful evidence upon good 
cause Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Integrity of the evidence and chain of 
custody  Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Difficulty of device isolation in the 
cloud Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Jurisdictional issues Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Decreased control over data and 
decreased access to forensic data 
from a client side Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Access control on the central server Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Cloudification Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Communication Channel Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Encryption Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Compression Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Authentication of log data and proof 
of integrity Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Authenticating the client and server Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Timestamping Factor Trenwith & Venter 2013 2013 
Qualified individuals Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Forensic strategy Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Non-technical stakeholders Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Technical stakeholders Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Technology Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Monitoring Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Architecture Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Policies Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
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Training Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Forensic culture Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Top management support Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Governance Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Need of regulatory compliance Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Need of internal investigations Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Involvement in legal proceedings Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Data indexing Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Information fusion Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Cryptographic Time-stamps Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
System synchronization Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Digital signatures Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
File hashing Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Maintaining change management 
database Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
CCTVs Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Encryption Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Hashing Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Remote secure central servers for 
logs Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
IDS Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Anti-virus and Anti-Spyware Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Communications with external 
stakeholders Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Leadership commitment towards the 
forensic program Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Appropriate organizational structure 
that takes forensics into account Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Staff awareness Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Enforcement of policies Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Identify the objectives of forensic 
program Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Identify potential scenarios that will 
require digital evidence Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Identify and prioritize evidence 
sources Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
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Identify forensic roles Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Plan for budget Factor 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Capabilities of legal evidence 
management Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Capabilities of internal investigations Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Capabilities of regulatory compliance Dimension 
Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & 
Lonie 2014 2014 
Is there intelligence in place? Factor 
Web, Ahmad, Maynard / 
Shanks 2014 2014 
Security awareness Dimension 
Web, Ahmad, Maynard / 
Shanks 2014 2014 
Personnel believe in the necessity of 
technology such as anti-spyware Factor 
Web, Ahmad, Maynard / 
Shanks 2014 2014 
Personnel understand the 
technology Dimension 
Web, Ahmad, Maynard / 
Shanks 2014 2014 
Impact on stakeholders (e.g. 
customers and employees) Factor Starkman 2014 2014 
Provide data that is triangulated with 
other data, and to be able to prove 
timeline Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Knowing what information you have Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Knowing where information is stored Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Knowing who is in charge of the 
information Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Objective of DFR program e.g. 
business objectives, compliance, 
internal investigation, forensic 
response, and legal evidence 
management Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Business objectives e.g. Satisfaying 
de directors and Corporate 
reputation Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Organizational Factors (Top 
Management Support, Governance, 
Culture) Elyas 2014 Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Roles instead of positions (Forensic 
stakeholder instead of Technical 
stakeholder) Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Extent to which design & 
configuration of IT architecture 
complements forensic process Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Having logging features architected 
for digital forensics Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Validated forensic tools Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Transparency Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Maintenance and testing of systems Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Need for adequate resources to 
sustain the forensic readiness Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
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program 
Senior management buy-in Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Ability to recover assets, or avoiding 
financial loss Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Certified or validated technology Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Practice and experience with 
technology Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Updated technology Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Cost of technology Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Resourcing Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Technology use and selection Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Forensic Training Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Legal investigations Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Incident response Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Policy Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Training in the of use forensic tools  Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Training about the Forensic Policy 
and how to recognise and respond to 
an incident Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Leadership commitment towards 
forensics Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Staff awareness and commitment 
towards forensics Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Organisational structure that takes 
forensics into consideration Dimension 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Enforcement of forensic policy and 
training Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Accountability of staff towards their 
forensic responsibilities Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Active monitoring and continuous 
assessment of system activities Factor 
Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & 
Lonie 2015 2015 
Type of data Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Potential sources of attacks or failure Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Number of customers Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Sales Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Location Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Preparedness of competitors and 
enemies Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
BYOD policies Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Is it data or metadata? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Is it part of the content? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Is it a dimension or a measure? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
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Can it be derived? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
What other data are related to it? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Is it legal to store or view? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Where else the data are? Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Concern about corporate image Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Perceptions of security risk Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Culture or requirements of corporate 
secrecy Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Past successes in dealing with digital 
forensics incidents Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Business continuity is critical Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Completeness of the DFR framework 
itself Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
Timing of events Factor Diaz Lopez 2014 
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191 
 
 
 
Item 
Re-
Classification Paper 
Security policy Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Security organization Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Personnel security Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Physical and environmental security Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Communications and operations  Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Management Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Systems development and maintenance Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Business Continuity management Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Compliance Dimension 
VonSolms 2000 / DIS ISO/IEC 17799 - 
1 (BS 7799) 
Cultivating an Information Security Culture 
Right Dimension VonSolms 2000 
Tools & Equipment Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 
Evidence Collection Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 
Packaging, Transportation, and Storage Dimension US DoS/NIJ 2001 
Forensic Acquisition Dimension Tan 2001 
Evidence Handling Dimension Tan 2001 
Chain of custody Dimension Tan 2001 
Transport and encryption Dimension Tan 2001 
Physical storage & transport of evidence Dimension Tan 2001 
Planning the response.  Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 
Training.  Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 
Accelerating the investigation.  Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 
Protect the evidence. Dimension Yasinsac & Manzano 2001 
Information States Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Security Services Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Security Countermeasures Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Time Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Education Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Training.  Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Literacy Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
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Awareness Dimension 
Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale & Welch 
2001 
Reliable unbiased methods to extract and 
analyze evidence Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 
Storage technology Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 
Chain of custody Dimension Reith, Carr & Gunch 2002 
Infrastructure digital and physical Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 
Operations Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 
Training Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 
Equipment Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 
Maintenance of the target environment Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2003 
How can we be sure that there even was 
an incident? Dimension Stephenson 2003 
What legal issues need to be addressed 
(policies, privacy, subpoenas, warrants, 
etc.)? Dimension Stephenson 2003 
What non-technical (business) issues 
impacted the success or failure of the 
attack? Dimension Stephenson 2003 
Logs from involved computers, detection 
systems, firewalls, etc. Dimension Stephenson 2003 / Daubert test 
A. Identification  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
A6. System  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
A7. Monitoring Audit Analysis  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
B. Preservation Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
B1. Case Management  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
B3. Chain of Custody  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
C. Collection Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
C1. Preservation  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
C2. Approved Methods Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
C3. Approved Software  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
C4.Approved Hardware  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
C5. Legal Authority  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
D. Examination Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
D1. Preservation  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
E. Analysis Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
E1. Preservation  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
E2. Traceability  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
E6. Timeline  Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
E8. Spatial Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
F. Presentation   Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
F1. Documentation Dimension DFRWS cited by Stephenson 2003 
Codes of conduct and security policies Dimension Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 
Chain of evidence Dimension Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 
Laboratory and specialized hardware and 
software Dimension Wolfe-Wilson & Wolfe 2003 
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Chain of custody Dimension Bradford, Brown, Perdue & Self 2004 
Infrastructure Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2004 
Preservation of physical and digital 
evidence Dimension Carrier & Spafford 2004 
3. Planning  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
4. Notification  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
5. Search for and identify evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
6. Collection of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
7. Transport of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
8. Storage of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
9. Examination of evidence  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
10. Hypothesis  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
11. Presentation of hypothesis  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
12. Proof/Defense of hypothesis  Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
13. Dissemination of information Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
Information flow and controls Dimension Ciardhuáin 2004 
Cost Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
4. How is data currently controlled, 
secured and managed?  Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
12. How could data be made available to 
an investigation? Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Capability for securely gathering legally 
admissible evidence  Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Establishment of policies for secure 
storage and handling of potential evidence Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Monitoring of incidents detection and 
deterrence systems Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Train personnel in incident awareness, 
roles and legal aspects of digital evidence 
process Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Benefit/cost proportionality  Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Evidence collection requirements Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Retention of information Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Planning of the response Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Training Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Acceleration of the investigation Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Legal Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Technical Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Non-technical Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Personnel and external organizations Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Understanding possible evidence sources, 
how to gather evidence legally and cost-
effectively, when to escalate into a formal 
investigation, and how to put together a 
case involving law enforcement agencies. Dimension Rowlingson 2004 
Legal requirements and constraints on 
collection and preservation of potential 
digital evidence Dimension Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 
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Guidelines for preserving digital evidence, 
processes, procedures, and suggestions 
to use technologies Dimension Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 
Assets and customers Dimension Danielsson & Tjøstheim 2004 
Forensic policies Dimension Wolfe 2004 
Chain of evidence Dimension Wolfe 2004 
Develop a strategy to prepare the 
underlying systems from a forensic 
viewpoint Dimension Casey 2005 
Case management and incident tracking Dimension Casey 2005 
Laboratory accreditation and auditing Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 
A quality assurance system that covers 
quality policies, activities, procedures, 
documentation, and management. Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 
Procedures to control the quality of 
documents Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 
Archive Management Dimension Chen, Tsai, Chen & Yee 2005 
Forensic knowledge of IT management Dimension Quinn 2005 
Policies and procedures Dimension Quinn 2005 
What are the skills and abilities of the 
computer forensic examiners? Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge & 
Debrota 2006 
What type of technology is involved 
(standalone systems, complex networks 
etc.)? Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge & 
Debrota 2006 
Maintaining the integrity of digital evidence Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge & 
Debrota 2006 
Maintaining the chain of custody of 
evidence Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge & 
Debrota 2006 
Complying with rules of evidence for 
admissibility at the Federal and State 
levels Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge & 
Debrota 2006 
Planning and pre-raid intelligence Dimension 
Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge & 
Debrota 2006 
Policies including contacting law 
enforcement, performing monitoring, and 
conducting regular reviews of forensic 
policies and procedures Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
Procedures and guidelines for performing 
forensic tasks,based on the organization’s 
policies and all applicable laws and 
regulations Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
Policies and procedures supporting 
reasonable and appropriate use of forensic 
tools Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
Demonstrate conclusively the authenticity, 
credibility, and reliability of electronic 
records Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
Capability to perform computer and 
network forensics Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
1. What are the potential sources of data?  Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
4. Which forensic tools and techniques 
would most likely be used?  Which other 
tools and techniques might also be used?  Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
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5. Which groups and individuals within the 
organization would probably be involved in 
the forensic activities?  Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
6. What communications with external 
parties might occur, if any?  Dimension Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang 2006 
Information Management Team including 
experts in computer forensics, law, 
information management, information 
technology, and auditing Dimension Luoma 2006 
Electronic document retention and deletion 
policy Dimension Luoma 2006 
Employees knowledge on information 
management and awareness of policies Dimension Luoma 2006 
Planning Information Retention 
Requirements Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler 
2006 
Gather potential evidence Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler 
2006 
Prevent anonymous activities Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler 
2006 
Planning the response.  Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler 
2006 
Digital Forensic Training Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler 
2006 
Accelerating the DF investigation.  Dimension 
VonSolms, Lowurens, Reeky & Grobler 
2006 
Incident response team Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 
Organisational policies and procedures Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 
Pre-emptive systems in place Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 
Corporate governance material converted 
into a Forensic Readiness Policy Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 
Legal context Dimension Forrester & Irwin 2007 
Good corporate governance, specifically 
IS governance Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 
Use of DF tools Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 
IS and DF awareness training Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 
IS and DF policies Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 
Establish a capability to securely gather 
admissible evidence by considering 
technology and human capacity Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 
Developing a preservation culture in the 
organization to preserve all processes and 
activities should an investigation arise;  Dimension Grobler & Louwrens 2007 
Establishment of policies in terms of digital 
assets, forensic events, data collection 
and storage Dimension 
Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky & Frincke 
2007 
Multidisciplinary approach (Law, IT, 
Enforcement, Business) Dimension Bem, Feld, Huebner & Bem 2008 
Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRTs)  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Digital investigation procedures  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Interaction with law enforcement  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
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Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Analysis of logs and alerts gathered by 
IDSs, server logs, and network logs Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Roles and Responsibilities Model Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Plethora of useful tools (IDS, Centralized 
logging) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Site Technical Roles (Lead, Incident 
Investigator, Digital Forensics Specialist, 
Security/System Administrator, 
Security/System Architect) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Collaboration Technical Roles (Lead, 
Incident Investigator, Digital Forensics 
Specialist, Workspace Administrator) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Site Legal Roles (Legal Adviser, Liason 
with Law Enforcement) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Law Enforcement Roles (Prosecutor, 
Investigator, Executive, Media Liason) Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Preparation of security system architecture 
documentation Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Train staff on latest threats and software 
tools Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Deploy intrusion detection and forensics 
data collection capabilities Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Develop incident response policies, 
procedures and legal coordination plan Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Establish and maintain a collaborative 
workspace hosting environment Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Develop/deploy collaborative tools, 
policies and procedures Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
Chain of custody  Dimension 
Khurana, Basney, Bakht, Freemon, 
Welch & Butler 2009 
ID Management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Information Security Management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Legal & Regulatory Compliance Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Network Security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Physical Security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Privacy Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Risk Management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Software Security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Wireless infrastructure security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Internal network security Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Management involvement, risk 
management Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
User education, training and awareness Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Policy & regulatory compliance 
(Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA) Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
Data protection Dimension Dlamini, Eloff, & Eloff 2009 
An overall forensic policy  Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
Technical readiness procedures and 
processes Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
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Non-technical readiness procedures and 
processes Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
Monitoring and auditing  Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
Hardware and software configured 
properly Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
Education of forensic team members and 
appropriate certifications Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
Architecture Dimension Reddy & Venter 2009 
Legal limitations Dimension Garfinkel 2010 
Mobile computing Dimension Garfinkel 2010 
Training Dimension Garfinkel 2010 
International laws Dimension Garfinkel 2010 
Functionality of DF tools Dimension Garfinkel 2010 
Collaboration Dimension Garfinkel 2010 
Strategy Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Compliance & Monitoring Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Policy & Procedures Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Technology  Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Digital Forensic Response Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Staff IT skills Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Chain of custody is kept for the evidence Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Quality assurance to ensure that the 
examination and analysis Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Policy, people and process adaptation to 
DF Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Updating the organisation’s policies and 
procedures  Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
The systematic gathering of potential 
digital evidence  Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
The secure storage of potential digital 
evidence  Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Preparation for events requiring digital 
forensic intervention Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Enhanced capability for evidence retrieval  Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Legal advice  Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Developing of an in-house digital forensics 
examination and analysis capacity Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Identifying and understanding retention 
records legislation Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Computers and Servers Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Acquisition and Analysis technology Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Evidence Storage technology Dimension Barske, Stander & Jordaan 2010 
Interdisciplinary formal programs to 
educate professionals Dimension Duranti & Endicott-Popovsky 2010 
Infrastructure preparedness Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Existance of risk mitigation plans including 
evidence and process requirements Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Preparation for containments of incidents 
to include containment on live systems Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
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Use of IT tools Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Minimization of business interruption Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Efficiency Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Specific requirements per country, 
jurisdiction, and industry for admissible 
evidence Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Ability to prove compliance Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Active DF capabilities in live system 
environments Dimension Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
Establishment of policies and procedures Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
Legal Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
Policies Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
Governance Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
People Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
Process Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
Technology Dimension 
Grobler, Louwrens & Von Solms 2010 
(2) 
Implemented processes and 
methodologies Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Legal aspects Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
The individuals involved in the 
investigation Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Business aspects Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Social aspects  Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Technical aspects Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Legal apects e.g. admissibility and 
jurisdiction Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Security training Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Organizational culture Dimension Hoolachan & Glisson 2010 
Monitoring Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 
Logging Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 
Preservation Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 
Analysis Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 
Report Dimension Ngobeni, Venter & Burke 2010 
Cloud computing Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Hegarty 
2010 
Jurisdictional difficulties Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Hegarty 
2010 
Encryption Dimension 
Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Hegarty 
2010 
Resourcing of the incident response 
capability Dimension Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2010 
Availability and application of technical 
expertise Dimension Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2010 
Organizational skill in creating, acquiring Dimension Shedden, Ahmad & Ruighaver 2010 
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and transfering knowledge 
Corporate security policies Dimension Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010 
Law framework Dimension Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010 
Security policy Dimension Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010 
The scene, the requirements, the 
methodology and tools used, the results 
and reports Dimension Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010 
Processes related to data backup and 
recovery Dimension Pangalos, Ilioudis & Pagkalos 2010 
Encryption Dimension Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty & Lamb 2011 
9. Implementing defined procedures and 
PKI system architecture Dimension Valjarevic & Venter 2011 
Organizational policy which will consider 
the preventative side of security Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011 
Control to DE access and maintenance of 
a digital chain of custody (DCOC). Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011 
Evidence Management Plan development Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011 
Technical infrastructure standards. Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Grobler & Li 2011 
Ability to collect the evidence without 
disrupting the environment. Dimension Mouton & Venter 2011 
Privacy Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 
Jurisdiction Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 
Cloud storage Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 
Legal procedure Dimension Spyridopoulos & Katos 2011 
Organisational resources coordination Dimension Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 
Development of IT infrastructure Dimension Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 
IT security and DF programmes maturity Dimension Reddy, Venter & Olivier 2012 
Legal requirements Dimension Leigh 2012 
IT systems in use. Dimension Leigh 2012 
Back-up procedures. Dimension Leigh 2012 
Electronic document retention and 
archiving policies. Dimension Leigh 2012 
Employment law or privacy issues Dimension Leigh 2012 
Likely threats Dimension Hamidovic 2012 
How to secure data Dimension Hamidovic 2012 
Legal problems (e.g. admissibility, data 
protection, human rights, limits to 
surveillance, obligations to staff members 
and others, and disclosure in legal 
proceedings) Dimension Hamidovic 2012 
Management, skill, and resource 
implications and developed an action plan Dimension Hamidovic 2012 
Information retention Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Response planning Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Training Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Investigation acceleration Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Evidence protection Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
People Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
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Process Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Policy Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Technology Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Computer Incident response Team (CIRT) 
information and skills management Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Security awareness Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Planning of incident response Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Storage technology Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Policies & Procedures Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Incident Management Dimension Pooe & Labuschagne 2012 
Management commitment and leadership 
to secure information systems Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
User awareness of the issues, threats and 
best practices in information security Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
The implementation of policies, processes 
and procedures to secure the information 
system Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Adequate technology to secure the 
information system Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Compliance with regulatory requirements 
according to information security 
information Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Risk analysis Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Security indicators Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Security of premises Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Architecture and Systems Security Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Development of action plans Dimension 
Elachgar, Boulafdour, Makoudi & 
Regragui 2012 
Records management including the cloud Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
Information governance and assurance 
(confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
authentication and non-repudiation) Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
Chain of custody is kept for the evidence Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
Cross-disciplinary teams Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
The preservation, continuity, mainainability 
and resilience of cloud information Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
Cloud warehousing Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
Legal framework and jurisdictions Dimension 
Ferguson-Boucher & Endicott-
Popovsky 2012 
Generally accepted standardized training 
and certification programs Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Policies from yasinsac & Manzano Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Risk assessment Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Data identification Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
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Forensic policy writing and Legal review Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Digital evidence management Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Incident response process Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Staff training Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Depict results on a Cost-Benefit factor 
relation model Dimension Mouhtaropoulos & Li 2012 
Risk Assessment Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Digital Evidence Management  Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Staff Training Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Incident Response Process Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Policies & Procedures  Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Business Scenarios Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Digital Evidence Preparation Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Human factor Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Dimotikalis & Li 2013 
Specific methodology to capture, stored, 
analyze, preserve, integrate, present 
evidence Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012 
Relevant software tools to capture, stored, 
analyze, preserve, integrate, present 
evidence Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012 
Risk assessment analysis Dimension Mouhtaropoulos, Li & Grobler 2012 
Event analysis Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
DFR information Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Costing Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Staff from multiple departments and 
business units Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Network infrastructure and computing 
platforms Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Investigative teams (DF teams) and 
incident response teams descriptions Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Training requirements and training Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Business process descriptions Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Organisational DF policies and policies 
related to DFR Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Incident response procedure Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Defined organisational structure, privileges 
and rank hierarchy Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Staff involved in DFR and incident 
response Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Storage of information about training, 
procedures, people, roles, policies, etc. Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Documentation of incidents and 
investigation archive  Dimension Reddy & Venter 2013 
Network forensics Dimension Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 
Computer forensics Dimension Sibiya, Venter & Ngobeni 2013 
Data and Process provenance Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 
Integrity of the evidence and chain of 
custody  Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 
Jurisdictional issues Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 
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Cloudification Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 
Encryption Dimension Trenwith & Venter 2013 
Qualified individuals Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Forensic strategy Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Non-technical stakeholders Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Technical stakeholders Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Technology Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Monitoring Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Architecture Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Policies Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Training Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Forensic culture Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Governance Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Encryption Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Communications with external 
stakeholders Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Appropriate organizational structure that 
takes forensics into account Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Staff awareness Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Capabilities of legal evidence 
management Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Capabilities of internal investigations Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Capabilities of regulatory compliance Dimension Elyas, Maynard, Ahmad & Lonie 2014 
Security awareness Dimension Web, Ahmad, Maynard / Shanks 2014 
Personnel understand the technology Dimension Web, Ahmad, Maynard / Shanks 2014 
Objective of DFR program e.g. business 
objectives, compliance, internal 
investigation, forensic response, and legal 
evidence management Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Organizational Factors (Top Management 
Support, Governance, Culture) Elyas 2014 Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Validated forensic tools Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Maintenance and testing of systems Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Resourcing Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Technology use and selection Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Forensic Training Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Policy Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
Organisational structure that takes 
forensics into consideration Dimension Elyas, Ahmad, Maynard & Lonie 2015 
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DFR Dimensions Survey 
Q1 Thanks for your participation in this study. By accepting to take this survey you consent with 
the utilization of this information for the purpose of the study and acknowledge that your participation is 
voluntary. You can abandon this survey at any time. However, it is appreciated that you complete all 
required information to the best of your knowledge. This study has been reviewed by The University of 
Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding 
your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482 or irb@olemiss.edu.    
Mark with an x: 
 Accept (1) 
 Decline (2) 
 
Q2 What is your age range in years? 
 Below 18 (1) 
 18 to 25 (2) 
 26 to 33 (3) 
 34 to 41 (4) 
 42 to 49 (5) 
 50 to 57 (6) 
 Above 57 (7) 
 
Q3 What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
Q4 What is your experience with computer information systems in years? 
 Less than 1 (1) 
 1 to 5 (2) 
 6 to 10 (3) 
 11 to 15 (4) 
 16 to 20 (5) 
 21 to 25 (6) 
 More than 25 (7) 
 
Q5 What is your experience in information security in years? 
 Less than 1 (1) 
 1 to 5 (2) 
 6 to 10 (3) 
 11 to 15 (4) 
 16 to 20 (5) 
 21 to 25 (6) 
 More than 25 (7) 
 
Q6 What is your level of expertise in information security? 
 Layman (1) 
 Minimal (2) 
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 Below average (3) 
 Average (4) 
 Above average (5) 
 Superior (6) 
 Expert (7) 
 
Q7 Many factors affect the digital forensic readiness (DFR) of organizations. These factors can be 
classified in different categories or dimensions. Your task is to help determine these categories by 
grouping the following words into a set of minimal, unique and independent dimensions to which different 
factors of DFR might belong. 
Instructions 
Along with this document, you will find 65 tags that each contain a different word. These words might 
each indicate an independent category. However, some of them might belong to the same category 
because they are synonyms or because they together determine a theme that is independent of other 
categories proposed. It is your task to determine whether some of the words should be grouped or not. 
An easy way to perform this task is to spread all the tags on a table and make clusters of words by 
placing together those which you believe belong together in a category, leaving alone those words that 
define a category by themselves. There is no limit for the number of words in a category or group. You 
might decide that each word is an independent category. However, the purpose of the exercise is to 
attempt to define the minimum number of categories possible. 
Once your grouping is done, please place a rubber band (provided) around each bundle of two or more 
words making a category. Please, place the word that best represents the category on the top of the 
stack before placing the rubber band around it. 
Count the total categories you defined and write it here:  _____ 
If you feel that there may exist super-categories into which one or several rubber-band-bound collections 
and remaining single-words categories may be arranged, please place the grouped items together with 
another rubber band around all items within each super-category. 
Count the total super-categories you defined and write it here:  _____ 
Please, put all documents, the tied bundles of words and the loose words into the envelope provided and 
return it to the researcher. 
Thanks for your time and effort. 
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Apriori 
Parameter specification: 
Confidence: 0.5263 
Minval: 0.1 
Smax: 1 
Arem: none 
Aval: FALSE 
OriginalSupport: TRUE 
Support: 0.03968 
Minlen: 2 
Maxlen: 10 
Target: rules 
Ext: FALSE 
Algorithmic control: 
Filter: 0.1 
Tree: TRUE 
Heap: TRUE 
Memopt: FALSE 
Load: TRUE 
Sort: 2 
Verbose: TRUE 
Absolute minimum support count: 9  
set item appearances ...[0 item(s)] done [0.00s]. 
set transactions ...[65 item(s), 252 transaction(s)] done [0.00s]. 
sorting and recoding items ... [65 item(s)] done [0.00s]. 
creating transaction tree ... done [0.00s]. 
checking subsets of size 1 2 3 4 5 6 done [0.00s]. 
writing ... [403 rule(s)] done [0.00s]. 
creating S4 object  ... done [0.00s]. 
 
Accepted Association Rules (Min. Support = 0.0397, Min. Confidence = 0.526) 
 
    lhs                                             rhs               
support    confidence lift      
1   {Stakeholder}                                => {People}         0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
2   {People}                                     => {Stakeholder}    0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
3   {Stakeholder}                                => {User}           0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
4   {User}                                       => {Stakeholder}    0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
5   {Stakeholder}                                => {Customer}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
6   {Customer}                                   => {Stakeholder}    0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
7   {Stakeholder}                                => {Team}           0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
8   {Team}                                       => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
9   {Stakeholder}                                => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
10  {Personnel}                                  => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
11  {Threat}                                     => {Risk}           0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
12  {Risk}                                       => {Threat}         0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
13  {Threat}                                     => {Intrusion}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
14  {Intrusion}                                  => {Threat}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
15  {Threat}                                     => {Attack}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
16  {Attack}                                     => {Threat}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
17  {Threat}                                     => {Target}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
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18  {Target}                                     => {Threat}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
19  {People}                                     => {User}           0.06746032 0.8947368  11.867036 
20  {User}                                       => {People}         0.06746032 0.8947368  11.867036 
21  {People}                                     => {Customer}       0.06746032 0.8947368  11.867036 
22  {Customer}                                   => {People}         0.06746032 0.8947368  11.867036 
23  {People}                                     => {Team}           0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
24  {Team}                                       => {People}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
25  {People}                                     => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
26  {Personnel}                                  => {People}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
27  {Business}                                   => {Corporate}      0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
28  {Corporate}                                  => {Business}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
29  {Business}                                   => {Organization}   0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
30  {Organization}                               => {Business}       0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
31  {User}                                       => {Customer}       0.07142857 0.9473684  12.565097 
32  {Customer}                                   => {User}           0.07142857 0.9473684  12.565097 
33  {User}                                       => {Team}           0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
34  {Team}                                       => {User}           0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
35  {User}                                       => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
36  {Personnel}                                  => {User}           0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
37  {Risk}                                       => {Intrusion}      0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
38  {Intrusion}                                  => {Risk}           0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
39  {Risk}                                       => {Attack}         0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
40  {Attack}                                     => {Risk}           0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
41  {Customer}                                   => {Team}           0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
42  {Team}                                       => {Customer}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
43  {Customer}                                   => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
44  {Personnel}                                  => {Customer}       0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
45  {Corporate}                                  => {Organization}   0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
46  {Organization}                               => {Corporate}      0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
47  {Team}                                       => {Personnel}      0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
48  {Personnel}                                  => {Team}           0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
49  {Workspace}                                  => {Site}           0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
50  {Site}                                       => {Workspace}      0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
51  {Workspace}                                  => {Space}          0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
52  {Space}                                      => {Workspace}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
53  {Workspace}                                  => {Premises}       0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
54  {Premises}                                   => {Workspace}      0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
55  {Workspace}                                  => {Environment}    0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
56  {Environment}                                => {Workspace}      0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
57  {Workspace}                                  => {Lab}            0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
58  {Lab}                                        => {Workspace}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
59  {Site}                                       => {Space}          0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
60  {Space}                                      => {Site}           0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
61  {Site}                                       => {Premises}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
62  {Premises}                                   => {Site}           0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
63  {Site}                                       => {Environment}    0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
64  {Environment}                                => {Site}           0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
65  {Intrusion}                                  => {Attack}         0.07539683 1.0000000  13.263158 
66  {Attack}                                     => {Intrusion}      0.07539683 1.0000000  13.263158 
67  {Intrusion}                                  => {Event}          0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
68  {Event}                                      => {Intrusion}      0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
69  {Intrusion}                                  => {Incident}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
70  {Incident}                                   => {Intrusion}      0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
71  {Intrusion}                                  => {Target}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
72  {Target}                                     => {Intrusion}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
73  {Attack}                                     => {Event}          0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
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74  {Event}                                      => {Attack}         0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
75  {Attack}                                     => {Incident}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
76  {Incident}                                   => {Attack}         0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
77  {Attack}                                     => {Target}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
78  {Target}                                     => {Attack}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
79  {Event}                                      => {Incident}       0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
80  {Incident}                                   => {Event}          0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
81  {Space}                                      => {Premises}       0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
82  {Premises}                                   => {Space}          0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
83  {Space}                                      => {Environment}    0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
84  {Environment}                                => {Space}          0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
85  {Record}                                     => {Document}       0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
86  {Document}                                   => {Record}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
87  {Law}                                        => {Rule}           0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
88  {Rule}                                       => {Law}            0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
89  {Resource}                                   => {Asset}          0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
90  {Asset}                                      => {Resource}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
91  {Evidence}                                   => {Proof}          0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
92  {Proof}                                      => {Evidence}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
93  {Proof}                                      => {Case}           0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
94  {Case}                                       => {Proof}          0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
95  {Information}                                => {Data}           0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
96  {Data}                                       => {Information}    0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
97  {System}                                     => {Software}       0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
98  {Software}                                   => {System}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
99  {Requirement}                                => {Policy}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
100 {Policy}                                     => {Requirement}    0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
101 {Operation}                                  => {Process}        0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
102 {Process}                                    => {Operation}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
103 {Equipment}                                  => {Server}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
104 {Server}                                     => {Equipment}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
105 {Equipment}                                  => {Network}        0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
106 {Network}                                    => {Equipment}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
107 {Equipment}                                  => {Hardware}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
108 {Hardware}                                   => {Equipment}      0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
109 {Equipment}                                  => {Computer}       0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
110 {Computer}                                   => {Equipment}      0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
111 {Program}                                    => {Software}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
112 {Software}                                   => {Program}        0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
113 {Program}                                    => {Code}           0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
114 {Code}                                       => {Program}        0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
115 {Rule}                                       => {Policy}         0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
116 {Policy}                                     => {Rule}           0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
117 {Rule}                                       => {Guideline}      0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
118 {Guideline}                                  => {Rule}           0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
119 {Objective}                                  => {Strategy}       0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
120 {Strategy}                                   => {Objective}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
121 {Software}                                   => {Code}           0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
122 {Code}                                       => {Software}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
123 {Plan}                                       => {Guideline}      0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
124 {Guideline}                                  => {Plan}           0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
125 {Plan}                                       => {Strategy}       0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
126 {Strategy}                                   => {Plan}           0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
127 {Architecture}                               => {Infrastructure} 0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
128 {Infrastructure}                             => {Architecture}   0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
129 {Policy}                                     => {Guideline}      0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
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130 {Guideline}                                  => {Policy}         0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
131 {Policy}                                     => {Procedure}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
132 {Procedure}                                  => {Policy}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
133 {Process}                                    => {Flow}           0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
134 {Flow}                                       => {Process}        0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
135 {Process}                                    => {Procedure}      0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
136 {Procedure}                                  => {Process}        0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
137 {Technology}                                 => {Computer}       0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
138 {Computer}                                   => {Technology}     0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
139 {Server}                                     => {Network}        0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
140 {Network}                                    => {Server}         0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
141 {Server}                                     => {Hardware}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
142 {Hardware}                                   => {Server}         0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
143 {Server}                                     => {Computer}       0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
144 {Computer}                                   => {Server}         0.05952381 0.7894737  10.470914 
145 {Guideline}                                  => {Strategy}       0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
146 {Strategy}                                   => {Guideline}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
147 {Guideline}                                  => {Procedure}      0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
148 {Procedure}                                  => {Guideline}      0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
149 {Network}                                    => {Hardware}       0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
150 {Hardware}                                   => {Network}        0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
151 {Network}                                    => {Computer}       0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
152 {Computer}                                   => {Network}        0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
153 {Hardware}                                   => {Computer}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
154 {Computer}                                   => {Hardware}       0.06349206 0.8421053  11.168975 
155 {Method}                                     => {Procedure}      0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
156 {Procedure}                                  => {Method}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
157 {People,Stakeholder}                         => {User}           0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
158 {Stakeholder,User}                           => {People}         0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
159 {People,User}                                => {Stakeholder}    0.05952381 0.8823529  11.702786 
160 {People,Stakeholder}                         => {Customer}       0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
161 {Customer,Stakeholder}                       => {People}         0.05952381 0.9375000  12.434211 
162 {Customer,People}                            => {Stakeholder}    0.05952381 0.8823529  11.702786 
163 {People,Stakeholder}                         => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
164 {Stakeholder,Team}                           => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
165 {People,Team}                                => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
166 {People,Stakeholder}                         => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
167 {Personnel,Stakeholder}                      => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
168 {People,Personnel}                           => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
169 {Stakeholder,User}                           => {Customer}       0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
170 {Customer,Stakeholder}                       => {User}           0.05952381 0.9375000  12.434211 
171 {Customer,User}                              => {Stakeholder}    0.05952381 0.8333333  11.052632 
172 {Stakeholder,User}                           => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
173 {Stakeholder,Team}                           => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
174 {Team,User}                                  => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
175 {Stakeholder,User}                           => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
176 {Personnel,Stakeholder}                      => {User}           0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
177 {Personnel,User}                             => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
178 {Customer,Stakeholder}                       => {Team}           0.04761905 0.7500000   9.947368 
179 {Stakeholder,Team}                           => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
180 {Customer,Team}                              => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
181 {Customer,Stakeholder}                       => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8125000  10.776316 
182 {Personnel,Stakeholder}                      => {Customer}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
183 {Customer,Personnel}                         => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
184 {Stakeholder,Team}                           => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
185 {Personnel,Stakeholder}                      => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
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186 {Personnel,Team}                             => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.7333333   9.726316 
187 {Risk,Threat}                                => {Intrusion}      0.04761905 0.7500000   9.947368 
188 {Intrusion,Threat}                           => {Risk}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
189 {Intrusion,Risk}                             => {Threat}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
190 {Risk,Threat}                                => {Attack}         0.04761905 0.7500000   9.947368 
191 {Attack,Threat}                              => {Risk}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
192 {Attack,Risk}                                => {Threat}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
193 {Intrusion,Threat}                           => {Attack}         0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
194 {Attack,Threat}                              => {Intrusion}      0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
195 {Attack,Intrusion}                           => {Threat}         0.05555556 0.7368421   9.772853 
196 {People,User}                                => {Customer}       0.06746032 1.0000000  13.263158 
197 {Customer,People}                            => {User}           0.06746032 1.0000000  13.263158 
198 {Customer,User}                              => {People}         0.06746032 0.9444444  12.526316 
199 {People,User}                                => {Team}           0.05158730 0.7647059  10.142415 
200 {People,Team}                                => {User}           0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
201 {Team,User}                                  => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
202 {People,User}                                => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.8235294  10.922601 
203 {People,Personnel}                           => {User}           0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
204 {Personnel,User}                             => {People}         0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
205 {Customer,People}                            => {Team}           0.05158730 0.7647059  10.142415 
206 {People,Team}                                => {Customer}       0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
207 {Customer,Team}                              => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
208 {Customer,People}                            => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.8235294  10.922601 
209 {People,Personnel}                           => {Customer}       0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
210 {Customer,Personnel}                         => {People}         0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
211 {People,Team}                                => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
212 {People,Personnel}                           => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
213 {Personnel,Team}                             => {People}         0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
214 {Business,Corporate}                         => {Organization}   0.05158730 0.8125000  10.776316 
215 {Business,Organization}                      => {Corporate}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
216 {Corporate,Organization}                     => {Business}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
217 {Customer,User}                              => {Team}           0.05158730 0.7222222   9.578947 
218 {Team,User}                                  => {Customer}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
219 {Customer,Team}                              => {User}           0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
220 {Customer,User}                              => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.7777778  10.315789 
221 {Personnel,User}                             => {Customer}       0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
222 {Customer,Personnel}                         => {User}           0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
223 {Team,User}                                  => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
224 {Personnel,User}                             => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
225 {Personnel,Team}                             => {User}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
226 {Intrusion,Risk}                             => {Attack}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
227 {Attack,Risk}                                => {Intrusion}      0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
228 {Attack,Intrusion}                           => {Risk}           0.04761905 0.6315789   8.376731 
229 {Customer,Team}                              => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
230 {Customer,Personnel}                         => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
231 {Personnel,Team}                             => {Customer}       0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
232 {Site,Workspace}                             => {Space}          0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
233 {Space,Workspace}                            => {Site}           0.03968254 0.7142857   9.473684 
234 {Site,Space}                                 => {Workspace}      0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
235 {Site,Workspace}                             => {Premises}       0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
236 {Premises,Workspace}                         => {Site}           0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
237 {Premises,Site}                              => {Workspace}      0.03968254 0.7692308  10.202429 
238 {Space,Workspace}                            => {Premises}       0.03968254 0.7142857   9.473684 
239 {Premises,Workspace}                         => {Space}          0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
240 {Premises,Space}                             => {Workspace}      0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
241 {Space,Workspace}                            => {Environment}    0.03968254 0.7142857   9.473684 
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242 {Environment,Workspace}                      => {Space}          0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
243 {Environment,Space}                          => {Workspace}      0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
244 {Attack,Intrusion}                           => {Event}          0.04365079 0.5789474   7.678670 
245 {Event,Intrusion}                            => {Attack}         0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
246 {Attack,Event}                               => {Intrusion}      0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
247 {Attack,Intrusion}                           => {Incident}       0.05158730 0.6842105   9.074792 
248 {Incident,Intrusion}                         => {Attack}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
249 {Attack,Incident}                            => {Intrusion}      0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
250 {Attack,Intrusion}                           => {Target}         0.03968254 0.5263158   6.980609 
251 {Intrusion,Target}                           => {Attack}         0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
252 {Attack,Target}                              => {Intrusion}      0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
253 {Event,Intrusion}                            => {Incident}       0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
254 {Incident,Intrusion}                         => {Event}          0.03968254 0.7692308  10.202429 
255 {Event,Incident}                             => {Intrusion}      0.03968254 0.6666667   8.842105 
256 {Attack,Event}                               => {Incident}       0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
257 {Attack,Incident}                            => {Event}          0.03968254 0.7692308  10.202429 
258 {Event,Incident}                             => {Attack}         0.03968254 0.6666667   8.842105 
259 {Equipment,Server}                           => {Hardware}       0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
260 {Equipment,Hardware}                         => {Server}         0.05555556 0.8750000  11.605263 
261 {Hardware,Server}                            => {Equipment}      0.05555556 0.8750000  11.605263 
262 {Equipment,Server}                           => {Computer}       0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
263 {Computer,Equipment}                         => {Server}         0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
264 {Computer,Server}                            => {Equipment}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
265 {Equipment,Network}                          => {Hardware}       0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
266 {Equipment,Hardware}                         => {Network}        0.03968254 0.6250000   8.289474 
267 {Hardware,Network}                           => {Equipment}      0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
268 {Equipment,Hardware}                         => {Computer}       0.05555556 0.8750000  11.605263 
269 {Computer,Equipment}                         => {Hardware}       0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
270 {Computer,Hardware}                          => {Equipment}      0.05555556 0.8750000  11.605263 
271 {Program,Software}                           => {Code}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
272 {Code,Program}                               => {Software}       0.04365079 0.7857143  10.421053 
273 {Code,Software}                              => {Program}        0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
274 {Policy,Rule}                                => {Guideline}      0.03968254 0.7692308  10.202429 
275 {Guideline,Rule}                             => {Policy}         0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
276 {Guideline,Policy}                           => {Rule}           0.03968254 0.7692308  10.202429 
277 {Guideline,Plan}                             => {Strategy}       0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
278 {Plan,Strategy}                              => {Guideline}      0.03968254 0.6666667   8.842105 
279 {Guideline,Strategy}                         => {Plan}           0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
280 {Network,Server}                             => {Hardware}       0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
281 {Hardware,Server}                            => {Network}        0.04365079 0.6875000   9.118421 
282 {Hardware,Network}                           => {Server}         0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
283 {Network,Server}                             => {Computer}       0.03968254 0.8333333  11.052632 
284 {Computer,Server}                            => {Network}        0.03968254 0.6666667   8.842105 
285 {Computer,Network}                           => {Server}         0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
286 {Hardware,Server}                            => {Computer}       0.05952381 0.9375000  12.434211 
287 {Computer,Server}                            => {Hardware}       0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
288 {Computer,Hardware}                          => {Server}         0.05952381 0.9375000  12.434211 
289 {Hardware,Network}                           => {Computer}       0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
290 {Computer,Network}                           => {Hardware}       0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
291 {Computer,Hardware}                          => {Network}        0.04365079 0.6875000   9.118421 
292 {People,Stakeholder,User}                    => {Customer}       0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
293 {Customer,People,Stakeholder}                => {User}           0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
294 {Customer,Stakeholder,User}                  => {People}         0.05952381 1.0000000  13.263158 
295 {Customer,People,User}                       => {Stakeholder}    0.05952381 0.8823529  11.702786 
296 {People,Stakeholder,User}                    => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
297 {People,Stakeholder,Team}                    => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
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298 {Stakeholder,Team,User}                      => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
299 {People,Team,User}                           => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
300 {People,Stakeholder,User}                    => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
301 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder}               => {User}           0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
302 {Personnel,Stakeholder,User}                 => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
303 {People,Personnel,User}                      => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
304 {Customer,People,Stakeholder}                => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
305 {People,Stakeholder,Team}                    => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
306 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team}                  => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
307 {Customer,People,Team}                       => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
308 {Customer,People,Stakeholder}                => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
309 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder}               => {Customer}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
310 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder}             => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
311 {Customer,People,Personnel}                  => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
312 {People,Stakeholder,Team}                    => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
313 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder}               => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
314 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}                 => {People}         0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
315 {People,Personnel,Team}                      => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
316 {Customer,Stakeholder,User}                  => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
317 {Stakeholder,Team,User}                      => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
318 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team}                  => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
319 {Customer,Team,User}                         => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
320 {Customer,Stakeholder,User}                  => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
321 {Personnel,Stakeholder,User}                 => {Customer}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
322 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder}             => {User}           0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
323 {Customer,Personnel,User}                    => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
324 {Stakeholder,Team,User}                      => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
325 {Personnel,Stakeholder,User}                 => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
326 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}                 => {User}           0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
327 {Personnel,Team,User}                        => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
328 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team}                  => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
329 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder}             => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
330 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}                 => {Customer}       0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
331 {Customer,Personnel,Team}                    => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
332 {Intrusion,Risk,Threat}                      => {Attack}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
333 {Attack,Risk,Threat}                         => {Intrusion}      0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
334 {Attack,Intrusion,Threat}                    => {Risk}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
335 {Attack,Intrusion,Risk}                      => {Threat}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
336 {Customer,People,User}                       => {Team}           0.05158730 0.7647059  10.142415 
337 {People,Team,User}                           => {Customer}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
338 {Customer,People,Team}                       => {User}           0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
339 {Customer,Team,User}                         => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
340 {Customer,People,User}                       => {Personnel}      0.05555556 0.8235294  10.922601 
341 {People,Personnel,User}                      => {Customer}       0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
342 {Customer,People,Personnel}                  => {User}           0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
343 {Customer,Personnel,User}                    => {People}         0.05555556 1.0000000  13.263158 
344 {People,Team,User}                           => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
345 {People,Personnel,User}                      => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
346 {People,Personnel,Team}                      => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
347 {Personnel,Team,User}                        => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
348 {Customer,People,Team}                       => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
349 {Customer,People,Personnel}                  => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
350 {People,Personnel,Team}                      => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
351 {Customer,Personnel,Team}                    => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
352 {Customer,Team,User}                         => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
353 {Customer,Personnel,User}                    => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
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354 {Personnel,Team,User}                        => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
355 {Customer,Personnel,Team}                    => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
356 {Attack,Event,Intrusion}                     => {Incident}       0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
357 {Attack,Incident,Intrusion}                  => {Event}          0.03968254 0.7692308  10.202429 
358 {Event,Incident,Intrusion}                   => {Attack}         0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
359 {Attack,Event,Incident}                      => {Intrusion}      0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
360 {Equipment,Hardware,Server}                  => {Computer}       0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
361 {Computer,Equipment,Server}                  => {Hardware}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
362 {Computer,Equipment,Hardware}                => {Server}         0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
363 {Computer,Hardware,Server}                   => {Equipment}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
364 {Hardware,Network,Server}                    => {Computer}       0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
365 {Computer,Network,Server}                    => {Hardware}       0.03968254 1.0000000  13.263158 
366 {Computer,Hardware,Server}                   => {Network}        0.03968254 0.6666667   8.842105 
367 {Computer,Hardware,Network}                  => {Server}         0.03968254 0.9090909  12.057416 
368 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,User}           => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8000000  10.610526 
369 {People,Stakeholder,Team,User}               => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
370 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,Team}           => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
371 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team,User}             => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
372 {Customer,People,Team,User}                  => {Stakeholder}    0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
373 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,User}           => {Personnel}      0.05158730 0.8666667  11.494737 
374 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}          => {Customer}       0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
375 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder}      => {User}           0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
376 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}        => {People}         0.05158730 1.0000000  13.263158 
377 {Customer,People,Personnel,User}             => {Stakeholder}    0.05158730 0.9285714  12.315789 
378 {People,Stakeholder,Team,User}               => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
379 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}          => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
380 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}          => {User}           0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
381 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User}            => {People}         0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
382 {People,Personnel,Team,User}                 => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
383 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,Team}           => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
384 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder}      => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
385 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}          => {Customer}       0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
386 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}        => {People}         0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
387 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team}             => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
388 {Customer,Stakeholder,Team,User}             => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
389 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,User}        => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
390 {Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User}            => {Customer}       0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
391 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team}        => {User}           0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
392 {Customer,Personnel,Team,User}               => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
393 {Customer,People,Team,User}                  => {Personnel}      0.04761905 0.9230769  12.242915 
394 {Customer,People,Personnel,User}             => {Team}           0.04761905 0.8571429  11.368421 
395 {People,Personnel,Team,User}                 => {Customer}       0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
396 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team}             => {User}           0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
397 {Customer,Personnel,Team,User}               => {People}         0.04761905 1.0000000  13.263158 
398 {Customer,People,Stakeholder,Team,User}      => {Personnel}      0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
399 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder,User} => {Team}           0.04365079 0.8461538  11.222672 
400 {People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User}     => {Customer}       0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
401 {Customer,People,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team} => {User}           0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
402 {Customer,Personnel,Stakeholder,Team,User}   => {People}         0.04365079 1.0000000  13.263158 
403 {Customer,People,Personnel,Team,User}        => {Stakeholder}    0.04365079 0.9166667  12.157895 
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ID Question Type 2 High Level Subtype Covers 
1 
Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the 
state of preparedness to obtain, understand, and present 
verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would rate my 
organization's DFR as: 
Perceived 40 
2 
Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic 
readiness 
Perceived 8 
3 Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive. Perceived 9 
4 This organization is exposed to many risks and threats. Perceived 10 
5 Our firm has a public profile. Demographic 11 
6 The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure. Perceived 12, 16 
7 
The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are 
consistent with its personnel privacy policies and applicable 
employment law. 
Perceived 29, 178 
8 
The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics 
program and implement lessons learned from previous incidents. 
Perceived 32, 36 
9 
The organization's employees have knowledge of information 
management and security policies. 
Perceived 34, 37, 143 
10 
The organization's security system has been proven to be 
reliable. 
Perceived 
39, 102, 
136, 186, 
145 
11 
Information technology and information security objectives are 
aligned with the business mission and objectives. 
Perceived 177 
12 
Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about 
admissibility and reliability of digital evidence for our organization 
is: 
Perceived 179 
13 Seeks accountability for intruders. Does 7, 43 
14 Allows wireless access. Does 20 
15 
Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their 
digital forensic responsibilities and the use of digital forensic 
tools. 
Does 
27, 123, 
187 
16 
Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure 
conduct and digital forensics tools and techniques. 
Does 
13, 31, 33, 
38, 123, 
157, 166 
17 
Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), security event management software 
(SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware. 
Does 
43, 100, 
101, 145, 
152, 181, 
184 
18 
Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs 
and data, and assesses the value of potential evidence. 
Does 
61, 76, 80, 
85, 86, 87, 
99, 106, 
121,155, 
188 
19 
Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous 
activities and anti-forensic activities (e.g. password crackers, key-
loggers, and steganography software) and assesses Internet 
activities such as cookies, temporary files, URLs, email, instant 
messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs. 
Does 
88, 92, 
145, 159 
20 
Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic 
capabilities such as authentication traffic monitoring, tamper 
proof mechanisms and logging time synchronization. 
Does 
89, 100, 
159, 182, 
185 
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21 
Controls access to data and evidence through strong 
authentication, access control lists, user logging, encryption, and 
implements measures for handling inadvertent exposures. 
Does 
81, 91, 93, 
96, 97, 98, 
103, 145 
22 
Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file 
encryption, and anti-forensic strategies (e.g. anonymity, data 
destruction/alteration, and onion routing). 
Does 104, 152 
23 
Looks for legal and technical advice, including published 
standards, regarding forensic policies, procedures, and 
information security, and monitors emerging academic digital 
forensics research. 
Does 
111, 167, 
168, 170, 
172, 174 
24 Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews. Does 
112, 156, 
173 
25 Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices. Does 
137, 138, 
139, 140 
26 
Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate 
physical and digital assets according to a digital forensic 
program. 
Does 
47, 57, 
147, 151 
27 
Develop corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using 
collaboration tools to maintain a shared workspace. 
Does 160 
28 
Controls security information through dashboards and metrics 
that continuously and dynamically measure information security 
performance. 
Does 169 
29 
Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their 
capabilities and response times, and validates the accreditation 
of their laboratories. 
Does 171 
30 
Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of 
competitors and enemies. 
Does 175 
31 
A forensic culture of preserving evidence and sharing knowledge 
in computer security and digital forensics. 
Has 5 
32 
A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from 
users). 
Has 6 
33 
Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel 
devices, use of systems, privacy, and consent of monitoring.  
Has 22, 23, 26 
34 Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them. Has 
14, 21, 24, 
25, 26, 74, 
75, 105, 
113, 116 
35 
Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory 
and/or governmental regulations (e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, 
admissibility rules, reporting requirements, international law and 
penalties for security incidents). 
Has 
28, 77, 
107, 109, 
116, 125, 
180 
36 
A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing 
roles and procedures to capture, store, map, analyze, preserve, 
control access to, integrate, and present evidence. 
Has 
30, 26, 48, 
74, 78, 
110, 114, 
115, 120 
121, 127, 
128, 129, 
130, 131 
37 
A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers 
policies, activities, procedures, training, roles, documentation, 
and management. 
Has 41, 56 
38 
A documented system security architecture configuration with 
consistent standards throughout the entire platform. 
Has 46, 54, 90 
218 
 
39 
Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, 
crime and dispute history and lessons learned. 
Has 49, 50, 51 
40 
A change management database that includes file hashes for 
common operating system files and for deployed applications, 
using file integrity checking software on important assets. 
Has 52, 53 
41 
A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite 
computer forensic examiners. 
Has 58, 59, 189 
42 
A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the 
associated meta-data identifying times and authors. 
Has 
55, 84, 94, 
95 
43 
A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or 
failure, complaints, crimes and disputes, and threats from 
opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees. This policy 
indicates how to manage people leaving the company. 
Has 108 
44 
Archive management procedures to assure that records 
(including those in the cloud) possess content, context and 
structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of 
authenticity, reliability, integrity, and usability. 
Has 115 
45 
Procedures describing the configuration and use of active 
monitoring and logging mechanisms, including procedures to 
prevent alteration of intercepted communications. 
Has 117 
46 
Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT 
and business systems, and monitoring of the forensics process. 
Has 118, 119 
47 
Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and 
volatile data, and analyzing admissible evidence. 
Has 
120, 122, 
124, 163 
48 
A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of 
technology deployed in the organization's information systems 
and the forensic readiness program. 
Has 126, 149 
49 
The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer 
and network forensics and manage legal evidence properly. 
Has 
35, 132, 
141, 144, 
146, 148, 
150, 153 
50 
Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first 
responders and investigators ready to work collaboratively with 
legal, IT, law enforcement, business, and auditing 
representatives in case of a cyber incident. 
Has 
133, 134, 
135, 142, 
161, 162, 
176 
51 
Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly 
pervasive use of encryption technologies. 
Has 154 
52 
A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the 
business while gathering admissible evidence, to restore 
essential services during an attack, to avoid financial loss, and to 
recover assets and data. 
Has 158 
53 
Mature and adequate governance models as well as an 
information systems development life cycle (ISDLC) informed by 
a well-developed forensic readiness policy. 
Has 
45, 46, 
164, 165 
54 
Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and 
functionality, including storage visualization abilities. 
Has 190 
55 
Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a 
mobile platform. 
Demographic 60 
56 
Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic 
readiness. 
Demographic 42 
57 
The standards of the digital forensics discipline and how to 
conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original 
evidence. 
Knows 
15, 19, 
125, 174 
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58 
Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a 
cyber incident. 
Knows 17 
59 
How to handle a politically sensitive or publicly embarrassing 
incident. 
Knows 11, 18 
60 
Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to 
deploy in case of a cyber incident.  
Knows 63, 123 
61 
Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in 
case of a cyber incident. 
Knows 64 
62 
How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and 
accelerate its investigation in case of a cyber incident. 
Knows 65 
63 
How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a 
digital forensic incident. 
Knows 66 
64 
How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ 
examination, seizure and removal of the system(s), in case of a 
cyber incident. 
Knows 67 
65 
How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may 
be involved in a legal inquiry, in case of a cyber incident. 
Knows 62, 68 
66 
How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, 
timeline of events, and duration of a cyber incident. 
Knows 69, 70 
67 
How to determine the nature, crime category, types of 
technologies used or involved, and technical skill and knowledge 
of a suspect in a cyber incident. 
Knows 
62, 71, 72, 
73 
68 
How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of 
evidence at every step, including information about the tools 
used, in case of a cyber incident. 
Knows 79 
69 
The sources and format of the organization's  data, when and 
where data is generated, the associated threats to the data, and 
how data is preserved for long-term storage. 
Knows 83 
70 
How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the 
organization’'s policies and all applicable laws and regulations in 
all phases of a forensic investigation process. 
Knows 125 
71 Industry sector of the organization. Demographic 1 
72 
What are the estimated organization sales? (in thousands of 
dollars per year). 
Demographic 2 
73 What is the organization size in number of employees? Demographic 3 
74 What is the organization size in number of customers? Demographic 4 
75 
What is the amount of data produced in the organization every 
month? 
Demographic 82 
76 
After completing this survey and given the definition of digital 
forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain, 
understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, 
I would rate my organization's DFR as: 
Perceived 191 
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Thanks for your participation in this study. By agreeing to participate in this survey you consent with the 
utilization of this information for the purpose of the study and acknowledge that your participation is 
voluntary. You can abandon this this survey at any time. However, we appreciate that you complete all 
required information to the best of your knowledge. 
 
Choices: Accept, Decline 
 
Please read each sentence carefully and check the circle corresponding to your level of agreement with it 
according to your perception of the situation in your organization. 
 
1. Given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of preparedness to obtain, 
understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would rate my organization's DFR as: 
 
Choices: Very low, Low, Average, High, Very high 
 
Question Matrix: 
2. Management is convinced of the importance of digital forensic readiness 
3. Implementing a digital forensics program is expensive. 
4. This organization is exposed to many risks and threats. 
5. Our firm has a public profile. 
6. The location(s) of the organization makes it insecure. 
7. The organization's policies on information systems monitoring are consistent with its personnel privacy 
policies and applicable employment law. 
8. The organization's personnel is committed to the forensics program and implement lessons learned 
from previous incidents. 
9. The organization's employees have knowledge of information management and security policies. 
10.The organization's security system has been proven to be reliable. 
11.Information technology and information security objectives are aligned with the business mission and 
objectives. 
12.Fulfilling the demands that the legal system makes about admissibility and reliability of digital evidence 
for our organization is hard. 
 
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree 
 
Question Matrix: 
Please select your level of agreement with the following assertions of what your organization currently 
does. 
 
13.Seeks accountability for intruders. 
14.Allows wireless access. 
15.Enforces forensic policies and makes staff accountable of their digital forensic responsibilities and the 
use of digital forensic tools. 
16.Offers and encourages personnel training and guidance in secure conduct and digital forensics tools 
and techniques. 
17.Uses digital forensics tools and techniques, e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDS), security event 
management software (SEM), forensic kits, antivirus and spyware. 
18.Identifies and prioritizes the sources of evidence, preserves logs and data, and assesses the value of 
potential evidence. 
19.Controls information flow and channels to prevent anonymous activities and anti-forensic activities 
(e.g. password crackers, key-loggers, and steganography software) and assesses Internet activities such 
as cookies, temporary files, URLs, email, instant messages and SMTP send-receiver pairs. 
20.Develops the digital and physical infrastructure with forensic capabilities such as authentication traffic 
monitoring, tamper proof mechanisms and logging time synchronization. 
21.Controls access to data and evidence through strong authentication, access control lists, user logging, 
encryption, and implements measures for handling inadvertent exposures. 
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22.Bans disk scrubbing tools, file shredding software, personal file encryption, and anti-forensic strategies 
(e.g. anonymity, data destruction/alteration, and onion routing). 
23.Looks for legal and technical advice, including published standards, regarding forensic policies, 
procedures, and information security, and monitors emerging academic digital forensics research. 
24.Conducts regular risk assessments and compliance reviews. 
25.Profiles and monitors systems' users and their personal devices. 
26.Controls physical access to, classifies, and relocates corporate physical and digital assets according 
to a digital forensic program. 
27.Develops corporate policies and procedures collaboratively using collaboration tools to maintain a 
shared workspace. 
28.Controls security information through dashboards and metrics that continuously and dynamically 
measure information security performance. 
29.Manages external digital forensic investigators, establishes their capabilities and response times, and 
validates the accreditation of their laboratories. 
30.Performs security benchmarking to assess the preparedness of competitors and enemies. 
 
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree 
 
Question Matrix: 
Please select your level of agreement with the following assertions of what your organization currently 
has. 
 
31.A forensic culture of preserving evidence and sharing knowledge in computer security and digital 
forensics. 
32.A corporate culture of secrecy (forensics activities are kept from users). 
33.Policies clarifying ownership of data in corporate and personnel devices, use of systems, privacy, and 
consent of monitoring.  
34.Policies defining potential incidents and how to respond to them. 
35.Policies clarifying the roles and tasks to comply with statutory and/or governmental regulations (e.g. 
Sarbanes–Oxley, HIPAA, admissibility rules, reporting requirements, international law, and penalties for 
security incidents). 
36.A documented digital forensics investigation protocol describing roles and procedures to capture, 
store, map, analyze, preserve, control access to, integrate, and present evidence. 
37.A quality assurance system, with good records, that covers policies, activities, procedures, training, 
roles, documentation, and management. 
38.A documented system security architecture configuration with consistent standards throughout the 
entire platform. 
39.Archived reports of previous incidents, anomalous observations, crime and dispute history and lessons 
learned. 
40.A change management database that includes file hashes for common operating system files and for 
deployed applications, using file integrity checking software on important assets. 
41.A proper laboratory, equipment, hardware and software for onsite computer forensic examiners. 
42.A secure storage of systems and networks activity logs with the associated meta-data identifying times 
and authors. 
43.A suspicion policy to review potential sources of attacks or failure, complaints, crimes and disputes, 
and threats from opportunists, competitors or disgruntled employees. This policy indicates how to 
manage people leaving the company. 
44.Archive management procedures to assure that records (including those in the cloud) possess 
content, context and structure, while preserving evidence quality in terms of authenticity, reliability, 
integrity, and usability. 
45.Procedures describing the configuration and use of active monitoring and logging mechanisms, 
including procedures to prevent alteration of intercepted communications. 
46.Information security audit procedures that include protection of IT and business systems, and 
monitoring of the forensics process. 
47.Procedures for performing backups, gathering permanent and volatile data, and analyzing admissible 
evidence. 
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48.A process for the selection, use, testing, and maintenance of technology deployed in the organization's 
information systems and the forensic readiness program. 
49.The technology, expertise, and resources to perform computer and network forensics and manage 
legal evidence properly. 
50.Dedicated roles relating to security and forensics including first responders and investigators ready to 
work collaboratively with legal, IT, law enforcement, business, and auditing representatives in case of a 
cyber incident. 
51.Sufficient decryption capabilities to counter the increasingly pervasive use of encryption technologies. 
52.A business continuity plan to minimize interruption to the business while gathering admissible 
evidence, to restore essential services during an attack, to avoid financial loss, and to recover assets and 
data. 
53.Mature and adequate governance models as well as an information systems development life cycle 
(ISDLC) informed by a well-developed forensic readiness policy. 
54.Storage technology that is appropriate in capacity and functionality, including storage visualization 
abilities. 
55.Multiple virtual locations, wired and wireless networks, and/or a mobile platform. 
56.Enough funding for the implementation of digital forensic readiness. 
 
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree 
 
Question Matrix: 
Please select your level of agreement with whether or not the people in your organization in charge of the 
following tasks has the knowledge to perform them. 
 
57.How to conduct an onsite examination keeping the integrity of the original evidence. 
58.Whether or not to turn off a hacked system or device in case of a cyber incident. 
59.How to handle a politically sensitive or publicly embarrassing incident. 
60.Which forensic tools and techniques the organization needs to deploy in case of a cyber incident.  
61.Where to look in the system to identify case specific evidence in case of a cyber incident. 
62.How to anticipate the organization's discovery needs and accelerate its investigation in case of a cyber 
incident. 
63.How to forecast and control the escalation of costs when facing a digital forensic incident. 
64.How to determine whether a warrant allows for an onsite or in situ examination, seizure and removal of 
the system(s), in case of a cyber incident. 
65.How to recognize the range of personnel within the firm who may be involved in a legal inquiry, in case 
of a cyber incident. 
66.How to determine the location, remote access methods, time, timeline of events, and duration of a 
cyber incident. 
67.How to determine the nature, crime category, types of technologies used or involved, and technical 
skill and knowledge of a suspect in a cyber incident. 
68.How to provide detailed log and documentation of the chain of evidence at every step, including 
information about the tools used, in case of a cyber incident. 
69.What the sources and format of the organization's data are, when and where data is generated, the 
associated threats to the data, and how data is preserved for long-term storage. 
70.How to demonstrate due diligence and compliance with the organization's policies and all applicable 
laws and regulations in all phases of a forensic investigation process. 
 
Choices: Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree 
 
Organizational demographics 
 
1. What is your organization's primary business activity? (Select one only) 
 
Choices: 
 
Manufacturing and Process Industries (Non-computer) 
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Online Retailer 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Application Service Provider (ASP) 
Communications Carrier 
Aerospace 
Banking/Finance/Accounting 
Insurance/Real Estate/Legal 
Federal Government (including military) 
State/Local Government 
Medical/Dental/Healthcare 
Transportation/Utilities 
Construction/Architecture/Engineering 
Data Processing Services 
Wholesale/Retail/Distribution 
Education 
Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment 
Research/Development Lab 
Business Services/Consultant 
Computer Manufacturer (Hardware, software, peripherals) 
Computer/Network Services/Consultant 
Computer Related Retailer/Wholesaler/Distributor 
Other 
 
2. What are the estimated organization sales? (in thousands of dollars per year). 
 
Choices: 
 
Less than 50 
Between 50 and 200 
Between 200 and 500 
Between 500 and 2,000 
More than 2,000 
 
3. What is the organization size in number of employees? 
 
Choices: 
 
1 to 50 
Between 51 and 200 
Between 201 and 500 
Between 501 and 2000 
More than 5,000 
 
4. What is the organization size in number of customers? 
 
Choices: 
 
1 to 20 
Between 21 and 200 
Between 201 and 1,000 
Between 1,001 and 10,000 
More than 10,000 
 
5. What is the amount of data produced in the organization every month? 
 
Choices: 
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Less than 10 MB 
Between 10 and 500 MB 
Between 0.5 and 50 GB 
Between 50 GB and 1 TB 
More than 1 TB 
 
6. After completing this survey and given the definition of digital forensic readiness (DFR) as the state of 
preparedness to obtain, understand, and present verifiable digital evidence when needed, I would rate my 
organization's DFR as: 
 
Choices: Very low, Low, Average, High, Very high 
 
Basic demographics questions: 
 
1. What is your age range in years? 
 
Choices: 
 
Below 18 
18 to 25 
26 to 40 
41 to 60 
Above 60 
 
2. What is your gender? 
 
Choices: 
 
Male 
Female 
Omit to answer 
 
3. For how many years have you been in this organization? 
 
Choices: 
 
Less than 2 
2 to 5 
6 to 10 
11 to 20 
More than 20 
 
4. What is your current position in this organization? 
 
5. For how many years have you been in your current position? 
 
Choices: 
 
Less than 2 
2 to 5 
6 to 10 
11 to 20 
More than 20 
 
6. Let us know if you have any comments about this survey and add your email if you want to be 
contacted.  
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